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Abstract 
 
Microfinance aims to better the livelihoods of the bottom of the pyramid by providing them 
with financial services. However, recent studies show that microfinance can have adverse 
effects, leading clients into over-indebtedness. This dissertation argues that microfinance 
clients are by default vulnerable and offers ways to rethink microfinance as client-centered, 
presuming a responsibility for client protection. Part I discusses the vulnerability of clients 
and the centrality of their protection. Part II analyzes the causes and consequences of over-
indebtedness and suggests state regulations, financial literacy programs, and soft law 
standards for its mitigation. Part III introduces the concept of responsible microfinance, 
which claims that not only microfinance institutions but also other stakeholders, such as 
states and transnational and international organizations, have a responsibility to protect 
microfinance clients. Part IV accepts that over-indebtedness has to be addressed from 
several angles and considers how public and private actors may enhance its alleviation and 
develops an encompassing multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance. 
Developing this framework includes a thorough evaluation of the suitability of ten novel 
strategies, such as behaviorally informed consumer protection regulations, educational soap 
operas, and Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles, to further the mitigation of over-
indebtedness. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Mikrofinanz ermöglicht ärmeren Bevölkerungsschichten in Entwicklungs- und 
Schwellenländern den Zugang zu Finanzprodukten und beabsichtigt inkludierend und 
armutsbekämpfend zu wirken. Studien zeigen jedoch, dass Mikrofinanz auch negative Effekte 
haben kann. Ein zentrales Thema in dieser Debatte ist die Überschuldung. Diese Dissertation 
argumentiert, dass Mikrofinanz-Klienten aufgrund ihrer Verwundbarkeit eines besonderen 
Schutzes vor Überschuldung bedürfen. Von dieser Annahme ausgehend bietet diese Arbeit 
Anknüpfungspunkte um Mikrofinanz dahingehend zu überdenken, dass Mikrofinanz 
Institutionen klientenzentriert operieren und ihre Verantwortung, Klienten zu schützen, 
wahrnehmen sollen. Teil I diskutiert die Verwundbarkeit der Klienten und die 
Schlüsselfunktion des Klientenschutzes. Teil II beleuchtet die Ursachen und Auswirkungen 
von Überschuldung und schlägt Regulierungen, Massnahmen zur Förderung des 
Finanzwissens und Soft Law Standards zu deren Minderung vor. Teil III führt das Konzept 
Responsible Microfinance ein, welches eine Verantwortung der Mikrofinanz Institutionen und 
weiteren Stakeholdern im Bereich Klientenschutz annimmt. Teil IV entwickelt ein 
umfassendes Multi-Stakeholder Rahmenkonzept für Responsible Microfinance. Dabei werden 
zehn neuere Strategien öffentlicher und privater Akteure, wie z.B. verhaltensorientierte 
Regulierungen, bildungsstiftende Seifenopern und Smart Campaigns Klientenschutz 
Prinzipien auf ihre Eignung, Überschuldung zu vermindern, geprüft.  
  
  
  
To my Grandmother Annie Landolt 
  
  
 
  
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I 
INTRODUCTION 1 
1 INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, MICROFINANCE, AND 
OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 1 
2 RETHINKING MICROFINANCE: CONNECTING RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS AND INSIGHTS TO EXPLORE NEW AVENUES 4 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 6 
3.1 INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THIS 
RESEARCH PROJECT 6 
3.2 METHODS 15 
3.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND LITERATURE 15 
3.4 SEPARATE DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH OUTLINE OF PART IV 16 
3.4.1 CASE SELECTION 17 
3.4.2 AVAILABILITY OF DATA 17 
3.5 GOALS OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION 18 
PART I – MICROFINANCE: ADDING A NEW DIMENSION 19 
4 BRINGING FINANCIAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 19 
4.1 NO INFORMATION, NO COLLATERAL, NO BUSINESS? 22 
4.2 FROM PROMISES TO REALITY: CLIENT PROTECTION AS A PRESSING ISSUE 
WHEN PROVIDING FINANCIAL SERVICES TO THE BOP 24 
5 MICROFINANCE: AN OVERVIEW 27 
5.1 A CURRENT DEFINITION OF MICROFINANCE 27 
5.2 TARGET GROUPS OF MICROFINANCE 29 
  
5.3 MICROFINANCE PROVIDERS AND CREDIT 31 
5.3.1 DIFFERENT TYPES OF MFIS 31 
5.3.2 MICROFINANCE PRODUCTS 32 
5.3.2.1 CREDIT 33 
5.3.2.1.1 HOW TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND 
UNCOLLATERALIZED CREDIT 33 
5.3.2.1.1.1 ADVERSE SELECTION 34 
5.3.2.1.1.2 MORAL HAZARD 36 
5.3.2.1.1.3 GROUP- AND INDIVIDUAL LENDING METHODOLOGIES 37 
6 EXTENDING THE DEFINITION OF MICROFINANCE 41 
6.1 THE VULNERABILITY OF MICROFINANCE CLIENTS 43 
6.2 THE SOCIAL MISSION INHERENT TO MICROFINANCE 46 
6.3 OVER-INDEBTEDNESS CRISES 46 
7 THE EXTENDED DEFINITION OF MICROFINANCE: ADDING A 
HOW-DIMENSION 47 
8 CONCLUSION 49 
PART II – OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AS THE CORE PROBLEM OF 
MICROFINANCE 51 
9 OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND MICROFINANCE 51 
9.1 THE FUNGIBILITY OF MONEY 53 
9.2 INDEBTEDNESS AND DEBT STRESS 55 
10 OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 55 
10.1 OVER-INDEBTEDNESS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 59 
10.1.1 CAUSES OF OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 61 
10.1.1.1 CAUSES: EXTERNAL FACTORS 61 
10.1.1.2 CAUSES: INSTITUTIONAL AND SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE 62 
  
10.1.1.2.1 COMPETITION IN AND SATURATION OF MICROFINANCE MARKETS 63 
10.1.1.2.2 LACK OF POOLED INFORMATION ABOUT CREDIT RECORDS 65 
10.1.1.2.3 INAPPROPRIATE MICROFINANCE PRODUCTS 66 
10.1.1.3 CAUSES: CLIENT LEVEL 67 
10.1.1.3.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE BIASES 68 
10.1.1.3.2 SOCIOLOGICAL INFLUENCE FACTORS 70 
10.1.1.3.3 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTORS 71 
10.1.2 CAUSES OF OVER-INDEBTEDNESS: RESULTS 72 
10.1.3 CONSEQUENCES OF OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 73 
10.1.3.1 CONSEQUENCES ON THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 73 
10.1.3.1.1 MATERIAL CONSEQUENCES 73 
10.1.3.1.2 SOCIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES 74 
10.1.3.1.3 CONSEQUENCES FOR CLIENTS HANDLING THEIR DEBT WELL 75 
10.1.3.2 CONSEQUENCES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL 75 
10.1.3.2.1 CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF MFIS 76 
10.1.3.2.2 REPUTATIONAL LOSS AS A CONSEQUENCE 77 
10.1.3.3 CONSEQUENCES ON THE SYSTEMIC LEVEL 78 
10.2 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 79 
10.2.1 EXTERNAL FACTORS HYPOTHESIS AND IMPLICATION 81 
10.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL AND SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE HYPOTHESES AND 
IMPLICATIONS 81 
10.2.3 CLIENT PERSPECTIVE HYPOTHESES AND IMPLICATIONS 83 
10.3 THREE APPROACHES TO MITIGATE OVER-INDEBTEDNESS 85 
11 CONCLUSION 86 
PART III – TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF RESPONSIBLE 
MICROFINANCE 88 
12 FROM THE EXTENDED DEFINITION TO A FRAMEWORK OF 
RESPONSIBLE MICROFINANCE 88 
  
13 RESPONSIBLE MICROFINANCE: A DEFINITION AND ITS THREE 
DEMANDS 90 
14 THE OVERALL DEMAND FOR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPONSIBLE 
MICROFINANCE 96 
14.1 SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RESPONSIBILITY 98 
14.2 DISCUSSING RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE ACTORS 102 
14.3 WHAT ARE CORPORATE AGENTS? 105 
14.4 HOLDING RESPONSIBLE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 105 
14.5 ARE CORPORATE AGENTS FIT TO BE HELD RESPONSIBLE? 107 
14.5.1 FIRST CONDITION – VALUE RELEVANCE 108 
14.5.2 SECOND CONDITION – VALUE JUDGMENT 113 
14.5.3 THIRD CONDITION – VALUE SENSITIVITY 113 
14.6 INDIVIDUAL VERSUS CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 115 
14.7 APPLICABILITY OF PETTIT’S THEORY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
THE RESPONSIBLE MICROFINANCE FRAMEWORK 117 
15 CONCLUSION 118 
PART IV – ENFORCING AND ENABLING RESPONSIBLE 
MICROFINANCE 119 
16 THE THREE PILLARS OF RESPONSIBLE MICROFINANCE 119 
17 PILLAR ONE: STATE REGULATIONS 126 
17.1 CASE I: BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION 127 
17.2 CASE II: CREDIT BUREAUS 132 
17.3 CASE III: PRIVATE INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 134 
17.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION – CLIENT PROTECTION POLICIES 135 
  
18 PILLAR TWO: FINANCIAL LITERACY PROGRAMS 137 
18.1 CASE IV: THE FINANCIAL LITERACY PROGRAM OF SEWA BANK 139 
18.2 CASE V: MAKUTANO JUNCTION: A KENYAN SOAP OPERA 145 
18.3 CASE VI: THE GAMIFICATION OF FINANCIAL LITERACY 148 
18.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION – FINANCIAL LITERACY ENDEAVORS 150 
19 PILLAR THREE: SOFT LAW STANDARDS 152 
19.1 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF COMMON INTEREST REGULATION 155 
19.1.1 INSTITUTIONAL SUPPLY-SIDE CONDITIONS 159 
19.1.2 SOCIETAL DEMAND-SIDE CONDITIONS 162 
19.2 CASE VII: UN GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION: FINANCIAL 
SERVICES CHAPTER 166 
19.3 CASE VIII: UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 170 
19.4 CASE IX: SMART CAMPAIGN’S CLIENT PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND 
CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 176 
19.5 CASE X: THE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE TASK FORCE’S UNIVERSAL 
STANDARDS FOR SOCIAL PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 184 
19.6 ANALYSIS OF THE CASES AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE COMMON 
INTEREST REGULATION THEORY 191 
19.7 INSTITUTIONAL SUPPLY OF THE FOUR CASES 193 
19.8 SOCIETAL DEMAND IN REGARD TO THE FOUR CASES 199 
19.9 CATEGORIZING THE FOUR CASES WITHIN THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
COMMON INTEREST REGULATION 204 
19.10 APPLICABILITY TO THE RESPONSIBLE MICROFINANCE FRAMEWORK 206 
19.11 INTERIM CONCLUSION – SOFT LAW STANDARDS 210 
20 CONCLUSION 212 
  
CONCLUSION 217 
21 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS, OVERALL CONTRIBUTION, AND 
IMPLICATIONS 217 
21.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RESULTS 218 
21.2 OVERALL CONTRIBUTION 224 
21.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 225 
APPENDIX 229 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 233 
 
  
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1:	 Financial Needs in a Household Life Cycle (adapted from 
Landolt 2009, 15) 44	
Figure 2: Within the Black Box – Manageable Debt, Debt Stress, 
Over-Indebtedness (O-I) (own figure) 54	
Figure 3: The Causes of Over-Indebtedness (O-I) (own figure) 72	
Figure 4: The Multi-Stakeholder Framework of Responsible 
Microfinance (revised and updated from 
Responsible Finance Forum 2011) 120	
Figure 5: Capital Formation Life-Graph (own figure) 141	
Figure 6: Regulatory Outcomes (adapted from Mattli and 
Woods 2009, 16) 158	
Figure 7: Regulatory Outcomes of the Four Analyzed 
Cases (own figure) 205	
Figure 8:	 Multi-Stakeholder Framework of Responsible 
Microfinance Including Practical Strategies to Mitigate O-I 213	
Figure 9:	 Financial In- and Outflows of MFIs (Landolt 2009, 8) 232	
 
  
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Extent of Institutional Supply: UN Guidelines on 
Consumer Protection 193 
Table 2: Extent of Institutional Supply: UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights 194 
Table 3: Extent of Institutional Supply: Smart Campaign’s Client 
Protection Principles and Certification Program 196 
Table 4: Extent of Institutional Supply: SPTF’s Universal Standards for 
Social Performance Management 198 
  
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
APR Annual Percentage Rate 
BoP Bottom of the Pyramid 
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
CFI Center for Financial Inclusion 
CI Consumers International 
DFID Department of International Development 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECOSOC UN Economic and Social Council 
ESG Environmental, Social, Governance 
EU European Union 
GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 
GNI Gross National Income 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IO International Organization 
MFI Microfinance Institution 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NCP National Contact Point 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
O-I Over-Indebtedness 
PAR  Portfolio at Risk 
ROI Return on Investment 
ROSCAs Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
RQ Research Questions 
SC Smart Campaign 
SEBI Securities and Exchange Board of India 
SMEs Small to Medium Size Enterprises 
SPTF Social Performance Task Force 
WTO World Trade Organization 
UN United Nations 
  
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDESA UN Department for Economic and Social Affaires 
UNGPBHR UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
UNPCP UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
UNPRI UN-Supported Principles for Responsible Investments 
 
  I 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This thesis would not have been possible without the support and inputs of 
a number of dear friends, family, colleagues, and my supervisors. I would 
like to express my gratitude and appreciation to all of them for being part of 
this not only wonderful but at times also challenging journey. 
I would like to thank the advisors that helped me during the course of 
this research. I am indebted to my main supervisor Francis Cheneval, who 
provided guidance and advice at every stage of the project. As his teaching 
and research assistant at the Center for Ethics at the University of Zurich, I 
was given the opportunity to follow my research interests, teach, and 
organize and manage interdisciplinary events in the field of impact 
investing. During three years these events provided me with a valuable 
network of individuals to discuss and debate my research. Also I would like 
to thank Markus Huppenbauer for his support during this project. His cluster 
meetings on economic and corporate responsibility were a source of 
inspiration and knowledge. 
Thanks are also due to my colleagues at the Center for Ethics and the 
Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich, which made my 
doctoral studies, my writing, and working hours pleasant and fun. 
Especially, I would like to thank Martin Beckstein, Lineo De Vecchi, Alice El-
Wakil, Christoph Laszlo, Julia Meyer, Michael Räber, Johan Rochel, and 
Franziska Spörri for their help and comments on various parts of this book. 
I am also deeply indebted to my friends and family that endured patiently 
my dissertation talk. 
I would like to express my gratitude to my dear friend and colleague 
Antoinette Scherz, who contributed greatly to this project. She was a 
constant source of support and gave me helpful advice on this book as a 
whole. I am beyond thankful to Annette Krauss for having confidence in my 
work. She was always willing to discuss ideas and share her broad 
knowledge of microfinance. Also I am indebted to Susanne Post my dearest 
sparring partner. Ever happy to debate conceptual questions, structure, and 
  II 
the project as a whole, I cannot thank her enough for her contribution to 
and support for this book. Also I would like to thank Beverly Weiss for 
proofreading this research. 
Over the course of this project, I have accumulated a large debt of 
gratitude to my husband Robert Loosli. I am thankful for the confidence he 
put in this project and me. During this time he was nothing less but 
encouraging, patient, and loving. 
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Inclusive Development Strategies, Microfinance, 
and Over-Indebtedness  
With his statement that development strategies should aim for „build[ing] 
development around people rather than people around development” and 
that they should target the „productivity of the poor”, Ul Haq’s book The 
Poverty Curtain – Choices for the Third World heralded the start of a new 
perception that development strategies should be inclusive and orient 
themselves to the needs of the poor (1976, 28) 1 . The introductory 
paragraphs in the first United Nations (UN) Human Development Report of 
1990 elucidated this novel perception further. 
This Report is about people - and about how development enlarges 
their choices. […] No one can guarantee human happiness, and 
the choices people make are their own concern. But the process of 
development should at least create a conducive environment for 
people, individually and collectively, to develop their full potential 
and to have a reasonable chance of leading productive and 
creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. (Ul Haq 
1990, 1) 
Microfinance, as a prominent example of an inclusive development 
strategy, tries to provide this conducive environment for the Bottom of the 
Pyramid (BoP) 2  to lead productive lives. Described as the process of 
                                       
1 His claims resonate with the later developed approaches known as the Capability 
Approach (Sen 2000a) or the Human Development Approach (Nussbaum 2011). 
2 „The term base or bottom of the pyramid [BoP] describes a consumer profile, as well 
as a portion of the financial market and financial services and products directed at this 
consumer profile. The consumer profile is characterized by a number of related and 
overlapping potential vulnerabilities including low or variable incomes, lower levels of 
financial literacy and capability, and limited access to or experience with formal financial 
services. Often, these characteristics correlate with other factors, such as lower education 
levels, illiteracy, language differences, minority racial or ethnic status, and longer distances 
from major population centers” (M. Chapman and Mazer 2013, 1). The term bottom of the 
pyramid (BoP) was first coined by Prahalad and Hart (2002; see also Prahalad 2010).  
  2 
microfinance institutions (MFIs)3 providing the BoP with different financial 
services, microfinance furthers financial inclusion4 and eventually aims to lift 
the BoP out of poverty. Financial inclusion has gained momentum in recent 
years, and has become a considerably important subject for academia, 
policy makers and a wide array of stakeholders involved in development 
cooperation (Tilman et al. 2013, The World Bank 2014). Serving as a 
poverty reduction vehicle, financial inclusion is seen as an inclusive 
development strategy which aims to enhance the distribution of income by 
means of generating opportunities in the economic as well as in the social 
sphere (Chibba 2011, 78–79). The goal of financial inclusion is to widen and 
facilitate the poor’s access to financial services. 
Microfinance is one of the key strategies to enhance financial inclusion5 
and the object of this study. However, there is nothing trivial about 
furthering financial inclusion with microfinance. Microfinance, if not 
conducted responsibly, may bring about unintended and often adverse 
effects. One of the key messages of the Global Financial Development 
Report 2014 for Financial Inclusion is „[i]f inclusion is to have positive 
effects, it needs to be promoted responsibly. Financial inclusion does not 
mean credit for all at all costs” (The World Bank 2014a, 14). Microfinance 
was long perceived as a cure-all to reduce poverty in low- and middle-
income countries in order to increase the poor’s access to financial markets. 
Microfinance would enable the BoP to start or expand (mostly self-
employed) businesses with a loan and become profitable. By means of 
                                       
3 The term microfinance institutions (MFIs) is henceforth used interchangeably with the 
term microfinance providers. 
4 Financial inclusion is the opposite of financial exclusion. The latter refers to the process 
where people are prevented from „gaining access to the financial system” (Leyshon and 
Thrift 1995, 312). Over the past decades, financial exclusion has increasingly come to the 
attention of governments and international and transnational organizations, as a dimension 
to be taken into account in the fight against poverty and social exclusion (Dangi 2012, 70). 
The term social exclusion was coined by René Lenoir secretary of the social security 
department in France under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the 1970s (see 
Lenoir 1974). Social exclusion can be understood as an umbrella term and includes financial 
exclusion. It is presented as one of the major problems today’s development strategies 
attempt to fight. Sen (2000b, 1–2) provides a good overview of the usage of the concept of 
social exclusion and how it connects to and has taken root in the discourse about poverty 
and capability deprivation over the past 40 years. 
5 Other financial inclusion endeavors comprise financial literacy programs, promoting 
private-sector development, and regulatory and legislative support from governments. 
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microfinance the poor should also be able to smooth fluctuations in 
consumption as well as invest in education and health (Karlan and Zinman 
2010, 436; Collins et al. 2011; Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). Especially 
the years 2005 and 2006 were important for the exceptional growth of 
microfinance markets. The Secretary General of the UN stated referring to 
the ‘year of microcredit’ in 2005: 
[O]nce the poor were commonly seen as passive victims, 
microfinance recognizes that the poor people are remarkable 
reservoirs of energy and knowledge. And while the lack of financial 
services is a sign of poverty, today it is also understood as an 
untapped opportunity to create markets, bring people in […] and 
give them the tools […] to help themselves. (Kofi Annan, UN, 
Geneva Symposium, 10/10/2005) 
One year later as Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the renowned 
‘Grameen Bank’ in Bangladesh, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, 
microfinance saw another boost and was identified as effective development 
assistance6. 
  
                                       
6 Further reasons for the growing importance and the increased growth of microfinance 
for the past four decades are: First, empirical evidence from the field, despite its limitations 
in regard to generalization, suggests that microfinance has a positive impact on economic 
self-sufficiency (Karlan and Zinman 2010, 453). Setboonsarng and Parpiev argue, for 
example, that microfinance helps reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
especially the goal to half the number of people living on less than US$ 1 a day (2008, 1). 
Second, interest stems from an economic point of view. The fact that globally 50 percent of 
the adult population lacks a bank account, translates into an untouched market of 2.5 billion 
unbanked individuals (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012, 2). 
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2 Rethinking Microfinance: Connecting Recent 
Developments and Insights to Explore New 
Avenues 
After years of concentrating on growth and outreach of microfinance 
academics as well as individuals and groups of the private and public sector 
have started to evaluate the assets and drawbacks of microfinance more 
critically. Recent experimental studies have found that microfinance in fact 
has a limited impact on health, education and income (Banerjee, Duflo, and 
Kinnan 2015, 25–26). Furthermore, over-indebtedness as a pressing issue 
within microfinance has been prominently discussed in the media and 
especially in the case of the over-indebtedness crises in Andra Pradesh, 
India. Microfinance clients had taken up too much debt and had slid into 
over-indebtedness. Scholars have lately started to analyze the causes and 
adverse and wide-ranging effects over-indebtedness has not only on 
microfinance clients, but also on MFIs’ financial sustainability, and the 
stability of microfinance markets. Additionally, they have investigated how 
over-indebtedness could be minimized. 
Two research topics, however, have been widely left untouched. First, 
over-indebtedness as the most mediatized and as one of the pressing issues 
in microfinance showed the wide-ranging impact it has had on clients, MFIs, 
and markets to a wider public. While many authors investigate the 
phenomenon of over-indebtedness, no paper or publication, to the best of 
my knowledge, has yet addressed whether the devastating effects of over-
indebtedness crises in combination with the other two core premises of 
microfinance, namely to follow a social mission, and to provide financial 
services to vulnerable clients, implies a rethinking of the current 
understanding and definition of microfinance. Arguing that microfinance 
clients should be protected from harmful practices and claiming that the 
connection between the current understanding of microfinance and the 
protection of its clients is a much more direct one, I advocate and propose 
an extended definition of microfinance including a quality-dimension 
demanding MFIs to abide by client protection standards. Second, although 
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scholars propose ways to mitigate over-indebtedness from different angles 
and with different microfinance stakeholders (McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 
2011; Guérin, Morvant-Roux, and Villarreal 2014; Brix and McKee 2010; 
Schicks 2010; Schicks 2011b; Schicks 2012; Kappel, Krauss, and Lontzek 
2010; Johnson 2014; Hummel 2014; Guérin 2013; Guérin et al. 2014; 
Schicks and Rosenberg 2011; Wampfler, Bouquet, and Ralison 2014) the 
implications made in these publications had been seldom connected to and 
presented within an encompassing framework of coordinated and 
cooperated action to fight over-indebtedness. McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 
(2011) are among the few who make this connection. They propose a 
framework of responsible finance within which over-indebtedness can be 
mitigated from different angles and stakeholders. However and this holds 
for the few publications connecting responsible finance with microfinance, 
they do not clarify what ‘responsible’ or ‘responsibility’ in this context 
means. In the course of this research project, I advocate working towards a 
‘multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance’ that constitutes a 
specification of the broader and fuzzier framework of responsible finance. In 
doing so, I primarily elaborate the possible functions responsibility could 
have in such a framework. Thereafter, I present a framework of responsible 
microfinance including three pillars (i.e. state regulations, financial literacy 
programs, soft law standards) and analyze three to four cases for each 
pillar. These cases constitute tangible strategies to alleviate over-
indebtedness among microfinance clients. The two overarching research 
questions of this study are therefore: On what grounds can an extension of 
the current definition of microfinance by a dimension accounting for how 
microfinance products should be delivered be advocated? And, what could a 
framework of responsible microfinance look like, and what are the potential 
functions ‘responsibility’ could take in such a framework? 
In the succeeding chapter, I present the research design of this study, 
starting by introducing all of the research questions arising throughout this 
research project, briefly summarizing the arguments of the four parts it 
entails, and addressing the research methods used. I conclude by 
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presenting the main goals this research project pursues and what 
contributions it could potentially make. 
3 Research Design 
This research endeavor is concerned with the overarching questions of what 
grounds there are to extend the current definition of microfinance, and how 
over-indebtedness, having serious and far reaching consequences not only 
for clients but also for MFIs and microfinance markets, can be mitigated. 
Additionally, there are further research questions that arise throughout the 
course of this research project. All the research questions are introduced 
below. Please note that in each of the four parts of this study the 
corresponding research questions will be separately introduced once more 
and a short literature review will be presented. In order to provide possible 
answers to the following research questions, my arguments are based on 
theories, insights, and empirical evidence from the fields of political science 
and philosophy, economics, behavioral economics, psychology, law, and 
ethics. 
3.1 Introducing the Research Questions and the 
Structure of this Research Project 
Hereafter, I briefly elaborate on all research questions that arise throughout 
this research project and provide a summary of the arguments brought 
forward in each of the four parts constituting this study. 
 
RQ I Although the main premise of microfinance is to be 
financially profitable and to help clients better their 
livelihoods, recent studies have shown that microfinance 
in fact also could have adverse effects that may leave 
microfinance clients over-indebted. Scholars and 
practitioners alike call for enhanced protection of 
microfinance beneficiaries. This demand is so 
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comprehensive that the question arises whether 
protecting microfinance clients from harmful practices is 
so substantial that the current definition of microfinance 
should be revised and extended by the requirement to 
adhere to client protection standards (i.e. quality-
dimension). The first research question, which is 
discussed in Part I of this study is the following: On what 
grounds can an extension of the current definition of 
microfinance by a dimension accounting for how 
microfinance products should be delivered be advocated? 
 
RQ II Assuming that there are grounds to extend the 
microfinance definition by a quality-dimension accounting 
for the better protection of microfinance beneficiaries 
when provided with financial services, Part II 
demonstrates that due to the manifold and intertwined 
reasons for over-indebtedness, it is not sufficient to ‘only’ 
require MFIs to abide by client protection standards. 
Rather the question arises whether there is a range of 
approaches that could contribute to the lasting mitigation 
of over-indebtedness, MFIs delivering a certain quality of 
products being just one of them. The second research 
question, which is discussed in Part II of this research 
project, is: What are the causes and consequences of 
over-indebtedness and what approaches could be suited 
to mitigate over-indebtedness from different angles? 
 
RQ III The analysis of Part II reveals that there are mainly three 
approaches to fight over-indebtedness: state regulations, 
financial literacy programs, and soft law standards. The 
main goal of Part III is to argue that the extended 
definition developed in Part I in combination with the 
three approaches deduced from the over-indebtedness 
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analysis in Part II could be connected to an encompassing 
multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance. 
However, responsible microfinance is a young and fuzzy 
concept that still lacks a common definition and literature 
further neglects to concretize what ‘responsibility’ in the 
context of microfinance could mean. The third research 
question, which is discussed in Part III of this research 
project, is therefore: What is responsible microfinance and 
how could responsibility be interpreted in this context? 
 
RQ IV & V Defining and concretizing the concept of responsible 
microfinance facilitates the development of a multi-
stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance, which 
stands on three pillars (e.g. state regulation, financial 
literacy programs, soft law standards). In Part IV, I 
explore and elaborate on practical cases that mitigate 
over-indebtedness in regard to each pillar to illustrate how 
responsible microfinance could be enhanced and enforced. 
The fourth and fifth research question, which are 
discussed in Part IV of this study, are as follows: What 
could a framework of responsible microfinance look like? 
What are the possible actors involved and which practical 
strategies to mitigate over-indebtedness could they 
further? 
 
Short Summary of Argument – Part I 
MFIs are extending credit to low- to zero-income clients, who cannot show 
any collateral. Therefore, MFIs have to use a business model accounting for 
the risks of providing uncollateralized loans, and at the same time manage 
the information asymmetries underlying traditional loan contracts. Having 
no securities in case of a defaulting client requires MFIs to use specific 
group- and individual lending methodologies, which help MFIs to prevent 
their clients from defaulting. 
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In the 1990s, microfinance markets registered unprecedented growth 
and soon microfinance was talked about being the most encouraging 
poverty reduction vehicle. However, MFIs started to ease their lending 
practices in order to enlarge the outreach and profitability of their business, 
which eventually led to clients taking on more debt than they could 
manage. These developments peaked in a few microfinance markets 
suffering over-indebtedness crises 7 , which served as a demonstration 
showing that after all the ‘microfinance promise’ of the 1990s did not hold 
true. The failed microfinance promise and the realization that clients 
suffered greatly from over-indebtedness made scholars and practitioners 
alike demand enhancing the protection of microfinance beneficiaries. 
Accounting for this call the question whether the protection of microfinance 
clients is so substantial that extending the current definition of microfinance 
becomes necessary to be investigated. To substantiate that in fact the 
definition of microfinance should be extended in such a way that 
microfinance should not only be defined in regard to what kind of products 
microfinance entails, who the target group is and who provides the services, 
but also how they are supplied or which quality they have, three arguments 
are brought forward. 
 
I. The Vulnerability of Clients 
People living at the BoP are much more vulnerable to seemingly 
normal life events and to external shocks than people living above a 
certain income level. By discussing the dichotomy between average 
and vulnerable clients, it surfaces that microfinance clients are by 
default vulnerable clients and need „a higher level of protection” 
(Benöhr 2013, 17). 
  
                                       
7 Microfinance markets that underwent repayment crises were Bolivia (1998-1999), 
Colombia (1999-2000), South Africa (1999-2002), Morocco (early 2008), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2008), Pakistan (late 2008), Nicaragua (2009-2010), India (2010) and Chile 
(2010-2011) (Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010, 1; Davel 2013, 12). 
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II. The Social Mission of MFIs 
The social mission of microfinance is the cornerstone of this business 
model. Since the early days of microfinance the double bottom line8 
has been the constitutive element of microfinance. Owing to their 
social mission MFIs should therefore apply certain measures to 
protect their clients from harmful practices. 
 
III. Over-Indebtedness Crises 
The causes triggering over-indebtedness crises are diverse and 
intertwining. Contrasting with the beliefs of the 1980s and 1990s, 
academics as well as individuals and groups in the private and public 
sector started realizing that microfinance may in fact produce 
adverse effects and they have recently commenced to assess the 
advantages and disadvantages of microfinance more critically. One 
special focus has been directed at the causes and consequences of 
over-indebtedness and what promising ways there are to minimize 
the probability of getting over-indebted. The principal suggestion 
from scholars is to increase the protection of microfinance clients. 
 
On the grounds of these three arguments, I advocate a rethinking of 
what microfinance defines in such a way that a quality- or how-dimension9 
is included into the current definition of microfinance. The extension of the 
definition of microfinance creates a general understanding that microfinance 
ought to be carried out within certain boundaries, to which I refer in Part I 
as consumer or client protection. Encouraging that microfinance products 
should be provided in accordance with client protection standards, I set a 
benchmark how the quality-dimension could be evaluated. Justifying that 
the adherence of MFIs to client protection standards while supplying 
financial products is a fundamental feature of microfinance is the main goal 
of Part I. 
                                       
8 Helping the BoP out of poverty by providing them with financial services and at the 
same time aiming for profitability is known as the double bottom line of microfinance. 
9 I henceforth use the terms quality-dimension and how-dimension interchangeably. 
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Short Summary of Argument – Part II 
In Part II of this research endeavor further implications of the extended 
definition of microfinance are elaborated. Starting from the assumption that 
the reasons for microfinance clients struggling with too much debt cannot 
be solely accounted to the malpractices of MFIs, a detailed analysis of the 
causes and consequences of over-indebtedness, not only on the MFI but 
also on the client and market level, helps to assess whether including the 
quality-dimension into the definition of microfinance lastingly protects 
clients from the risk of unmanageable debt or if there is need for a more 
comprehensive and protective framework. Accounting for the many causes 
and wide-ranging consequences that over-indebtedness has and brings 
along, it is recommended that microfinance stakeholders could alleviate 
over-indebtedness from various perspectives. The analysis reveals that 
there are three promising approaches suitable to counter over-
indebtedness: state regulation, financial literacy programs, and soft law 
standards. To protect microfinance clients effectively from over-
indebtedness, it is insufficient to extend the current definition of 
microfinance. Analyzing the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness 
in Part II suggests working towards and conceptualizing a broader 
framework, which includes all relevant microfinance stakeholders and calls 
upon them to take the responsibility necessary when doing business with 
the BoP. Such a framework will be developed in Part III and further 
discussed in Part IV. 
The in-depth analysis of the manifold and intertwined causes and 
consequences of over-indebtedness emphasizes the centrality over-
indebtedness takes in microfinance and gives leeway to thinking about 
connecting the extended definition of microfinance, which requires MFIs to 
protect their clients from harmful practices, to an encompassing multi-
stakeholder oriented framework including tangible strategies to fight over-
indebtedness. 
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Short Summary of Argument – Part III 
In Part III, I connect the extended definition of microfinance with the 
comprehensive and multi-stakeholder oriented framework of responsible 
microfinance. The concept of responsible microfinance has only surfaced in 
the past few years and presupposes that due to the vulnerability of 
microfinance clients, microfinance’s social mission, and the threats over-
indebtedness pose to the client’s well-being, the MFI’s financial 
sustainability and the systemic stability, microfinance stakeholders have a 
responsibility to mitigate over-indebtedness. What this responsibility could 
mean, however, is neglected by literature. The possible functions which 
responsibility could take within a framework of responsible microfinance are 
left undefined. Therefore, the aim of Part III is to further define and 
concretize the concept of responsible microfinance, and to underpin the 
framework with an approach to responsibility to spark a debate about how 
narrow or wide this responsibility shall be interpreted in the context of 
responsible microfinance. 
Responsible microfinance is developed as having an overall demand for 
enhanced responsibility when doing business with vulnerable clients. 
Additionally, responsible microfinance has three more specific demands: 
MFIs balance their financial and social performance (1), stakeholders should 
contribute to enabling and enforcing responsible microfinance (2), and MFIs 
should hold themselves responsible for their social mission (3). Whereas the 
first two demands will be elucidated in Part IV, Part III is concerned with 
the overall demand for responsibility within microfinance and the specific 
claim that MFIs should hold themselves responsible for attaining their social 
mission. In Part III a definition of responsible microfinance is developed and 
a definition of ‘responsibility’ is provided. Furthermore, a main focus is put 
on the question whether MFIs as group agents can be held responsible. 
The concept of responsible microfinance is still in its infancy and needs 
more work, nevertheless concretizing and defining how responsibility could 
be interpreted in this context contributes to the discussion about how 
responsible microfinance might evolve and further develop. In Part III, by 
defining and putting into context what responsibility could mean I aim to 
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provide responsible microfinance with a foundation. Having an approach to 
responsibility narrows down the interpretational range of what responsible 
microfinance is. A common understanding of responsible microfinance would 
lead to translating a fuzzy practical into a definable concept, which might 
also be used in more theoretical work. 
 
Short Summary of Argument – Part IV 
Whereas Part III focuses on the overall demand for responsibility in 
responsible microfinance, Part IV is concerned with elaborating on the 
remaining two demands of responsible microfinance calling for balancing 
the financial and social performance, and enabling and enforcing 
responsible microfinance. Therefore, I explore and elucidate on the three 
pillars of responsible microfinance (i.e. state regulations, financial literacy 
programs, soft law standards). Analyzing three to four practical cases for 
each pillar provides the framework with tangible strategies to alleviate over-
indebtedness among microfinance clients. 
 
I. State Regulations 
Three cases in the realm of state regulations that potentially mitigate 
over-indebtedness and enable and enforce responsible microfinance 
are explored. First, I elaborate on behaviorally informed consumer 
protection regulations with a focus on disclosure requirements, fair 
treatment and recourse mechanisms (Case I). Second, credit bureaus 
and their potential to prevent cross-borrowing are explored (Case II). 
Third, I dwell on the widely neglected topic of how private insolvency 
systems could help to provide over-indebted microfinance clients with 
a ‘fresh start’ (Case III). 
 
II. Financial Literacy Endeavors 
Three cases of how financial literacy programs can enable and 
enforce responsible microfinance and therefore mitigate over-
indebtedness are discussed. First, the financial literacy program of 
SEWA Bank (India), which uses in-depth knowledge about their 
  14 
clients to assess their financial situation and financial literacy level, is 
presented (Case IV). Second, ‘Makutano Junction’, a Kenyan soap 
opera, is introduced as a way to educate microfinance clients and 
raise awareness of and thereby have the potential to mitigate over-
indebtedness among viewers (Case V). Third, digital games as a 
possibility to educate clients about the risks and costs of microfinance 
products are addressed (Case VI). 
 
III. Soft Law Standards 
Four cases of how soft law standards enable and enforce responsible 
microfinance and prevent over-indebtedness are analyzed. First, the 
UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection with a specific focus on the 
newly added financial services chapter are elucidated (Case VII). 
Second, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are 
discussed (Case VIII). Third, Smart Campaign’s Client Protection 
Principles and Certification Program, which is specifically aimed at 
protecting microfinance clients from over-indebtedness, is analyzed 
(Case IX). Fourth, The Social Performance Task Force’s Universal 
Standards of Social Performance Management, which are the most 
encompassing soft law standards targeted at microfinance as well as 
the most demanding ones, are addressed (Case X). 
 
In Part IV of this research project, I develop and present a 
comprehensive multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance 
within which individual, as well as institutional and systemic risks connected 
to over-indebtedness among microfinance clients, can be alleviated. I 
analyze ten cases that represent practical strategies of how responsible 
microfinance as a coordinated and cooperative effort of multiple 
microfinance stakeholders can be enabled and enforced. 
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3.2 Methods 
Extending the definition of microfinance by adding a quality-dimension and 
connecting this understanding of microfinance to an encompassing multi-
stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance I break new ground and 
contribute to and concretize a conception of microfinance that orients itself 
to the well-being of its vulnerable clients. This research area is understudied 
and therefore also the research method is largely explorative. Insights and 
results from explorative studies that use less structured methods are limited 
in regard to generalization. Generally, explorative studies trade 
generalizability and comparability for an in-depth and contextual 
understanding of the studied phenomena and higher internal validity 
(Maxwell 2013, 88). 
In order to elaborate on the research questions in Part I to III, I conduct 
a secondary source analysis. Hence, I consider secondary sources, such as 
qualitative, quantitative, and theoretical publications, and draw inferences 
in regard to the current research questions. To investigate the research 
questions of Part IV, especially when analyzing the ten cases to enhance 
and enforce responsible microfinance, I mainly use primary sources. 
Primary sources that are examined in this regard are, for example, 
documents, presentations, reports, minutes, soft law standards, covenants, 
regulations, and working group transcripts. If there are secondary sources 
discussing the same, or similar primary sources, I refer to them to 
substantiate my conclusions. 
3.3 General Discussion of Availability of Data and 
Literature 
As discussed in other microfinance publications, data availability in the field 
of microfinance is an issue, especially in regard to the topic of over-
indebtedness (see for example Kappel, Krauss, and Lontzek 2010, 2). This 
is mostly due to small sample sizes preventing the possibility of generalizing 
results. Furthermore, there are only a few academic research papers 
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discussing over-indebtedness in microfinance (see for example Guérin, 
Morvant-Roux, and Villarreal 2014; Morvant-Roux et al. 2014; Schicks 
2012). Most of the literature debating and analyzing over-indebtedness in 
microfinance include policy papers and reports commissioned by 
international or advocacy organizations (see for example Ardic, Ibrahim, 
and Mylenko 2011; Brix and McKee 2010; Forster et al. 2010; CGAP 2012; 
Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010). In regard to responsible microfinance 
there are, to the best of my knowledge, no academic research papers so far 
and only a few policy papers and reports (McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 2011; 
Chien 2012; Koning and McKee 2011; Koning and Wardle 2014; 
Responsible Finance Forum 2011; Haebig and Gross 2012). The scarcity of 
secondary and primary sources has challenged this research project insofar 
as the generalizability and the comparability of the results of this study are 
very limited. 
In the following, I separately discuss the research outline, case 
selection, and data quality and availability for Part IV where I analyze ten 
practical cases of how over-indebtedness can be mitigated within a 
framework of responsible microfinance. 
3.4 Separate Discussion of Research Outline of 
Part IV 
Part IV explores practical cases for each of the three pillars of the multi-
stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance (i.e. state regulations, 
financial literacy programs, soft law standards). For Pillar I and II, I present 
three cases and for Pillar III, I present four cases that shall illustrate 
practical strategies to mitigate over-indebtedness among microfinance 
clients. By means of a thick description, I conduct ten single case studies. 
Whereas I discuss the Cases I to VI of the first and second pillar in detail, I 
put an in-depth focus on the Pillar III (i.e. soft law standards). 
The four soft law standards that I analyze in Pillar III have one common 
characteristic, namely that they all have established part or all of their 
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standards by consulting with an array of stakeholders. Resonating with the 
introductory paragraphs at the beginning of this research project, 
advocating an understanding of microfinance that should be oriented 
towards the client, and elaborating more on the consultative and 
participatory elements of soft law standard setting, I evaluate four hard 
cases of soft law standards against the common interest regulation theory 
by Mattli and Woods (2009) (see Chapter 19). 
3.4.1 Case Selection 
The main goal of Part IV is to analyze ten practical cases that contribute to 
the mitigation of over-indebtedness. The chosen cases should offer data 
available to analyze their impact on the alleviation of over-indebtedness. 
Optimally, the cases are well documented and secondary but especially 
primary sources are available. Furthermore, the selected cases have to be 
of „practical relevance and social importance” (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 
102). All of the ten cases are hard cases due to their importance, 
pioneering role, or uniqueness in regard to their contribution to the 
mitigation of over-indebtedness. 
3.4.2 Availability of Data 
Cases I to VI are well documented and there are secondary and primary 
sources available for a detailed description. As the focus lies on the soft law 
standard cases (Cases VII-X) also the data availability in this regard is 
crucial. Cases VII to X – the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Smart Campaign’s 
Client Protection Principles and Certification Program, and the Social 
Performance Task Force’s (SPTF) Universal Standards of Social Performance 
Management – are very well documented and there is substantial 
information about the stakeholders involved. There is furthermore a 
delineation of who is actually taking decisions and thus involved in the 
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decision-making processes. In order to conduct the case studies I will 
mainly draw on primary data sources. 
Although data availability is good, there is mainly one challenge to face 
throughout this research endeavor. Microfinance is still a young, ever-
growing, and changing field of research. During the research period, 
internet resources, such as minutes, datasets, reports, and policy papers 
were not accessible any longer under the same title or URL address not only 
due to updates but also because certain websites were not online anymore. 
3.5 Goals of this Research Project and Potential 
Contribution 
The main goals and contributions of this research project are twofold. First 
and foremost, I develop and concretize a framework of responsible 
microfinance that presents tangible strategies of how to fight over-
indebtedness from different angles. The second contribution is that the 
proposition of such a framework however presupposes the rethinking of 
what elements actually define microfinance. Without an understanding of 
microfinance, which accounts for the vulnerability of microfinance clients, 
the social mission of MFIs, the reaction to over-indebtedness crises of late, 
and therefore the demand that microfinance be conducted in certain 
boundaries (i.e. quality-dimension), the framework of responsible 
microfinance would lose a part of its foundation. 
In the concluding Chapter 21, the goals of this study are recapitulated, 
the study’s results and its overall contribution are discussed, and its 
implications and direction for future research are addressed. 
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PART I – MICROFINANCE: ADDING A NEW 
DIMENSION 
4 Bringing Financial Services to the Poor 
Microfinance includes the provision of small-scale financial services to 
individuals living at the BoP. In the optimal case, microfinance presents us 
with a win-win situation. On the one hand, microfinance has a social 
mission aiming to empower its clients in different respects and may 
eventually enable them to permanently escape poverty. On the other hand, 
MFIs earn money by providing the BoP with financial services that may 
grow and expand their businesses. This might ultimately have positive 
effects on the economic growth of a region or a country as a whole. 
However, recent over-indebtedness crises in microfinance markets have 
revealed that positive impact does not always materialize and that reality 
greatly differs from the often-suggested optimal case. As will be later 
discussed in greater detail, microfinance markets in Bolivia, Colombia, 
South Africa, Morocco, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Nicaragua, India 
and Chile were seriously shaken or collapsed entirely (Chen, Rasmussen, 
and Reille 2010, 1; Davel 2013, 12). Crises were caused by aggressive 
commercialization of the microfinance sector combined with not only 
abusive lending practices, concentrated market competition, political 
interferences but also non-repayment movements. These were the main 
triggers that led microfinance clients into over-indebtedness. Seemingly it is 
the potentially vulnerable microfinance clients that have to notice and bear 
the detriments of such crises the most. 
Since microfinance crises imply wide-ranging and devastating 
consequences, especially on the client-level, scholars and practitioners alike 
called upon an array of stakeholders to combating the various causes of 
over-indebtedness mainly through increasing consumer and client 
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protection10 (Guérin, Morvant-Roux, and Villarreal 2014; Schicks 2011a; 
Schicks 2011b; Schicks 2012; Schicks 2010; Chien 2012; Brix and McKee 
2010). Recent over-indebtedness crises revealed two pressing issues. 
Firstly, microfinance clients are rather vulnerable than average clients and 
need to be better protected from harm. Secondly and despite microfinance 
providers’ social mission, over-indebtedness crises revealed malpractices on 
the providers’ side letting clients slide more easily into over-indebtedness. 
In the light of past over-indebtedness crises and accounting for the demand 
for enhanced client protection it is questionable whether the current 
definition of microfinance captures these recent developments. On what 
grounds could an extension of the current definition of microfinance by a 
dimension accounting for how microfinance products should be provided be 
advocated? 
The first part of this research project pursues two goals. First, a general 
overview of microfinance and its workings is presented (Chapter 4 and 5). 
Second, the current definition of microfinance as introduced in Chapter 5.1 
will be challenged and extended (Chapter 6 and 7). 
Part I is structured as follows: Providing financial services to the BoP is 
no simple task. Chapter 4.1 explains the difficulties of investing into low-
income countries in general and what specific problems (e.g. information 
asymmetries, no collateral) microfinance providers face when trying to 
invest into micro businesses. Chapter 4.2 entails a short outline of the 
evolvement of microfinance, discussing how different initiatives for 
improved protection of microfinance clients developed and gained 
importance after the ‘microfinance promise’ of the 1990s did not hold true. 
For a general understanding of microfinance and its vocabulary, which is 
a prerequisite for every part of this research project, and particularly to 
appreciate the centrality of client protection in microfinance, it is key to 
have knowledge about the functions and difficulties of microfinance. 
Chapter 5 therefore provides an overview of what microfinance currently 
defines, what it entails, and who its providers are. A particular focus is 
                                       
10 Henceforth, I will use the terms client protection and consumer protection 
interchangeably. 
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given to the most common product of microfinance, which is credit. Credit 
relationships between clients and microfinance providers are always 
characterized by asymmetric information. Referring to the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, it is explained how microfinance 
providers overcome these information asymmetries by applying specific 
lending methodologies. This knowledge later serves as a foundation to 
understand that specific lending methodologies might not be sufficient to 
protect microfinance clients effectively from over-indebtedness. 
Chapter 6 presents the arguments to extend the current definition of 
microfinance by a quality-dimension. Three points are particularly important 
in order to advocate the extension of the definition of microfinance: the 
vulnerability of microfinance clients (1), the inherent social mission of 
microfinance (2), and recent over-indebtedness crises (3). These three 
arguments stand for the importance of how microfinance products should 
be provided and all three bear implications for how a microfinance provider 
should actually supply its financial products to the BoP. The extended 
definition is presented in Chapter 7 and against the backdrop of the three 
arguments demands microfinance providers building client protection into 
all of their services. The extended definition therefore considers client 
protection as essential to the definition of microfinance. 
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4.1 No Information, No Collateral, No Business? 
To argue that banking cannot be done 
with the poor because they do not have 
collateral to offer, is the same as arguing 
that men cannot fly because they do not 
have wings. Men have the singular 
distinction, among all animals, of being 
extra-ordinarily innovative. Until the 
recent past in history nobody ever 
believed that men will really fly. Today 
not only do they fly, they fly at a speed 
and to a distance, which boggles 
anybody’s mind. Now to argue that this 
innovative animal cannot design a 
banking system, which does not rely on 
collateral is simply an insult to human 
ingenuity. (Yunus 1992a, 75) 
Basic economics teaches that a relatively poor entrepreneur is able to make 
significantly higher returns on her invested capital than a richer 
entrepreneur. Therefore, she will be also able to pay higher interest rates 
on loaned money than richer entrepreneurs. The concept is simple: If an 
entrepreneur invests more money in her business, she has higher returns 
on her invested capital. However, every time she invests more capital into 
her business the marginal return on capital will diminish. A street vendor 
taking out a loan to sell her own fruit needs for example to buy a simple 
scale in order to weigh the fruit and calculate the price. Besides the scale 
she might have to invest some of that money in seeds, fertilizer and a rake. 
After some time she wants to expand her business. She engages a 
carpenter to build her a small, colorful booth that is lockable and where she 
can store fruit. The booth attracts a lot of customers and after six months 
she is ready to hire her first employee. With every investment, she expands 
her business and also earns more money, but she produces less gains on 
the money invested. An entrepreneur just starting her business will always 
have a higher marginal return to the capital invested than an entrepreneur 
owning a business that has already reached a certain size. Following this 
logic, poor entrepreneurs should not have any problems to fund their 
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business. Hence, money should run from commercial banks to business 
projects of the BoP, or on a bigger scale and more generally put from north 
to south. Why then can we not observe this shift? Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2010, 5) ask why capital does not naturally flow to the poor and the 
answer is plain: No information, no collateral, no business - at least no 
conventional business. 
Investing in low-income countries with weak legal frameworks, bad 
infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity) or unstable political systems for a high 
return on investment (ROI) is in general far riskier than investing in a 
middle- to high-income country with a reliable legal system, good 
infrastructure and a stable political environment even though the ROI might 
be comparatively small. The same holds true in regard to investing in 
micro-businesses of street vendors or seamstresses in low-income 
countries. Clients cannot show any collateral that the financial institution 
could seize in case of default. Financial institutions furthermore do not have 
enough reliable information about the client to assess his or her 
creditworthiness. Is she going to use the money for the project she said she 
would use it for? Will she be able to pay back the loan as scheduled or will 
she take the money and run? Unless the financial institution is able to 
collect more information about the investee or seize collateral in case of 
default, it remains a high-risk business. Additionally, lending to poor 
communities is expensive. Often clients live in remote areas that are not 
easily accessible by car or motorcycle. Thus, transaction costs (TCs) are 
high, which renders the provision of financial services to these clients very 
costly. Microfinance promises to fulfill the task of efficiently delivering 
financial services to poor communities, finding a remedy for agency 
problems 11 , and providing these services at a relatively low price 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 5–9). 
                                       
11 These remarks describe the problem of information asymmetries between investor 
and investee and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.3.2.1. 
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4.2 From Promises to Reality: Client Protection as 
a Pressing Issue When Providing Financial 
Services to the BoP 
Tackling financial exclusion with credit was already a well-known, yet 
unsuccessful strategy used by governments from the 1950s to the 1980s 
(Morduch 1999, 1570; Terberger 2003, 189). Government endeavors to 
help eradicating poverty with highly subsidized „credit-gifts” have failed 
miserably and credit did not find its way to the actual target groups (see for 
example Vogel 1984, 142–143). However, in the 1980s and 1990s a new 
set of financial institutions, which aimed to provide the poor with financial 
services, gained momentum. While still being dependable on subsidized 
funding and grants in a first phase, these pioneering microfinance providers 
soon strived for financially sustainable business models. Traditionally, they 
have a social mission – i.e. providing the BoP with financial services and 
help them out of poverty – and at the same time they aim to reach 
profitability (see for example Robinson 2001, 8). These two goals of 
microfinance are generally referred to as the double bottom line. Besides 
the positive effect of eradicating poverty, policy makers either emphasized 
how microfinance gives poor people the incentive to be productive and 
being less or not dependent on aid of the state, civil society or the 
international community, or highlighted the bottom-up aspects of 
microfinance, emphasizing the „attention to community, focus on women, 
and the aim to help the underserved” (Morduch 1999, 1570). 
That microfinance creates a win-win solution for both, poor clients and 
microfinance institutions, was widely acknowledged in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Hence, this ‘Microfinance Promise’, a term coined by Jonathan Morduch 
(1999), provided policy makers and practitioners with the keywords they 
needed in order to bring microfinance into prominence and attract 
investments. However, the above-described assumptions about the positive 
effects of microfinance not only on the individual but also on the 
institutional and the macro level might only accrue if we simulate an ideal 
case. In the late 1990s and 2000s researchers, practitioners and public 
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officials started to learn that the microfinance promise did not always 
pertain against the backdrop of the accelerating commercialization of the 
microfinance sector, competitive microfinance markets, the low educational 
level of clients, the inexperienced MFI staff, the incentive driven salary 
systems for loan officers and the too restrictive or too lax regulations. To 
the most part, and this particular topic is discussed in more detail in Part II, 
it was the microfinance clients that bore the detriments caused by these 
developments. In the mid to late 2000s slowly a debate about how 
microfinance clients should be protected against abusive practices picked up 
pace and peaked when different initiatives were launched to promote client 
protection. The three main ones are:  
• MFTransparency (2008) 
• Smart Campaign (2009) 
• Social Performance Task Force (2005) 
In 2008 MFTransparency12 was founded. It focuses on pricing transparency 
in microfinance and provides tools and information about how MFIs should 
display prices comprehensibly for poor clients. It envisages microfinance 
markets where clients are able to make informed decisions. In 2009, an 
institution to foster consumer protection called Smart Campaign was 
launched by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)13 and the 
Center for Financial Inclusion (CFI) 14 . In July 2011, Smart Campaign 
                                       
12 For more information please see http://www.mftransparency.org, especially the 
Calculating Transparent Pricing Tool http://www.mftransparency.org/resources/calculating-
transparent-pricing-tool/ [last accessed 26.01.2016]. 
13 „CGAP is an independent policy and research center dedicated to advancing financial 
access for the world's poor. It is supported by over 30 development agencies and private 
foundations who share a common mission to alleviate poverty. Housed at the World Bank, 
CGAP provides market intelligence, promotes standards, develops innovative solutions and 
offers advisory services to governments, financial service providers, donors, and investors” 
(http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/aboutus/ [last accessed 25.01.2016]). CGAP is located at the 
World Bank in Washington DC. 
14 „CFI works through a collaborative business model: it forms or connects with groups 
of key industry participants who come together to address selected challenges. Working with 
those groups, it applies the most appropriate tools from a toolbox that includes convening, 
research, publications, campaigns, piloting and knowledge-dissemination. In selecting its 
program areas, CFI seeks out areas that have a strong fit with its vision of financial inclusion 
– particularly its emphasis on quality. It looks for aspects of that vision that have been 
under-addressed by others and where CFI may have a comparative advantage based on its 
industry relationships and areas of existing competence 
(http://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/ [last accessed 25.01.2016]).” CFI is located at 
Accion (a global non-profit organization engaged in microfinance) in Washington DC. 
  26 
introduced seven ‘Client Protection Principles’15, which should serve as a 
standard with soft law character, meaning that the standards are voluntary. 
As a follow-up to the Client Protection Principles, Smart Campaign 
developed a third-party certification that should account for rendering the 
principles more enforceable (The Smart Campaign 2014). In 2005, CGAP, 
the Argidius Foundation, and the Ford Foundation founded the Social 
Performance Task Force (SPTF)16. Although primarily concerned with social 
performance of MFIs (i.e. reaching a double bottom line), they consider 
client protection an inherent element of social performance and endorse it 
by including the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles in their 
Universal Social Performance Standards (Social Performance Task Force 
2014a). These three initiatives were a reaction to different over-
indebtedness crises and other abusive practices in microfinance. They stand 
for the recognition that client protection is pivotal on the one hand to 
safeguard the continuity of microfinance and on the other hand to promote 
equal treatment of microfinance clients. 
  
                                       
15 Smart Campaign, its Client Protection Principles and Certification Program will be 
discussed in detail as Case IX in Chapter 19.4. 
16 SPTF will be discussed in detail as Case X in Chapter 19.5. 
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5 Microfinance: An Overview 
In order to better understand what microfinance is and entails, this chapter 
provides an overview of microfinance, its current definition, its target 
groups, service providers, and its products. In regard to microfinance 
products, the focus is put on the main financial service MFIs provide: credit. 
For more information on additional microfinance products, such as savings, 
insurance, and money transfer, please see the Appendix. Also the various 
investors involved in funding MFIs’ lending operations are summarized in 
the Appendix. 
5.1 A Current Definition of Microfinance 
In literature, one can find a wide array of microfinance definitions. Whereas 
recent literature makes use of broad and brief definitions (Armendáriz and 
Morduch 2010, 5), the ones of the late 1990s were narrow and exclusive 
(Robinson 2001, 41–42). A definition of microfinance should be broad 
enough to include the different types of MFIs operating in this field at the 
moment and narrow enough to describe what kind of services they provide 
and what should be the highest outstanding balance for a client that is still 
to be considered microfinance. 
In the following, I present a definition combining a qualitative and 
quantitative approach to define microfinance. The qualitative part of the 
definition of microfinance entails the description of the financial services, 
target group and types of institutions providing the financial services and is 
based on Robinson (2001, 9–10). The quantitative part is borrowed from 
The Mix17. The Mix publishes microfinance analyses on a regular bases and 
for this reason they apply an operationalizable definition factoring in the 
                                       
17 The Mix is a microfinance information exchange site, where most of the data used 
today for microfinance research is taken from. MFIs can report their data (e.g. numbers of 
clients, regulation status, accounting data, average loan size) to The Mix and interested 
parties may access this information. The complete microfinance definition of The Mix reads 
as follows: „Microfinance services – as opposed to financial services in general – are retail 
financial services that are relatively small in relation to the income of a typical individual. 
Specifically, the average outstanding balance of microfinance products is no greater than 
250% of the average income per person (GNI per capita) (The Mix 2010).” 
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outstanding balance. This definition is of special relevance because they 
relate the outstanding balance to geographical regions by specifying that 
the outstanding balance18 should not exceed 250 percent of the average 
income per person (GNI per capita)19. Therefore, a current definition of 
microfinance may read as follows: 
Microfinance is the provision of small-scale financial services to 
low-income individuals or low-income communities, small-scale 
meaning that the average outstanding balance of microfinance 
products does not exceed 250 percent of the averaging income per 
person (GNI per capita). Microfinance entails the supply of one or 
more of its principal components: credit, savings, insurance and 
money transfer. The services are supplied by a microfinance 
institution that is either regulated or non-regulated. (Robinson 
2001, 9–10; The Mix 2010) 
Whether this definition is sufficient for the purpose of this research project, 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
  
                                       
18 As in the definition of The Mix it is not the loan amount serving as a litmus test to 
evaluate whether some MFI is still operating in the microfinance sector. Rather it is the 
outstanding balance, meaning the aggregate of all outstanding financial services (e.g. fees, 
insurance premiums, loans) a microfinance client has at a specific moment in time. 
19 In literature, definitions accounting for a range of possible loan sizes instead of an 
outstanding balance that accounts for geographical regions are still common. For instance, 
Robinson refers to loans ranging from USD 10 to USD 10’000 (2001, 37) or La Torre and 
Vento (2006, 24) stating a range from USD 10 to USD 5’000. With the frame of reference 
provided by the Mix, microfinance loans disbursed in Tanzania, where we have an average 
income of USD 1’750 per person and year, could go up to USD 4’500 (GNI per capita figures 
are taken from the World Development Indicators, The World Bank 2014a). The Mix’s 
definition accounts for these country specific variances in income and is more accurate than 
the general ones by Robinson and La Torre and Vento. 
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5.2 Target Groups of Microfinance 
Microfinance mainly targets two groups: own-account or self-employed 
workers, and women living at the BoP. Microfinance clients are normally 
own-account workers living at the BoP, wanting to get economically active. 
The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) defines the term own-account 
worker as  
a person who operates his or her own economic enterprise, or 
engages independently in a profession or trade, and hires no 
employees. (United Nations Statistical Office 1990, lit. b) 
Although microfinance clients work alone for the most part, they sometimes 
do have a few people they employ. Since microfinance clients cannot be 
ruled out to have employees, I use the term self-employed interchangeably 
with own-account worker. Self-employment jobs are defined as follows: 
Self-employment jobs are those jobs where the remuneration is 
directly dependent upon the profits (or the potential for profits) 
derived from the goods and services produced (where own 
consumption is considered to be part of profits). The incumbents 
make the operational decisions affecting the enterprise, or 
delegate such decisions while retaining responsibility for the 
welfare of the enterprise. (ILO 1993, art. 7) 
Own-account or self-employed workers run microbusinesses, and might 
work as street vendors, seamstresses, hairdressers, or farmers. 
Microfinance is further renowned for having a focus on women. Women 
constitute the majority of microfinance clients. Summarizing the latest 
numbers, which are from 2012, we look at the following figures of clients 
reached: The State of the Microfinance Summit Campaign Report indicates 
that 3’718 MFIs reported a total number of 203.5 million clients that had a 
current loan. Of these 203.5 million clients, 74.9 percent are women. 
Looking at the poorest clients reached, the total is 115.6 million, of which 
83.3 percent are women (Reed 2014, table 1). In summary, there are five 
reasons why microfinance is mainly concentrating on women. These reasons 
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can be categorized as being motivated from a business (I-III) or poverty 
alleviation perspective (IV-V). 
I. The commercial financial sector in developing countries traditionally 
discriminates against women, which results in no access or 
difficulties in obtaining access to credit or other financial services 
(UNDP 2013, 5–6; Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 212). Banks 
widely focus on male clients and back formal businesses. This 
translates into a negligence of women on the one hand and the 
informal sector where most of the world’s poor try to make a living 
on the other hand. Women constitute 70 percent of the world’s poor 
and microfinance takes advantage of that in almost exclusively 
providing financial services to women working in the informal 
economy (Bureau for Gender Equality and International Labour 
Office 2008, 2). 
II. Research of the 1990s showed dramatic differences between men 
and women in regard to access to resources (e.g. rights and 
liberties, decision-power, access to money, social relationships, 
jobs), results revealed that women were the clear losers in contrast 
to their male counterparts. Women however have considerable 
potential, which they could invest into an income generating activity 
(Dobra 2011, 134–135). Neglecting informal businesses thus results 
in overlooking a big and increasing segment of potential female 
clients. MFIs therefore gain access to a large market. 
III. Women simply report higher repayment rates in regard to borrowed 
money than men (Gibbons, Kasim, and Ikhtiar 1990; Khandker, 
Khalily, and Khan 1995). 
IV. In contrast to their male counterparts, female borrowers invest a 
bigger share of their income into the household and family, including 
nutrition, education and health (Collins et al. 2011; Littlefield, 
Morduch, and Hashemi 2003, 1–2; Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 
5, 267–311; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Thomas 1990; Thomas 
1994; Khandker 1998). 
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V. Granting women access to credit may reduce inequalities regarding 
gender and access to resources and might contribute to the overall 
improvement of the status of women in developing countries 
(Bureau for Gender Equality and International Labour Office 2008). 
5.3 Microfinance Providers and Credit 
The following chapters give a summary of microfinance providers and the 
core product of microfinance, which is credit. Firstly, different types of MFIs 
that offer a range of financial and sometimes also non-financial services are 
presented. Secondly, credit as the main service of microfinance is explained 
in more detail20. A strong focus is put on the principal-agent problems (i.e. 
adverse selection and moral hazard), arising when providing 
uncollateralized loans and it is discussed how MFIs manage these problems 
with specific lending methodologies. 
5.3.1 Different Types of MFIs 
Literature distinguishes between informal, semiformal and formal 
microfinance institutions. Informal institutions, for example private 
moneylenders, family and friends, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs), constitute informal ways to purchase credit or save money and 
lack a legal status (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 67–68). In contrast, 
semiformal MFIs have to register their operations with an official authority. 
Which authority is responsible depends largely on the type of institution 
(e.g. unlicensed MFIs, NGO, post offices, financial cooperatives, credit 
unions) and country regulations. Semiformal institutions are subject to 
other „laws and regulations than banks and other formal institutions“ 
(Isern, Donges, and Smith 2008, 115). In many countries, only financial 
institutions with a banking license may take deposits, hence most of the 
semiformal MFIs are credit-only institutions (Isern, Donges, and Smith 
                                       
20 Other microfinance products, such as savings, insurance, and money transfer 
products as well as the variety of investors that may be involved in funding MFIs’ lending 
operations are summarized in appendix. 
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2008, 115). Formal MFIs are subject to the same laws and regulations as 
traditional banks. They are under the supervision of official authorities such 
as a financial market supervisory authority, a central bank and banking law 
in general. Formal MFIs may include microfinance oriented banks, 
agricultural banks, and regulated MFIs (Isern, Donges, and Smith 2008, 
115).  
5.3.2 Microfinance Products 
Credit, savings, insurance and money transfer are counted among the core 
financial services a microfinance institution provides. Some MFIs also offer 
non-financial services such as training (e.g. financial literacy and health 
education programs), which is not considered amongst the main services of 
microfinance. MFIs offering training programs are normally referred to as 
doing ‘microfinance plus’21. 
The following presents microfinance’s most prominent product22: credit. 
As described in Chapter 4.1 providing the BoP with credit is complicated, 
since there is a lack of collateral and information about the riskiness of the 
borrower. Accounting for this lack, it is explained in more detail, what 
specific lending methodologies MFIs apply to mitigate information 
asymmetries in the absence of conventional forms of collateral. A detailed 
description of credit products serves the purpose of this research in such a 
way that the knowledge about why MFIs use particular lending techniques 
later on serves as a foundation to understand that specific lending 
methodologies alone might not prove to be sufficient to protect 
microfinance clients from over-indebtedness. 
  
                                       
21 I provide a detailed description of a financial literacy program of such an institution in 
Chapter 18.1. 
22 The other services, such as savings, insurance and money transfer products are 
shortly discussed in the Appendix. 
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5.3.2.1 Credit 
Microfinance’s most common product is microcredit. It targets financially 
excluded individuals or communities by supplying them with loans. Whereas 
all MFIs provide credit, not all MFIs, as mentioned in Chapter 5.3.1, offer 
the whole spectrum of financial services. The loan amount disbursed must 
be relatively small (i.e. not more than 250% of the averaging income per 
person and year) and the loan maturity is normally below one year (La 
Torre and Vento 2006, 44). Repayment schedules usually foresee monthly 
or weekly installments (La Torre and Vento 2006, 24). As mentioned above, 
interest rates are usually higher than in collateralized banking. The average 
reaches about 35 percent but can range from 17 percent in Sri Lanka to 80 
percent in Uzbekistan (Kneiding and Rosenberg 2008, 1). The purpose of 
credit is to give the client the opportunity to get economically active with 
the money received. Microloans traditionally are not intended for 
consumption needs (La Torre and Vento 2006, 43). However, clients 
sometimes also make use of credit products for unforeseen events or 
consumption (Gonzalez 2008, 100). 
In Chapter 4.1, I touched upon the issue of agency problems in 
microfinance. The following chapter now explains how MFIs make use of 
group- or individual-based lending to set incentives to overcome imperfect 
information problems between the MFI and the client and as a consequence 
manage to decrease default risks. 
5.3.2.1.1 How to Overcome the Problem of Asymmetric Information 
and Uncollateralized Credit 
If we want to conceptualize the relationship between the MFI and a 
microfinance client as a principal-agent relationship, the MFI would be the 
principal delegating tasks (e.g. using the loan for the agreed upon 
entrepreneurial project) and the client would be the agent who has to 
deliver the tasks23. PA-relationships are characterized by the problem of 
                                       
23 Principals and agents are both equipped with their own utility functions (Drazen 2000, 
23). 
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imperfect information. The agent, fulfilling the task, will always have more 
information about how accurate she is going to fulfill that task. Analogously, 
the microfinance client, although claiming to use a loan according to the 
agreed upon purpose, might not live up to this promise and will use the loan 
for something else (e.g. repairing the house, consumables). Situations of 
imperfect information between the MFI and its clients may cause 
inefficiencies like under- or overestimating the riskiness of a client and 
might even culminate in market failure (Akerlof 1970, 490). The specific 
problems arising from asymmetric information between a principal and an 
agent are adverse selection and moral hazard, which are explained in more 
detail in the following. How MFIs try to mitigate these asymmetries by the 
means of specific lending methodologies is presented when discussing 
particular group and individual lending techniques. 
5.3.2.1.1.1 Adverse Selection 
The most noticeable example of explaining adverse selection is „The Market 
for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism” by George 
Arthur Akerlof (1970). Akerlof shows that the combination of diversity in 
quality and information asymmetries between the seller and buyer leads 
buyers to choose bad quality cars over good quality cars. As a consequence, 
good quality cars are squeezed out of the market. 
What are the underlying considerations Akerlof makes to come to that 
conclusion? Whereas the seller of a used car knows exactly what kind of 
hidden characteristics (e.g. future repairs, defects) the respective car 
entails (Akerlof 1970, 489), the buyer faces the problem that a used car 
cannot be easily inspected and defects of a used car mostly stay 
undiscovered due to a lack of knowledge about cars in general or also due 
to a lack of time the buyer wants to invest into buying a car. Imagine a car 
park where different vendors want to sell used cars. A buyer walks up to 
vendor I. Although car I is of low quality, vendor I will describe this car as 
of high quality and well maintained. The buyer looks at a different car from 
vendor II. This model is actually a perfectly maintained used car without 
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any defects. Vendor II explains proudly that he took good care of car II and 
that the buyer would not have to expect any repairs in the near future. The 
buyer is confused. Car I is USD 1000 cheaper than car II. Since he 
evaluates both offers as bona fide, he decides to buy the cheaper car. 
Akerlof transfers this situation to the big scale and shows that as a result of 
asymmetric information vendors will pass off their low-quality cars as 
higher-quality cars. After some time all of the vendor II types leave the 
market because they are not willing to sell off their cars to a price below 
their acceptance limit. In the end the buyer can only purchase ‘lemons’ (i.e. 
bad cars) for a relatively high price (Akerlof 1970, 489–491). 
Analogously to the above-described, imperfect information between the 
MFI and its client prohibits the MFI from categorizing its clientele into riskier 
and safer borrowers24. Setting accurate incentives is key in order not to end 
up with a pool of clients that consists only or merely of risky clients. The 
traditional banking sector also faces similar problems; however, a bank 
would not face exorbitant losses if, for example, some of their clients would 
not be able to repay their loan. Why is that? Traditional banks only disburse 
collateralized loans. Borrowers can show securities, such as land, a house or 
a business, which may be seized by the bank if the loan is not repaid. It 
follows that, due to the collateral that is at stake, the borrower is 
incentivized to rather pay back the loan than to shirk. With a contractual 
agreement that is enforceable, the bank (i.e. principal) can effectively 
minimize its agency costs because losing the collateral is incentive enough 
to repay. No additional endeavors have to be undertaken in order to elicit a 
sufficient repayment behavior from the borrower. In contrast, MFIs have 
higher agency costs due to the uncollateralized loans they disburse. If there 
is no collateral to seize, the MFI has to create a system of incentives, which 
enhances the probability of the borrower to repay (Armendáriz and Morduch 
2010, 41–48). Microfinance tries to create this system of incentives by 
means of group lending and costly individual lending schemes, which are 
discussed after the next chapter (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 101, 140). 
                                       
24 See also Akerlof’s (1970, 498–499) analysis on India’s informal credit market. 
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5.3.2.1.1.2 Moral Hazard 
Besides adverse selection, two manifestations of moral hazard are prevalent 
in microfinance (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 39–53): ex ante and ex 
post moral hazard. The incertitude an MFI has about its client’s actions after 
the loan is disbursed but before net returns on the entrepreneurial project 
are realized is explained by ex ante moral hazard. Due to insufficient 
information the MFI is in the dark regarding the borrower’s undertakings. 
She might indicate putting the loan to the agreed upon cause; however, it is 
characteristically for PA relationships that the agent (i.e. borrower) in 
contrast to the principal (i.e. MFI) has the advantage of knowing her exact 
agenda. The lender is moreover not in power to entirely monitor the actions 
of the borrower. This would be too cost intensive. 
After net returns on the entrepreneurial project are realized, MFIs face 
another incomplete information problem, which is called ex post moral 
hazard. It depicts situations where borrowers confirm to have failed in their 
business idea. In some cases it might not be straightforward whether a 
business project succeeded. As a consequence, lenders struggle to enforce 
contracts and face the risk of not being paid back. This is particularly 
difficult in developing countries with weak legal systems. As argued above, 
there is no or only negligible collateral to seize after a client has defaulted 
on her loan. If MFIs cannot elicit an adequate repayment behavior from 
their clients, they are confronted with losses. 
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5.3.2.1.1.3 Group- and Individual Lending Methodologies 
MFIs strive for setting incentives that are cost-effective and socially 
acceptable. To minimize the number of risky clients, which are likely to 
default, microfinance may apply different means. To minimize the 
information asymmetries between MFIs and their clients, MFIs focus on the 
three main stages of a credit cycle. In order to enhance the repayment rate, 
MFIs screen their clients before they take out a loan, monitor them while 
they use the loan for an entrepreneurial project and enforce contracts, if 
clients are in arrear with payments. Enforcing contracts may include seizing 
collateral, if existing, naming and shaming or disqualifying clients from 
future credit (Van Bastelaer 2000, 12). Depending on the lending scheme 
applied, MFIs may set further incentives to repay. Below, group- and 
individual lending schemes in microfinance are discussed. 
 
Group Lending 
The history of group-based lending goes more than 150 years back in 
history. The ‘People’s Banks’ in Germany was founded in the mid-nineteenth 
century by Frederik Raiffeisen. The difference between the „People’s Banks” 
and today’s group lending schemes in microfinance is only a small one. 
They both use joint liability and horizontal social capital, meaning that 
current group members evaluate potential members to join the group. They 
also both target poor people (Van Bastelaer 2000, 11)25. 
Today’s MFIs that apply group lending let borrowers build groups of a 
minimum of three up to a maximum of forty people and supply them with 
credit (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 97). If a member is unable to pay, 
the group is jointly liable. If one or more group members default, the others 
have to come up for the outstanding sum. In this way joint liability 
represents the collateral (Natarajan 2004, 3). Joint liability insures the MFI 
                                       
25 Another form of group-based lending that existed long before there was microfinance 
is ROSCAs. They constitute peer-to-peer banking and lending in the informal sector. After 
deciding on a certain amount of money, each ROSCA member, for example, puts USD 7 into 
a pot every month. Starting from the assumption that there are 10 people. Hence, every 
month there is a pot of USD 70. The group decides who will get the lump sum of USD 70 
first. This process is repeated until every member of the group has been able to receive the 
USD 70 to invest. 
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against individual risks, though this does not prevent group members from 
free riding. „[L]ow quality clients can free-ride on high quality clients 
leading to an increase in default rates” (Cason, Gangadharan, and Maitra 
2012, 207). In order to mitigate adverse selection problems, MFIs use 
horizontal social capital in order to give group members incentives not to 
default. MFIs let the clients form their groups themselves. Self-selection 
implies a certain level of trust and like-mindedness among group members, 
also they probably have a similar economic standing (Van Bastelaer 2000, 
13). These processes serve as client screening at a very low cost. To 
mitigate ex ante and ex post moral hazard MFIs make use of the superior 
knowledge group members have about each other in comparison to 
outsiders, such as loan officers (Cason, Gangadharan, and Maitra 2012, 
193). The group executes the monitoring while business projects are 
launched and after. The main incentive to monitor group members is 
certainly joint liability. They know that if a member of the group defaults all 
are liable to repay the outstanding sum. Also social sanctions might 
mitigate moral hazard problems. If group members face the risk of being 
excluded from the group or named and shamed in the community, they 
might not default. These are all incentives to mitigate the risk of defaults 
among group members (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 125–127). 
Characteristically, the group-lending scheme is defined as the MFI 
shifting the screening, monitoring and enforcing costs onto the group. But 
also the MFI itself has options to help enforce group loan contracts. First, 
the MFI might ask for compulsory savings, which it can take if a group 
member defaults (Morduch 1999, 1585). Second, the group’s access to 
future loans might be denied in case of default (Morduch 1999, 1582). 
However, Rai and Sjöström (2004; see also Van Bastelaer 2000, 17–18) 
show that group lending contracts are rarely strictly enforced. MFIs will 
probably face smaller losses when they are open to renegotiating the terms 
of the loans. Furthermore, it is important information whether a loan was 
not repaid due to insufficient effort by the borrower or because the 
borrower was ill, suffered a death in the family or had a bad harvest. In 
these cases, Rai and Sjöström (2004) suggest using cross-reporting (i.e. 
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talking to neighbors and friends about what happened) in order to verify the 
story of the defaulting group member. In sum, group lending is a relatively 
cost-effective scheme unless loan terms have to be renegotiated. In that 
case administrative, monitoring, adjustments costs rise and render group 
lending more expensive. 
 
Individual Lending 
Individual-based lending is related to lending in the conventional banking 
sector. It is imperative to screen and have a close contact with clients that 
are earning a low income in order to mitigate information asymmetries 
between the MFI and its clients. In contrast to group lending, the tasks of 
screening, monitoring and enforcing contracts remain with the MFI (Dellien 
et al. 2005, 2–3). First, screening a client’s financial and livelihood situation 
(e.g. reputation in the community, credit history if available, existence of 
collateral, personal and business risk) is key in order to assess a client’s 
creditworthiness (Dellien et al. 2005, 3). Second, monitoring is especially 
important to reduce moral hazard problems. Without closely monitoring the 
borrower, the credit might not be used for the agreed upon business 
project. „Gathering information from neighbors can be helpful at many 
stages in the loan process” (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 160–161). 
Third, in regard to the enforcement of contracts, individual lending, cannot 
rely on joint liability but draws on other options to provide the client with 
incentives to repay (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 137–162): 
i. trustworthy and reciprocal relationship between the MFI and the 
borrower including periodical consultations with neighbors and friends 
to gather information 
ii. co-signer as guarantor 
iii. repayments in public 
iv. prospects of future loans or/and to receive products at a reduced rate 
v. alternative collateral that has no resale value for the MFI but is 
problematic to lose for a borrower (e.g. kitchen utensils, TV) 
So, even if individual lending is very costly there are options how an MFI 
can self-insure against default. 
  40 
The preceding chapters provided an overview of the functions, target 
groups, providers, products, and funders of microfinance. Furthermore, the 
current definition of microfinance was introduced. The current microfinance 
definition introduced in Chapter 5.1 gives an answer to the questions „Who 
is providing the financial services, and what are these services?”. In the 
following, this current definition is challenged and I argue an extension. 
Three arguments are advocated in order to extend the current definition of 
microfinance by a dimension demanding that microfinance is also defined by 
how the products are supplied. First, due to the fact that microfinance 
clients are vulnerable by default, microfinance providers should account for 
this fact when providing financial services to them. Second, microfinance 
has an inherent social mission. That is why microfinance providers should 
focus on supplying products, which are suitable for their clientele. Third, the 
far-reaching effects of over-indebtedness crises showed how microfinance 
clients and MFIs alike suffer from such crises MFIs should therefore protect 
their clients of over-indebtedness. 
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6 Extending the Definition of Microfinance 
Definitions of microfinance mainly address the questions of „What is 
microfinance?”, „What kind of products does microfinance entail?”, „Who is 
the target group?”, „Who provides microfinance services?”. In Chapter 5.1, 
I introduced a common definition, which includes the who- and what-
dimension of microfinance. 
Microfinance is the provision of small-scale financial services to 
low-income individuals or low-income communities, small-scale 
meaning that the average outstanding balance of microfinance 
products does not exceed 250 percent of the averaging income per 
person (GNI per capita). Microfinance entails the supply of one or 
more of its principal components: credit, savings, insurance and 
money transfer [what-dimension]. The services are supplied by a 
microfinance institution that is either regulated or non-regulated 
[who-dimension]. (Robinson 2001, 9–10; The Mix 2010) 
However, against the backdrop of the vulnerability of microfinance clients, 
the inherent social mission of microfinance and recent events in a few 
microfinance markets, there is reason to add a ‘how-dimension’ – or as I 
also interchangeably refer to it the ‘quality-dimension’ – to a definition of 
microfinance. Hence, a definition of microfinance should, as I claim, also 
give an answer to the question of how microfinance services should be 
provided. 
Including a how-dimension into a definition of microfinance is, to the 
best of my knowledge, a novel idea. So far, there is no definition that 
includes how microfinance services should be provided to its beneficiaries. 
However, the indication that MFIs should provide their clients with products, 
which have a certain quality, is not a recent one. Muhammad Yunus 
emphasized the necessity of „specialized delivery mechanisms” in order to 
reach poor households in the 1990s (Yunus 1992d, 86). He argued that the 
appropriate quality of credit institutions and services is a prerequisite to 
meet the needs of a poor client (Yunus 1992a, 75; Yunus 1992c, 58; Yunus 
1992b, 78).  
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[T]he poor will be effectively reached if the programs [poverty 
focused programs such as MFIs, S.L.] are designed exclusively for 
the poor, implemented through specialized delivery mechanisms 
with specialized people, designed by people who know what they 
are doing and for whom. (Yunus 1992d, 78) 
He underlines the importance of how financial services are supplied. MFIs 
„require specialized people starting from the planning and designing level 
down to the person-to-person contact in the field” (Yunus 1992d, 86). More 
recently, CGAP, although not including it into their definition of microfinance 
(„microfinance is the provision of financial services to low-income people”) 
at least makes the connection between the need of low-income 
communities to gain access to a broad range of financial services with the 
endeavors of the global financial inclusion agenda that „recognizes the 
importance of financial literacy, building consumer financial capabilities, and 
[…] consumer protection policies that take the conditions and constraints of 
poor families in the informal economy into account” (CGAP 2014). McKee, 
Lahaye, and Koning (2011) make a similar connection and state that 
responsible finance, which among other factors includes client protection, 
should be the new standard for the supply of financial services to the BoP. 
Also the SPTF, which is a membership organization encouraging that MFIs 
and other stakeholders in microfinance abide by certain standards when 
doing business with vulnerable clients, emphasizes the moral obligation 
financial institutions have to protect their clients from harm (Social 
Performance Task Force 2016c). Presuming microfinance’s clients’ 
vulnerability, the inherent social mission of microfinance, and recent over-
indebtedness crises, I claim that the connection between microfinance and 
the protection of its clients is a much more direct one. The connection is of 
such a nature that I argue to extend the microfinance definition by a 
quality-dimension, which accounts for how microfinance products should be 
supplied to the BoP. 
In the following, three arguments are provided why standards 
governing how microfinance services should be provide to low- and zero-
income clients should be included into the current definition of microfinance. 
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6.1 The Vulnerability of Microfinance Clients 
The first argument is that microfinance clients are vulnerable by default. 
Microfinance clients are characterized by being more vulnerable to risks 
than people having a higher standard of living and income. People living at 
the BoP are highly vulnerable to outer shocks, such as natural catastrophes 
or illnesses. The term vulnerability is distinct from the superseded one-
dimensional definition of poverty which focuses exclusively on income as an 
indicator for poverty. Vulnerability as it is understood here can be 
subsumed under the, now widely accepted, multi-dimensional definition of 
poverty. The multidimensional understanding of poverty presupposes 
„different dimensions of deprivations” which concern the lack of economic, 
human, political, protective, and socio-cultural capabilities (OECD 2001, 
37). Vulnerability could be therefore subsumed under the lack of protective 
capabilities as presented in the DAC Guidelines for Poverty Reduction (OECD 
2001, 38). Chambers defines vulnerability as follows: 
[Vulnerability] means […] defenselessness, insecurity, and 
exposure to risk, shocks and stress. Vulnerability here refers to 
exposure to contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with 
them. Vulnerability has thus two sides: an external side of risks, 
shocks, and stress to which an individual or household is subject; 
and an internal side which is defenselessness, meaning a lack of 
means to cope without damaging loss. Loss can take many forms 
becoming or being physically weaker, economically impoverished, 
socially dependent, humiliated or psychologically harmed. 
(Chambers 1989, 1) 
Microfinance clients in particular are affected by the vulnerability context 
and are prone to unexpected adverse shocks mainly because of their own-
account worker or self-employed status (Rakodi 2002, 120; Lombard 2006, 
242). 
Figure 1 illustrates how microfinance products may be used alone or in 
combination with others to account for certain events in a household life 
cycle. The life events that are featured in the figure are situations that 
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every individual encounters with certainty, or is probable to encounter in 
her life. 
 
 
Figure 1: Financial Needs in a Household Life Cycle (adapted from Landolt 2009, 
15) 
Evidently, we all face many and diverse risks over our life span. Yet, for 
people living at the BoP seemingly normal life events have a far more 
serious impact than they have on people living above a certain income 
level. Besides providing a summary on which microfinance products match 
what kind of life events, this figure again underlines how vulnerable 
microfinance clients potentially are. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
substantiates that microfinance clients could be considered vulnerable 
clients in consideration of its rulings. Microfinance clients are not average 
clients or consumers. The concept of the average consumer or client (as I 
shall refer to her interchangeably) is regularly used in verdicts of the ECJ. 
The average consumer is defined as „reasonably well informed and 
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reasonably observant and circumspect“26. In its judicial decisions the ECJ 
however also refers to vulnerable consumers. The vulnerable consumer 
does, in particular purchasing situations, need a more intense level of 
protection relative to other consumers (Benöhr 2013, 17, 22, 23; 
Cartwright 2011, 7–8)27. 
Although literature does not discuss the dichotomy between the average 
and vulnerable consumer in connection with microfinance it is worthwhile to 
elaborate whether these concepts prove fruitful in advocating a revision of 
the current microfinance definition. I argue that the microfinance client is 
not an average client but a vulnerable client by default. This means that 
microfinance clients, due to their marginal economic and livelihood 
situation, should be always considered vulnerable and therefore all should 
receive „a higher level of protection” (Benöhr 2013, 17). This protection 
could not only be provided by the state and therefore by means of 
regulations and other protective policies (e.g. credit bureaus, consumer 
protection acts) but also by MFIs, and many of them already do, as I show 
in Part III of this research project, that apply best practices that safeguard 
at least a certain level of client protection. Assuming that microfinance 
clients are vulnerable clients, has certain implications for how microfinance 
clients should be provided with financial services. Furthermore, the 
definition of microfinance should account for this vulnerability and therefore 
include a quality-dimension, meaning that the definition of microfinance 
should also account for how microfinance products should be supplied. 
  
                                       
26 Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky [1998] ECR I-4657, para 31. Online: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61996CJ0210&from=EN 
[last accessed 25.04.2016]. 
27 Case C-382/87, Buet v Ministh·e Public [1989] ECR 1235, para. 13. Online: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:61987CJ0382&from=EN 
[last accessed 25.04.2016]. 
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6.2 The Social Mission Inherent to Microfinance 
The second argument for including the demand for enhanced protection into 
the current definition of microfinance is the social mission that the 
microfinance business model bears. Traditionally, it is in the social mission 
of MFIs to lift people out of poverty, or at least to help them smooth 
fluctuations in consumption and to better manage their money through 
giving them access to financial services. MFIs by definition lend and provide 
financial services to low- or zero-income clients and aim to better their 
livelihood situations. They know about their capabilities and they are aware 
of problems among their potential client base such as vulnerability against 
unexpected shocks or vulnerability due to illiteracy, and specifically financial 
illiteracy. Owing to the social mission inherent in microfinance, MFIs should 
apply certain measures to compensate for this fact and, for example, be 
transparent regarding their prices and fees, inform their clients about the 
terms of the contract, refrain from aggressive lending methods and the like. 
6.3 Over-Indebtedness Crises 
The third argument for incorporating the demand for client protection into 
the current definition of microfinance are late over-indebtedness crises. 
Microfinance markets in Bolivia (1998-1999), Colombia (1999-2000), South 
Africa (1999-2002), Morocco (early 2008), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008), 
Pakistan (late 2008), Nicaragua (2009-2010), India (2010) and Chile 
(2010-2011) underwent repayment crises and were seriously shaken or 
collapsed entirely (Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010, 1; Davel 2013, 12). 
The exact reasons for microfinance crises may be manifold and not clear-cut 
but aggressive commercialization of the sector combined with abusive 
lending practices, concentrated market competition, political interferences 
and non-repayment movements played a vital role. 
Due to these crises academics as well as individuals and groups of the 
private and public sector started to evaluate the assets and drawbacks of 
microfinance more critically. In addition, they have recently started to 
  47 
analyze the adverse effects the provision of microfinance could have, 
especially debated is the problem of over-indebtedness among borrowers, 
and what promising ways there are to minimize the probability of facing 
such over-indebtedness crises again soon 28 . There is common ground 
among the advocates of microfinance that there should be enhanced 
protection for microfinance clients and that practices such as aggressive 
lending or misleading advertising harm clients and should not be part of 
microfinance and that MFIs should make their contribution to mitigate the 
risks of over-indebtedness among microfinance clients (Schicks 2011a; 
Schicks 2011b; Schicks 2012; Schicks 2010; Chien 2012; Brix and McKee 
2010). 
7 The Extended Definition of Microfinance: 
Adding a How-Dimension 
I have argued that due to the vulnerability of microfinance clients, the 
inherent social mission of MFIs, and as a reaction to recent over-
indebtedness crises that have left many microfinance clients in desperate 
financial situations there should be a rethinking of what microfinance 
defines. Microfinance should not give leeway for misleading practices and 
should not be considered microfinance unless some quality standards are 
met by MFIs. Including a quality-dimension into the definition of 
microfinance creates a general understanding that microfinance ought to be 
carried out within certain boundaries. What these boundaries are and what 
we reasonably can demand from MFIs are still up for discussion and is 
further addressed throughout this research endeavor. Microfinance should 
not only be defined by who provides the services, who receives the services 
and what these services are but also how the services should be provided. I 
therefore propose to add an extension to the current definition of 
microfinance, which includes standards of client protection. The revised 
definition of microfinance reads as follows: 
                                       
28 I elaborate more on over-indebtedness, its causes, consequences and possible 
solutions for mitigation in Part II of this research project. 
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Microfinance is the provision of small-scale financial services to 
low-income individuals or low-income communities, small-scale 
meaning that the average outstanding balance of microfinance 
products does not exceed 250 percent of the averaging income per 
person (GNI per capita). Microfinance entails the supply of one or 
more of its principal components: credit, savings, insurance and 
money transfer [what-dimension]. The services are supplied by a 
microfinance institution that is either regulated or non-regulated 
[who-dimension]. Regarding the provision of its services, the 
microfinance institution complies with client protection standards, 
and therefore refrains from harmful practices [how-
dimension/quality-dimension]. 
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8 Conclusion 
Microfinance aims to bring financial services to the BoP and bears the 
potential to benefit its clients in various aspects and eventually enable them 
to escape poverty. Besides having a double bottom line, the business model 
of microfinance is yet in another way distinct from traditional banking 
business models, due to the fact that MFIs provide uncollateralized loans 
while having to deal with the same asymmetric information problems 
underlying every loan contract. Providing credit but having no securities in 
case of default forced MFIs to take advantage of specific group- and 
individual lending methodologies. They help MFIs to prevent their clients 
from defaulting. Accounting for the additional risk of supplying 
uncollateralized loans, MFIs have to very closely screen and monitor their 
clients in the case of individual lending, and apply self-selection and joint 
liability in the case of group lending. 
The promise of the 1980s and 1990s that the microfinance business 
model is one of the most beneficial poverty reduction instruments however 
revealed itself, at least partly, as unfulfilled; recent over-indebtedness 
crises are a proof of that. Due to unprecedented growth of the microfinance 
sector in many markets in the 1990s, MFIs eased their lending practices 
and clients took on more debt than they could manage. The failed promise 
of microfinance and experience of how clients suffered from having too 
much debt gave rise to scholars and practitioners alike to call for enhanced 
protection of clients. In Part I of this study, I account for this call and 
elaborate on the question whether the protection of microfinance clients is 
so substantial that extending the current definition of microfinance becomes 
necessary. 
Arguing that due to the vulnerability of clients, the social mission that is 
inherent in microfinance, and as a reaction to over-indebtedness crises, 
there is reason to extend the current definition of microfinance by a quality-
dimension was the main target of the first part of this research project. I 
claimed that the adherence of MFIs to certain client protection standards 
while supplying financial products is a fundamental feature of microfinance. 
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Therefore, the revised definition should not only consider what kind of 
products microfinance entails, who the target group is and who provides the 
services but also how the services are provided. Suggesting that 
microfinance products should be provided in accordance with client 
protection standards, I set a preliminary benchmark against how the 
quality-dimension could be evaluated. If such an extended definition proves 
helpful for practitioners and scholars is yet unclear. At the minimum, it 
serves as a normative demand that microfinance should aim to include 
certain standards of client protection and therefore abstain from practices 
that are potentially harmful to clients. 
In Part II further implications of the extended definition of microfinance 
are elaborated. Starting from the assumption that the reason microfinance 
clients struggle with too much debt cannot be solely accounted for by the 
malpractices of MFIs, a detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of 
over-indebtedness not only on the MFI, but also on the client and market 
level, helps to assess whether including the how-dimension into the 
definition of microfinance lastingly protects clients from the risk of 
unmanageable debt or if there is need for a more comprehensive protective 
framework. I conclude that to protect microfinance clients effectively from 
over-indebtedness, it is not sufficient to extend the current definition of 
microfinance. Analyzing the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness 
in Part II suggests working towards and conceptualizing a broader 
framework, which includes all relevant microfinance stakeholders and calls 
upon them to take the responsibility necessary when doing business with 
the BoP (see part III). 
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PART II – OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AS THE CORE 
PROBLEM OF MICROFINANCE 
9 Over-Indebtedness and Microfinance 
As discussed in Part I, MFIs use specific lending methodologies to minimize 
the information asymmetries between them and their clients. Applying 
lending strategies to reduce information asymmetries principally serves a 
business purpose, namely to increase the probability of the MFI being 
repaid. However, the debt situation of the borrower at the moment of 
repayment remains unclear. If the borrower has just fully repaid her 
outstanding loan with a loan from another financial institution, is irrelevant 
and often unnoticeable to the MFI. Yet, the borrower might be at the edge 
of being over-indebted. Such dynamics, meaning having no information 
about clients’ real financial situations and lacking collateral to seize in case 
of default, can lead to MFIs’ portfolios being increasingly at risk, which in 
turn might peak in entire markets losing stability. The main concern of Part 
II of this research project is to analyze the many causes of over-
indebtedness and demonstrate its devastating and far-reaching 
consequences that materialized during late microfinance crises and to find 
approaches to minimize these effects. Over-indebtedness does not only 
impact the social and economic well-being of microfinance clients but may 
also greatly influence the systemic stability of microfinance markets and the 
financial sustainability of MFIs (Guérin, Morvant-Roux, and Villarreal 2014; 
Brix and McKee 2010; Schicks 2010; Schicks 2011b; Schicks 2012; Kappel, 
Krauss, and Lontzek 2010; Johnson 2014; Hummel 2014; Guérin 2013; 
Guérin et al. 2014; Schicks and Rosenberg 2011; Wampfler, Bouquet, and 
Ralison 2014). So what approaches are suited to mitigate over-
indebtedness among microfinance clients? 
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In order to do so, the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness 
on all three levels are analyzed. The results will reveal that there are mainly 
three approaches to tackle over-indebtedness: state regulation, financial 
literacy programs, and soft law standards. This analysis then serves as the 
basis to brainstorm about connecting the extended definition, which calls 
upon MFIs to protect their clients from harmful practices, to a more 
encompassing framework including tangible strategies to tackle over-
indebtedness (see Part III and Part IV). 
The structure of Part II is as follows: To show how over-indebtedness 
may arise, I start at the root of the problem, namely by discussing that 
money is fungible after entering a household in Chapter 9.1. Again 
emphasizing problems of asymmetrical information inherent to loan 
contracts, I introduce how being in debt and having debt stress can lead to 
over-indebtedness. 
The term over-indebtedness is defined in Chapter 10 and followed by a 
detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness. 
This analysis is grounded on theoretical considerations and empirical data, 
and evaluates the client, institutional and systemic level. 
The overall aims of Part II are to show that the causes of over-
indebtedness are not only manifold and the consequences far-reaching and 
not restrictive to the individuals, but are also having a great impact on MFIs 
and microfinance markets. At the end of Part II and arising as a result from 
the over-indebtedness analysis, I detect that client protection is a 
prerequisite to prevent clients from being prone to debt stress or in the 
worst-case to over-indebtedness and suggest, in line with literature, three 
approaches to mitigate these risks from three different angles. 
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9.1 The Fungibility of Money 
Part I of this thesis outlined how microfinance products are supplied, what 
their main characteristics are and which products are suitable for what life 
situations. Often the money goes to its stipulated purpose (e.g. business). 
However, clients sometimes also use credit products for unforeseen events 
(e.g. illness, droughts) or consumption (Gonzalez 2008, 100). The 
fungibility of money after the client has received the loan is the main focus 
in the discussion about debt management (Dunn 2004, 173). On the client 
side, it is crucial to the borrower to keep track of her financial situation to 
successfully manage her debt. On the provider side, it is essential to have 
information about how the client’s financial situation develops over the 
repayment period in order to avoid defaults. As described above, the lender 
always lacks information about the borrower’s intentions and plans she has 
with the loaned money. There are strategies (e.g. group lending with joint 
liability or individual lending with very close screening and monitoring) to 
reduce this information gap. Yet, the perspective taken in Chapter 5.3.2.1.1 
focuses on the business aspect of microfinance. It answers the question: 
How can the MFI elicit a certain repayment behavior from its clients to 
prevent default? However, a client that repays her loan does not necessarily 
stand for a client without any other debt. The assumption that money is 
fungible as soon as it enters a household implies that the money might be 
used for a business purpose, consumables, as emergency money or 
repayment of another loan. Figure 2 below illustrates these different 
possibilities. 
After having received the money, the MFI cannot – at least not easily – 
detect whether a client uses the funds for the stipulated purpose or 
manages her debt well, is in debt stress or is already over-indebted29. These 
characteristics are hidden within a black box. How a client is able to manage 
her debt is influenced by different conditions. Debt management is for 
example affected by foreseeable and unforeseeable expenditures (e.g. 
                                       
29 A definition of debt stress and over-indebtedness is given in Chapter 9.2 and 10. 
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paying for daughter’s wedding, expanding business, having to pay for 
medication). 
 
Figure 2: Within the Black Box – Manageable Debt, Debt Stress, Over-Indebtedness 
(O-I) (own figure) 
As I show in the following, there are also other reasons besides 
unforeseeable and foreseeable events that define whether debt is 
manageable thus leading to full repayment, stressful thus leading to 
rescheduling repayment, or unbearable thus leading to default. To acquire a 
more complete picture of how over-indebtedness emerges, I firstly 
distinguish between the terms ‘indebtedness’ and ‘debt stress’, and 
secondly define ‘over-indebtedness’ followed by a detailed analysis of the 
causes and consequences of over-indebtedness on the individual, 
institutional and systemic level and its implications. 
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9.2 Indebtedness and Debt Stress 
Being in debt is a common situation in our lives. Either we bought a house 
with a mortgage or we took a loan to start a business, or a friend lent us 
some money to buy lunch because we did not have any cash on us. Hence, 
being in debt seems to be normal. However, if we start to struggle to repay 
our mortgage, it makes us feel uncomfortable and pressured. We think 
about how to repay the money. Maybe we have lost our job or have been 
unsuccessful with our business idea or something else unexpected has 
happened. No matter what, we still have to repay. At this moment we enter 
into a phase of debt stress. Debt stress characterizes a state where a 
borrower finds herself in a debt-related crunch (Davel 2013, 1). If we are 
lucky, we find a new job or the business idea eventually takes off, and we 
are able to make all the installments. What if we do not find a way to repay 
the loaned money with our own resources? We start looking for other ways, 
let them be formal or informal. If we manage to receive money that is given 
to us with no hope of a return, our debt will no longer be of any concern to 
us. However, most of the time we find money that comes at a certain cost, 
namely interest. And even if we received it at zero interest, we still had to 
pay back the amount lent. According to Davel (2013, 1), debt stress paves 
the road to over-indebtedness. 
10 Over-Indebtedness 
In literature, there is no comprehensive definition of over-indebtedness in 
the realm of microfinance. How to define over-indebtedness is often 
dependent on the perspective. Either scholars look at the problem of over-
indebtedness from a lender’s perspective or from the borrower’s perspective. 
From a lender’s perspective, clients are over-indebted when they lack the 
capacity „to repay all debts fully and on time“ (Haas 2006, 3). Best known 
for representing a benchmark of over-indebtedness from a lender’s 
perspective is the so-called portfolio at risk-value (PAR-value) and the 
default rates the MFI shows on the outstanding loans. MFIs showing high 
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PAR-values and high default rates in the accounting sheets, point to over-
indebtedness among their clients. Albeit PAR-values and default rates are 
taken as an indicator for over-indebtedness, they fail to adequately mirror 
this phenomenon. Guérin (2013) shows that there are two manifestations of 
default: liquidity and strategic defaults. On the one hand liquidity defaults 
occur when clients are not able to repay their debt. The source of their 
responsibilities can be manifold. If clients find themselves in debt stress or 
are already chronically indebted, their source of debts are normally of 
formal and informal origins. Thus, they stem from pawnbrokers, private 
moneylenders, MFIs, family and friends. On the other hand strategic 
defaults arise when clients have the liquidity to repay but choose not to 
(2013, 78; Morvant-Roux et al. 2014, 310–311; Guérin 2013). There are 
three main explanations found by two recent surveys of Guérin, Kumar, and 
Agier, conducted in Tamil Nadu (India), and Morvant-Roux, conducted in 
Morocco. 
First, lenders in Tamil Nadu – either informal or formal – trust in local 
‘leaders’ regarding the credit risk management of potential clients. These 
leaders are normally chosen due to their charisma, power to mobilize 
people and their knowledge of their community (Guérin, Kumar, and Agier 
2013, S78; Guérin 2013). To let them manage the microcredit risk of 
potential clients led to fast client growth but simultaneously beard immense 
risks. This system of reliance can crash easily due to credibility loss or also 
when a key individual announces that borrowers do not need to repay their 
outstanding loans anymore (Guérin 2013)30. 
Second, Morvant-Roux et al. (2014, 310–311) state that clients may 
refuse to repay due to a „lack of legitimacy of microcredit providers“. This 
points to the problem that without close social ties between the lender and 
borrower, loans are less probable to be paid back. That close ties and the 
„[c]ontinuity of a relationship creates an atmosphere of trust” was already 
                                       
30 A similar case occurred in Nicaragua, where Omar Gonzalez Vilchez, mayor of the 
northern municipality Jalapa called upon microfinance clients to not repay their loans 
anymore. The Movimiento No Pago was born. The borrowers believed that microfinance 
providers allegedly dragged them into debt owed to excessive interest rates and non-
transparent information. A severe non-repayment crisis was the result (Minchev 2014, 2). 
  57 
emphasized by Yunus in the 1990s (1992d, 88) and the hypothesis that the 
close relationship between local loan officers and borrowers positively 
influences repayment behavior is backed by several current studies (Karlan 
and Appel 2012, 52, 130; Morvant-Roux et al. 2014, 309; Collins et al. 
2011, 208). 
Third, if consequences of default are perceived to be marginal, 
borrowers will tend to default. In Morocco, state-owned providers disburse a 
lot of credit. Borrowers that perceive the Maghzen (Central Moroccan State 
Authority) as illegitimate take out loans and deliberately default (Morvant-
Roux et al. 2014, 308). The empirical evidence of strategic defaults 
discussed above, suggests that numerical indicators do not capture over-
indebtedness adequately. PAR-values and default rates are rough estimates 
and help to identify and assess institutional risks of MFIs or systemic risks 
of microfinance markets. However, they do not operationalize over-
indebtedness effectively. These measures only reflect a snapshot in time 
and do not live up to giving a complete picture of clients’ repayment 
situations. That is why this research project adopts an understanding of 
over-indebtedness, which represents the client’s perspective and is oriented 
towards the definitions brought forward by Schicks (2010, 6), Kappel, 
Krauss, and Lontzek (2010, 7) and Gonzalez (2008, 100). 
As argued in Chapter 6.1, risk is a constant companion when living at 
the BoP. Adverse shocks may destroy returns that would have been 
ascribed to other purposes. Instead of repaying debt, expanding the 
business or paying for school fees, the money has to be used to repair the 
house, buy medication or pay for a funeral. The future is uncertain, for all of 
us, however as argued before, this uncertainty especially affects the BoP. 
Risks, such as adverse and unexpected income shocks, are a key topic in an 
environment where incomes are low and volatile. Gonzalez (2008, 99–105) 
shows mathematically that a household, unless it defaults on the loan, has 
to undertake unduly high sacrifices to repay if hit by an external shock. 
Assuming uncertainty about the future means that households have no 
other choice than to make decisions on the bases of incomplete information. 
If the newly started business does not kick-off due to a currently bad 
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economy, or if a household loses its most effective manpower due to an 
illness, a household may quickly face a decline in profit and assets in 
general. This leaves the household with two options, to default on the loan 
and thereby risking being denied a consecutive loan or to undergo unduly 
high sacrifices. Making unduly high sacrifices could mean the further 
destruction of other assets such as savings or cutting down on consumption 
or increasing effort (Gonzalez 2008, 100). Gonzalez’ (2008, 99–105) 
mathematical models of repayment scenarios (i.e. making unduly high 
sacrifices to repay or to default and lose the possibility of getting another 
loan with the same MFI) have little in common with the static definition of 
over-indebtedness from a lender’s perspective focusing on PAR-values. 
The debt situation of a client is often multidimensional and much more 
complex than a single value manages to capture. Based on this 
argumentation, I adopt a client-centered definition of over-indebtedness, 
which follows Gonzalez (2008, 100), Schicks (2010, 6) and Kappel, Krauss, 
and Lontzek (2010, 7): 
A microfinance customer is over-indebted if she is continuously 
struggling to meet repayment deadlines and repeatedly has to 
make unduly high sacrifices to meet her loan obligations. (Schicks 
2010, 6) 
What causes microfinance clients to get over-indebted and how far-
reaching the consequences of over-indebtedness are for the clients, the 
MFIs, and the microfinance markets is addressed in the following chapter. 
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10.1 Over-Indebtedness: Causes and Consequences 
This chapter addresses the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness 
on the systemic, institutional and individual level. Ensuing from these 
reflections, seven hypotheses (H1-H7) and seven implications (I1-I7) 
summarizing the analysis of the causes and consequences of over-
indebtedness are derived. As a result of the analysis three suitable 
approaches to mitigate the risk of over-indebtedness, which encompass 
consumer protection regulations, soft law standards and financial literacy 
programs are presented. I conclude with stressing the substantial role the 
protection of clients from over-indebtedness takes in microfinance and seize 
on the idea to connect the extended definition of microfinance with the 
more comprehensive and multi-stakeholder oriented framework of 
responsible microfinance, which I construe in Part III and IV of this research 
endeavor. 
As mentioned above, several microfinance markets have experienced 
over-indebtedness crises and several studies have been conducted in order 
to learn more about the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness. 
With the focus on portfolio growth in the 1990s, literature and practice has 
not paid much attention to the great problem over-indebtedness poses to 
clients, as well as to MFIs and microfinance markets. Only recently, 
scholars, practitioners and policy makers have started thinking about the 
causes, consequences and remedies of over-indebtedness. 
The microfinance over-indebtedness literature can be generously 
divided into two bodies of literature. The first body of literature argues that 
over-indebtedness in microfinance is caused by external, institutional, 
systemic and individual factors. Most of the literature is concerned with 
possible institutional and systemic factors that beget over-indebtedness 
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2009; Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010; 
Hulme 2000; Porteous 2009; DeVaney 2006; Schicks 2010; Schicks and 
Rosenberg 2011; Kappel, Krauss, and Lontzek 2010; Chen, Rasmussen, and 
Reille 2010; Davel 2013). Also there is a range of literature, which 
addresses the question of how external factors, such as political unrest, 
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illness and natural catastrophe, add to over-indebtedness (Schicks 2010; 
Rakodi 2002). In contrast, only very few microfinance scholars are 
concerned with the causes of over-indebtedness on the individual level (in 
the broadest sense Gonzalez 2008). Therefore, I have to resort to studies 
focusing on the question of how borrowers can contribute to their own over-
indebtedness, but which were mostly carried out in industrialized countries 
(Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2009; Sprenger and Meier 2012; Campbell 
2006; Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2004; Anderloni and Vandone 
2008). Nevertheless, I try to transfer and adapt these insights to the 
microfinance context. The second body of literature is concentrating on the 
consequences over-indebtedness has on the institutional, systemic and 
individual level. Thereby, most of the literature is concerned with the 
consequences over-indebtedness has on the individual borrower (A. 
Gonzalez 2008; Schicks 2010; McIntyre 2013; Hulme 2000; Sweet et al. 
2013; Webley and Nyhus 2001; Wampfler, Bouquet, and Ralison 2014; 
Johnson 2014; Guérin et al. 2014; Hummel 2014; Schicks and Rosenberg 
2011; Schicks 2012; Angulo Salazar 2014) and a smaller portion addresses 
the consequences on the financial institutions (Rosenberg 1999; Stearns 
1991; Schicks 2010; Feasley 2011; Schicks 2011a) and microfinance 
markets (Kappel, Krauss, and Lontzek 2010; Schicks 2011a). Schicks 
(2010; 2011a) is among the few authors who give a detailed analysis of 
how over-indebtedness affects all three levels of analysis (i.e. individual, 
institutional, systemic). 
In the following, I work through the causes – external, institutional, 
systemic and individual – and consequences – institutional, systemic and 
individual – of over-indebtedness. Please take into account that I cannot for 
all cases provide unambiguous boundaries between the levels of analysis. 
Especially between the institutional and systemic level, clear-cut lines 
cannot always be drawn. In order to derive implications and present 
tangible strategies to mitigate the risks of over-indebtedness at the end of 
this second part, I provide a comprehensive analysis of the literature and 
empirical findings on the causes and consequences of over-indebtedness on 
the individual, institutional and systemic level in the next chapters. 
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10.1.1 Causes of Over-Indebtedness  
As in Schicks (2010), the causes of over-indebtedness are analyzed from 
three different viewpoints: external factors, institutional and systemic, and 
client-centered. Over-indebtedness might be triggered by external factors, 
provoked by particular actions and methods used by MFIs or generated by 
the actions of the clients themselves. 
10.1.1.1 Causes: External Factors 
In Chapter 6.1, I applied the vulnerability definition of Chambers 31 . 
Chambers thereby speaks of the two sides of vulnerability: external and 
internal. Taking account of the external side, poor people are highly 
susceptible to „risks, shocks, and stress” (Chambers 1989, 1). Microfinance 
clients in particular are affected by the vulnerability context and are prone 
to external shocks mainly due to their unsteady own-account worker or self-
employment status (Rakodi 2002, 120; Lombard 2006, 242). 
The nature of outer shocks can be manifold. Schicks (2010, 10) 
describes the following points as main factors in order for a client to move 
from debt which is easy to handle to unmanageable debt. Personal tremors 
such as illness, death of a family member, or failed business ideas may 
transform debt levels of microfinance clients from manageable to 
unbearable. Political factors, such as civil wars, riots and changes in 
governments may influence the debt management of clients. Clients may 
also face problems to repay successively if climatic shocks such as natural 
catastrophes occur. Furthermore, economic dynamics like price fluctuations 
but also the amount of informal alternatives borrowers have at their 
disposal affect their debt levels. The given institutional and legal 
                                       
31 „Vulnerability, though, is not the same as poverty. It means not lack or want, but 
defenselessness, insecurity, and exposure to risk, shocks and stress. Vulnerability here 
refers to exposure to contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with them. 
Vulnerability has thus two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an 
individual or household is subject; and an internal side which is defenselessness, meaning a 
lack of means to cope without damaging loss. Loss can take many forms becoming or being 
physically weaker, economically impoverished, socially dependent, humiliated or 
psychologically harmed” (Chambers 1989, 1). 
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frameworks have a great impact on the individual indebtedness levels via 
the MFI and regulations as well. 
In the following the institutional and systemic reasons for increased 
over-indebtedness among borrowers are discussed. 
10.1.1.2 Causes: Institutional and Systemic Perspective 
Researchers (Schicks 2010; Schicks and Rosenberg 2011; Kappel, Krauss, 
and Lontzek 2010; Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010; Davel 2013) assume 
that from an institutional and systemic perspective especially concentrated 
market situations but also aggressive commercialization and 
mismanagement of MFIs lead to over-indebtedness. There are three main 
hypotheses which can be found in literature: 
I. Increased competition in and saturation of microfinance markets may 
lead to hazardous lending practices including aggressive marketing 
methods accompanied by changes in lending standards and 
procedures. This increases the risk of over-indebtedness. 
II. Microfinance markets often lack an efficient system of pooled 
information about the credit record of microfinance clients. This may 
lead to higher over-indebtedness rates among clients, since MFIs 
cannot detect cross-borrowing and hence high-risk clients. 
III. Inappropriate microfinance products may increase the risk of driving 
clients into over-indebtedness. 
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10.1.1.2.1 Competition in and Saturation of Microfinance Markets 
Regarding the first hypothesis one can argue that several studies state 
that higher competition in microfinance markets alter lender behavior 
(Schicks and Rosenberg 2011; Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010; 
McIntosh and Wydick 2005; Navajas, Conning, and Gonzalez-Vega 2003). 
Scholars assume that the nature of the microfinance market (saturation and 
competitiveness) and the way in which microcredit is provided (hazardous 
lending standards) result in a prevalence of over-indebted clients. In a 
saturated and competitive market situation it is key for MFIs not to lose any 
of their clients to competitors. In order to pursue this strategy MFIs keep 
their lending expenses on a low level. This might result in easing up the 
lending standards and reducing their client screenings (Schicks and 
Rosenberg 2011; Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010; McIntosh and Wydick 
2005). Refraining from or cutting back on techniques to assess the riskiness 
of clients has consequences. It has already been shown that even in a 
normal market situation, MFIs may lend almost exclusively to risky clients 
without knowing it. This phenomenon stems from asymmetric information 
problems (i.e. ex ante moral hazard and adverse selection). Imagine a 
saturated competitive market where MFIs cut back on all kinds of important 
screening techniques, the probability of choosing riskier borrowers over 
safer ones is expected to be even higher than in a less competitive market 
setting. Lending to risky borrowers results in higher default numbers and 
ultimately also increases the probability of clients cross-borrowing. In 
addition, MFIs apply aggressive marketing techniques in order to sell loans 
and show an „exaggerated focus on portfolio growth” (Schicks 2010, 9; see 
also Sinclair 2012, 45). In a microfinance-critical article Hulme (2000, 27) 
states that MFIs focus on portfolio growth and not, for example, on savings 
because savings in contrast to loan products are not profitable. Additionally, 
Hulme reports that in the case of Kenya Women’s Finance Trust, clients who 
request to only make deposits and not to borrow will be „balanced out” 
(2000, 27). In other words: They are forced to leave the MFI. Banerjee and 
Mullainathan (2010, 36) are even more explicit. MFIs try to hinder clients 
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making their way out of poverty. Hence, institutions are setting incentives 
that clients always re-borrow, even when they would like to cease taking up 
new loans or would like to pause their borrowing. This is because the MFI 
mainly earns profit through selling credit products and if clients stop taking 
out loans the business will be less profitable. 
Scholars have also investigated the so-called „volume focused incentive 
system”, which also negatively impacts the manner of selling loans 
(DeVaney 2006, 18). MFIs often pay performance-based salaries to their 
loan officers. Hence, the more loan contracts they sell, the higher their 
compensation is. The unprecedented growth the microfinance sector in 
many developing countries experienced also required hiring more, often 
inexperienced and untrained, loan officers. Such employees may make poor 
decisions on selling loan contracts and might more easily drive clients into 
debt stress and over-indebtedness than more experienced coworkers would 
(Schicks 2010, 10). 
Furthermore, aggressive marketing strategies feature credit offers and 
advertising that are phrased and presented in a non-transparent and 
misleading manner (Porteous 2009, 7). Brix and McKee (2010, 4) 
emphasize that aggressive sales practices, such as „door-to-door 
solicitations or limited time-offers” might take advantage of clients’ 
psychological biases (see also Chapter 10.1.1.3 on the client perspective). 
So, in addition to marketing techniques there are transparency issues 
regarding interest rates and terms of contracts (Brix and McKee 2010, 3). 
The less transparent the contract terms, the more prone the clients are to 
plunge into over-indebtedness. Being unaware of the terms of the contract, 
especially regarding very high interest rates and fees, contributes to 
borrowers’ debt problems (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2009; Collins 
et al. 2011). 
Finally, some MFIs apply aggressive collection practices. As DeVaney 
(2006, 21) puts it, „a low default rate is critical to their [MFIs’] survival, 
institutions must put pressure on clients to repay”. However, this does not 
legitimize aggressive collection practices, such as humiliation, intimidation 
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or force (Schicks 2010, 11; DeVaney 2006, 21)32. Sinclair (2012, 203) finds 
very strong words for describing the results of the microfinance crisis in 
Andra Pradesh in 2010: 
The subtle twist here, which was a novel development on the 
previous crises in Bosnia, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and even, debatably, 
Nigeria, was that in India the practices actually led to scores of 
suicides, occasional abductions, and some forced prostitution 
thrown in for good measure, to add a final veneer of respectability 
to the sector once and for all. […] but they [the MFIs] employed 
increasingly aggressive practices in the field to pressure clients to 
repay-until clients simply started killing themselves. Numbers vary 
on the number of microfinance related suicides, but the generally 
accepted number is fifty-four currently. 
These procedures „unduly increase the burden of indebtedness for 
borrowers” (Schicks 2010, 11). Furthermore, clients are often unaware of 
their rights and might perceive aggressive practices as standard (Schicks 
2010, 11). 
10.1.1.2.2 Lack of Pooled Information About Credit Records 
The second hypothesis states that a lack of efficient pooled information 
systems leads to higher over-indebtedness rates among clients. Clients do 
in fact cross-borrow. That means they take out loans, either from informal 
or formal sources, in order to repay other loans. Microfinance knows 
roughly two solutions of how to detect cross-borrowing without increasing 
their expenses for screening potential clients more thoroughly: credit 
bureaus and informal sharing of credit information among MFIs33. Credit 
information systems serve the purpose of allowing MFIs to inspect 
information of their clients’ credit histories. Scholars assume that if a 
microfinance market lacks such a system, clients are more prone to over-
                                       
32 For further examples and cases of inappropriate collective practices see Tiwari et al. 
(2009). 
33 Informal data sharing systems come into play, when there is no credit bureau in 
place, or when MFIs without banking licenses are excluded and thus have no other possibility 
of gathering information (Brix and McKee 2010, 16). 
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indebtedness (Brix and McKee 2010, 15). What kind of information is 
collected however affects the usefulness of the pooled credit information 
system greatly and I explain the advantages and disadvantages of such 
systems in more detail in Chapter 17.2. 
10.1.1.2.3 Inappropriate Microfinance Products 
The third hypothesis describes the correlation between inappropriateness 
of microfinance products and over-indebtedness. Musoni, an MFI based in 
Kenya and other East African countries, interviewed its clients in regard to 
product design in general. Clients „value a product that they can access 
easily given their work schedule and their location, and a product that is 
flexible enough to fit their cash flows” (interview with an associate of 
Musoni in The Smart Campaign 2012, 2). Most of the investments and 
hence also repayment of loans is depending on seasonality (e.g. harvest 
period, raining season) (Schicks 2010, 10). MFIs need to take this fact into 
account and give out loans at times when it makes sense for clients and at 
the same time, have more flexible repayment schedules. For example, 
when cotton prices drop, clients should not have to sell under pressure and 
earn less because of that. In practice, flexible repayment schedules are 
seldom. Maturities are short and the repayment schedules can be rigid. 
Hence, clients with unstable revenues probably struggle to repay if they 
bought unsuitable credit products. 
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10.1.1.3 Causes: Client Level 
This chapter focuses on microfinance clients and how psychological biases, 
cognitive biases, sociological influence and socio-demographic and economic 
factors may influence their successful debt management. First, the reasons 
for over-indebtedness stemming from psychological and cognitive biases 
are discussed. The neo-classical model of economics includes the 
assumption that actors are rational utility maximizers who have perfect 
information at their hands when taking decisions (Akerlof 1991, 1; Goodwin 
et al. 2015, 178, 183). Behavioral economics challenges this axiom. To do 
so, behavioral economists depend heavily on scientific experiments to 
provide insights about reasons for individuals behaving a certain way in 
situations. The core claim is that a more complex model of motivation than 
the one suggested by neo-classical theory is required to explain human 
behavior. Instead of rational actors, behavioral economists assume the 
actors’ rationality to be bounded by cognitive biases, and the information 
accessible and the time available when making a decision (Goodwin et al. 
2015, 184; Simon 1972, 163–164). Second, sociological influences that 
may impact debt management negatively are presented. Third, socio-
demographic and economic factors influencing the debt management of 
microfinance clients are considered. 
As I pointed out above, microfinance literature mainly addresses the 
external, institutional, and systemic perspective of the causes of over-
indebtedness. Only a few microfinance scholars are concerned with the 
causes of over-indebtedness on the individual level (in the broadest sense 
Gonzalez 2008). Most of the studies referred to in this chapter have been 
carried out in industrialized countries (Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2009; 
Sprenger and Meier 2012; Campbell 2006; Bertrand, Mullainathan, and 
Shafir 2004; Anderloni and Vandone 2008). Still I will try to transfer and 
adapt these insights to the microfinance context. 
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10.1.1.3.1 Psychological and Cognitive Biases 
For the case of microfinance, behavioral economics tries to find 
explanations why a consumer would choose one product or service over 
another or why one client would default on a loan and the other would not. 
The microfinance and the U.S. mortgage crisis have shown again that the 
neo-classical model assuming rational agent behavior in competitive 
markets does not have to hold true after all. As discussed above individuals’ 
decisions are limited by their cognitive capabilities, by existing information, 
and the time available in order to make a decision (Goodwin et al. 2015, 
184; Simon 1972, 163–164). 
First, studies show that client behavior is rather governed by their 
cognitive capabilities, their own ideas and impulses than by „deliberative 
intent“ and „normative ideals“ (Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2009, 27). 
Studies show that clients lack self-control, are over-confident, and, or have 
inconsistent time preferences (Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2009, 32; 
Schicks 2010, 12). Microfinance clients might, for example, be tempted by 
immediate consumption and assess a loans’ benefits presently as more 
significant than its potential benefits in the future. But decisions a client 
makes grounded on her present utility function, are „unlikely to maximize 
long-term individual welfare” (Schicks 2010, 20). Behavioral economics has 
different explanations why individuals might act against their long-term 
well-being: the most prominent one being the ‘hyperbolic discount 
function’34. Hyperbolic discounting assumes consumers have inconsistent 
preferences, which lead them to take decisions that negatively impact their 
long-term well-being. For example, last year I committed that at the 
beginning of this year I would start an ambitious savings plan in order to be 
able to buy a house in the future. But as this year was starting, I decided 
that I would start saving next year because I was not yet ready to undergo 
the consumption sacrifices that I would have to make to meet the goals of 
the savings plan (Laibson 1997, 445–446). Inconsistent time preferences 
                                       
34 Two other well-known approaches of behavioral economics to explain time 
inconsistencies are ‘procrastination’ (see Akerlof 1991) and ‘dual self’ (see Fudenberg and 
Levine 2006). 
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lead to the decision to postpone the savings plan yet for another year. 
Analogously, whether or whether not a client uses her loan for immediate 
consumption depends on the importance she ascribes to the immediate 
consumption in comparison to the potential long-term benefit of the loan. 
Hyperbolic discounting presumes that due to inconsistent preferences, 
consumers are motivated to „constrain their own future choices” (Laibson 
1997, 443). Therefore, inconsistent time preferences may add to 
microfinance clients being prone to over-indebtedness. 
Second, existing information greatly impacts the decision making of 
clients. An important source of decisions made by clients, which might lead 
to over-indebtedness, stems from asymmetric information. Only this time it 
is not the MFI lacking information about the client as with the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard but rather the client lacking information 
about the offerings of the MFI. Clients often lack information about 
microfinance products and their financial literacy in general is low (Schicks 
2010, 12). Therefore, microfinance clients are likely to be susceptible to 
marketing and if financial products are presented in a misleading way, such 
as product prices being disclosed without additional fees, clients may buy 
products that exceed their financial limits. 
Third, loans are sometimes needed on short notice and clients lack the 
time to compare offers of different MFIs. A study by Meier and Sprenger 
(2012) that was carried out in the U.S. showed that having an urgent need 
for a loan predicts creditworthiness. Hence, individuals that will wait for 
their loan will have a higher probability of paying back their loan in contrast 
to the individuals having an immediacy bias (Sprenger and Meier 2012, 2). 
Since often microfinance clients do not have much time to decide about 
getting a loan they might end up buying a product that neither suits them 
nor is reasonably priced. Credit decisions made under these conditions 
make microfinance clients prone to over-indebtedness. 
Finally, cognitive and psychological biases may also set limits to the 
ability to be an entrepreneur, because not everybody is a born 
entrepreneur. Although it is a fact that mainly poor people are depending on 
self-employment because of a lack of wage jobs, it is evident that not all of 
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them are ready to or are qualified to be an entrepreneur (Karnani 2007, 
38). This may lead to money mismanagement and bad business decisions 
and may peak in over-indebtedness. 
10.1.1.3.2 Sociological Influence Factors 
The three main sociological factors influencing the debt management of 
clients are consumerism, economic socialization, and support of the family. 
Consumerism, as the focus on material goods, is an issue in microfinance. 
The consumption of goods represents one’s standing and identity in a 
society. This phenomenon is not exclusively observed in the realm of 
microfinance. Nevertheless, it is evident that the social pressure of 
consumption may drive clients of microfinance to take up too much debt. 
Whether borrowers can manage their debt is also dependent on their 
economic socialization. Economic socialization includes how acquainted 
clients are with money management, and debt management specifically. For 
example, if current borrowers can draw on experiences from their parents 
and how they managed their money and debt, it helps them to successfully 
manage their own debt or at least avoid the mistakes their parents might 
have made in the past (Stone and Maury 2006, 554). Inversely, a lack of 
economic socialization might add to the risk of over-indebtedness. 
Furthermore, feeling obliged to support family members at any cost is 
rooted in many cultures. The responsibility many borrowers feel towards 
their family and community - meaning that they feel obliged to support 
them financially – may lead to irresponsible borrowing (Schicks 2010, 13). 
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10.1.1.3.3 Socio-Demographic and Economic Factors 
Also socio-demographic and economic factors might provide explanations 
why clients take up unmanageable debt. Some of the socio-demographic 
factors where over-indebtedness among microfinance clients is prominent 
are the following35: young age, many and small children, lack of education, 
illiteracy, and illness. The most prominent economic factors negatively 
impacting the debt management are low income, unemployment, money 
mismanagement and income fluctuations (Anderloni and Vandone 2008, 15; 
Collins et al. 2011, 478). Gonzales (2008, 100) shows that loans are often 
partly used for consumption instead of being completely used for economic 
activity. Therefore, returns on investments – meaning the returns on the 
given loans – cannot be as high as assumed by lenders. Borrowers might 
consequently not be able to repay on time and run into debt stress and 
eventually into over-indebtedness. 
  
                                       
35 For further socio-demographic factors that may lead to over-indebtedness, see 
Schicks (2010, 13–14). 
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10.1.2 Causes of Over-Indebtedness: Results 
The causes of over-indebtedness are various and clients are prone to over-
indebtedness due to external, institutional, systemic and individual factors. 
The following figure summarizes the many variables influencing the 
manageability of debt of a microfinance client. To the question of how many 
potential causes of over-indebtedness must be put into effect to trigger 
over-indebtedness, there is no conclusive answer. It is most likely and also 
Schicks (2010, 15) argues that a credit relationship which ends with the 
borrower being over-indebted is normally the outcome of many interacting 
factors. 
 
Figure 3: The Causes of Over-Indebtedness (O-I) (own figure) 
In the succeeding chapter, the consequences of over-indebtedness are 
discussed to finally address the implications of how to tackle over-
indebtedness in microfinance and mitigate not only its wide-ranging 
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consequences on the individual, but also on the institutional and systemic 
level in Chapters 10.2 and 10.3. 
10.1.3 Consequences of Over-Indebtedness 
The consequences of over-indebtedness are manifold. Over-indebted clients 
feel the immediate effects. In addition, institutional and systemic effects 
might occur as the numbers of over-indebted clients rise. Providing an 
overview of the consequences of over-indebtedness they are separately 
discussed on the individual, institutional and systemic level. It has to be 
noted that sometimes there is no clear-cut differentiation between the three 
levels. I tried to take into consideration that consequences materializing on 
the individual level might also translate into consequences on the 
institutional and systemic level and vice versa.  
10.1.3.1 Consequences on the Individual Level 
The definition of over-indebtedness as used here emphasizes the unduly 
high sacrifices a borrower has to make in order to repay outstanding loans. 
On the individual level there are mainly five consequences: material 
repercussions, and sociological, psychological and physical consequences. 
The fifth consequence is that with the rising number of over-indebted 
borrowers, clients managing their debt well might be incentivized to default 
as well and suffer the same consequences as the already over-indebted. 
10.1.3.1.1 Material Consequences 
Probably the most obvious consequences are material repercussions. 
Immediate consequences are felt if the loan contract allows for the seizure 
of collateral, such as tools, utensils or other assets (Van Bastelaer 2000, 
12). Therefore, the household might lack vital assets. Regardless of what 
the loan contract states in case of default, an over-indebted client will 
primarily start to reduce her expenses and sell assets she has to spare 
(Gonzalez 2010, 29). Cutting down on expenditures could also mean to 
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downsize her business, for example to have to let go an employee. To 
reduce expenses thus means to make unduly high sacrifices to still make 
ends meet. Depending on the existence of pooled information systems, a 
client may also face a negative entry in her credit record and her future 
credit worthiness could be jeopardized. Lastly, there is a severe risk of 
over-indebted borrowers starting or continuing cross-borrowing, which will 
make the borrowers’ situations even worse (Schicks 2011a, 5). This 
strategy, at best, delays the material costs of a default. 
10.1.3.1.2 Sociological, Psychological, and Physical Consequences 
There are also sociological, psychological, and physical consequences of 
over-indebtedness felt on the individual level. Being associated with debt is 
negatively connoted in many cultures. In microfinance there are reports 
about compulsive acts against defaulting clients. In group lending schemes 
the pressure among peers may accumulate to the unbearable. Smets and 
Bähre (2004, 228–232) show with several cases how humiliation, scolding 
and threats of force are common in group lending. Also there have been 
reports about aggressive collection practices, such as seizure and 
harassments, of MFIs applying individual lending (Karnani 2007, 52; Hulme 
2000, 27). In general, the stigma of being over-indebted may decrease 
one’s self-confidence. Also a client’s social capital deteriorates due to loss of 
reputation and standing in the community (Guérin et al. 2014, 144–145). 
Debt stress and over-indebtedness does not only mark an intervention in 
one’s private finances but also has serious effects on a person’s life in 
general. Numerous studies have pointed to correlations between 
psychological health and debt36. Studies show that debt stress correlates 
with depression, lack of self-control and general decrease of psychological 
health (Sweet et al. 2013, 98–99; Brown, Taylor, and Price 2005, 647–648; 
Webley and Nyhus 2001, 442; Drentea and Lavrakas 2000, 527). 
                                       
36 Webley and Nyhus (2001, 440) point out that clear causal relations between debt 
stress and psychological health are inconclusive. Debt stress can have a negative impact on 
psychological well-being but also psychological problems may impact debt levels in a 
negative sense. 
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Furthermore, the negative psychological effects caused by debt stress and 
over-indebtedness may lead to physical problems. Studies report the 
correlation between over-indebtedness and weak performance and 
absenteeism of work (Kim and Garman 2003)37. Unfortunately, and as seen 
in the crises in Andra Pradesh, over-indebted borrowers even committed 
suicide (Hulme 2000, 27). 
10.1.3.1.3 Consequences for Clients Handling Their Debt Well 
Finally, negative effects do not only emerge among over-indebted clients 
but also among borrowers who manage their debt well. If an MFI, in a first 
phase, shows flexibility in regard to defaulting clients, no-risk borrowers 
might perceive strategic defaults as a favorable option because they do not 
fear any repercussions. When a significant part of clients are unable to pay, 
the government might intervene with debt releases and bailouts. This may 
even provoke opportunistic behavior from no-risk borrowers and borrowers 
that face debt stress. Gonzalez (2008, 36) argues that this may have 
happened in Bolivia during the microfinance crisis from 1999 to 2001 when 
the government announced debtor consortia and debt releases. There are 
reports of comparable developments in Nicaragua and India (Schicks 2010, 
10). 
10.1.3.2 Consequences on the Institutional Level 
MFIs face great institutional risks in regard to over-indebtedness among its 
client base. The main two points are that high numbers of over-indebted 
clients threaten the financial sustainability of MFIs and potentially diminish 
their reputation. 
                                       
37 For a more complete literature review on the psychological consequences of debt 
stress and over-indebtedness, see Sweet et al. (2013). 
  76 
10.1.3.2.1 Consequences for the Financial Sustainability of MFIs 
MFIs have to write-off delinquent loans and these write-offs will translate 
into definite losses in income statements. Rosenberg (1999, 4) states that if 
an MFI writes off only five percent of its loan portfolio, the MFI might be 
lulled in a false sense of security. Rosenberg describes how thin the line 
between managing and losing control of these apparently moderate default 
levels is38. Apparently, losses on the outstanding portfolio have negative 
effects on the financial sustainability of an MFI. This effect is furthermore 
fed by the additional necessary expenditures (i.e. increased screening 
monitoring and collection costs) the MFI has to take when confronted with 
defaulting clients (Rosenberg 1999, 1). Stearns (1991) states that MFIs will 
rather reschedule and sometimes also refinance loans than write them off in 
the first place. 
Because refinancing and rescheduling convert a delinquent loan 
into one that is suddenly back on schedule with no arrears (even 
though the borrower may be just as unlikely to repay as before), 
they [the MFIs] can disguise serious repayment problems. […] If 
frequently used, the rescheduling and refinancing of loans can 
render meaningless any measure of delinquency or repayment, as 
delinquency rates can be kept very low, and repayments high, 
even though the portfolio may be of poor quality. (Stearns 1991, 
26–27) 
One could argue that accepting a certain level of delinquency and therefore 
hope for late repayments and keeping monitoring, screening and collection 
costs low might be a worthwhile trade-off. However, Schicks (2010, 10) 
claims that MFIs cannot absorb a client portfolio that is severely lacking 
repayments at least not in the long run. 
  
                                       
38 See Rosenberg (1999, 4) for mathematical examples. 
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10.1.3.2.2 Reputational Loss as a Consequence 
There are also reputational risks MFIs might face if many of their borrowers 
are over-indebted. These reputational risks are multifaceted. First, if a 
certain MFI is known for selling bad quality loans, normally low-risk 
borrowers will react and turn their backs on this institution. The market 
dynamic behind this phenomenon is adverse selection. As described in 
Chapter 5.3.2.1.1, adverse selection leads to suboptimal outcomes. Good 
clients will move out of the market because they are only willing to take out 
a loan for a certain price and only from an institution that has a good 
reputation. Therefore, MFIs will, without even knowing, give out loans to 
riskier clients. Second, also the perception of the general public, the media 
and government about the MFI’s quality of services is important regarding 
reputational risks. As seen in Nicaragua, the general public might back 
delinquent clients and non-repayment movements so a complete collapse of 
a market can arise. In addition, the media is also capable of ruining the 
MFI’s reputation. The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and the New York 
Times have published critical articles about how certain MFIs contributed to 
the microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh. The MFIs were accused of being 
partly responsible for the suicides and community banishments that 
happened during the crisis (Feasley 2011, 3). Also governments may play a 
key role in regard to the reputation of MFIs by labeling microfinance 
markets exploitative and intervene with regulations such as interest caps 
(Feasley 2011, 11–13). Third, bad reputation of particular MFIs or of a 
whole sector may alienate important partners of MFIs. Donors, investors 
and development agencies might withdraw their money and make transfers 
to other MFIs or markets. Fourth, a loss in reputation may eventually lead 
to a decrease of staff motivation and identification with the employer. This 
makes „high staff turn-over” likely, which will again add to low quality 
lending practices (Schicks 2011a, 11; Drexler and Schoar 2014). 
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10.1.3.3 Consequences on the Systemic Level 
Reputation risks and financial sustainability problems are the two most 
important consequences of over-indebtedness on the institutional level, with 
the potential to trigger severe systemic effects. As addressed above, the 
bad reputation of a single MFI can have negative effects on other MFIs and 
on the microfinance sector as a whole in a country but also on a global 
scale. Coupled with lower returns on portfolios, there is the eventual risk of 
alienating investors, development agencies and donors. This can have a 
global and significant impact on the availability of capital for the 
microfinance sector. The severity of systemic risks born by over-
indebtedness may increase with the microfinance market’s size and its 
interwoveness with the formal banking sector. In many countries there are 
formal banks providing standard credit, microcredit services and deposits. 
Hence, spillover effects are to be taken seriously. If formal banks lose their 
financial stability savings of average non-borrowing clients will be in danger 
(Schicks 2011a, 11). The adverse selection problem discussed above may 
lead to diverse consequences. Either the MFIs continue lending and they 
may run into lending to risky borrowers, or MFIs are aware of the prevailing 
over-indebtedness in the market and might temporarily cease the financing 
of credits (even to credit-worthy individuals) due to the higher probability of 
picking a risky borrower. Both strategies may have effects on a systemic 
level. If one considers one of the causes of over-indebtedness, namely the 
lack of thorough client screening and monitoring, MFIs would have to invest 
more in these „unproductive uses and activities” (Ardic, Ibrahim, and 
Mylenko 2011; Brix and McKee 2010; Davel 2013; McKee 2013; McKee, 
Lahaye, and Koning 2011; DeVaney 2006; Tiwari, Khandelwal, and Ramji 
2009; Schicks 2010; Lumpkin 2010; Koning and McKee 2011; Chien 2012; 
Responsible Finance Forum 2011; Center for Financial Inclusion at ACCION 
2013). Money, MFIs normally do not have or want to spend in these 
situations. 
  
  79 
10.2 Results and Implications 
In the following, I shortly recapitulate the results of the analysis of the 
causes of over-indebtedness and summarize the insights gained from the 
preceding analysis of the consequences of over-indebtedness. Finally, policy 
implications in regard to what approaches could tackle over-indebtedness 
that can be drawn from my analysis are presented in seven hypotheses with 
seven corresponding implications. 
 
The main triggers for over-indebtedness are 
I. external factors including price fluctuations, natural catastrophes, 
civil wars, and illness, 
II. institutional and systemic factors comprising hazardous lending 
practices, lack of efficient pooled information systems, growth focus, 
unsuitable product offerings, and inexperienced personnel, and 
III. individual factors encompassing income fluctuations, money 
mismanagement, inconsistent preferences, lack of information, 
immediacy bias, lack of entrepreneurial mindset, consumerism, and 
lack of economic socialization. 
 
As presented in the analysis of the consequences of over-indebtedness, 
repercussions are far-reaching and devastating for the BoP but also for MFIs 
and microfinance markets. The main insights regarding the consequences 
over-indebtedness has on the individual level are: 
I. The material consequences of over-indebtedness on households are 
severe. Expenses have to be radically cut down or vital assets have 
to be sold. Also households might be forced to downsize their 
business. 
II. The sociological, psychological and physical repercussions are wide-
ranging. The stigma of being over-indebted might weigh heavy on 
the household. Over-indebted borrowers might suffer from 
depression and from a decrease in their performance at work. 
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III. If MFIs are not enforcing defaulting clients’ contracts by rejecting 
them from future loans, borrowers, which manage their debt well, 
might be incentivized to default too. The same effect is proposed in 
the case of countries’ announcing debt releases and bailouts. 
 
The main insights regarding the consequences over-indebtedness has on 
the institutional level are: 
I. Great losses in the outstanding portfolio cannot be absorbed by a 
MFI, at least not in the long run. Over-indebtedness severely 
threatens the MFI’s financial sustainability. 
II. High numbers of over-indebted clients may lead to reputational 
losses of single MFIs but also of microfinance markets. The general 
public, media or also governments, may trigger these losses. If 
suffering from reputational loss, MFIs and microfinance markets have 
to regain the trust of investors and donors to continue their 
investments. 
 
The main insights regarding the consequences over-indebtedness has on 
the systemic level are: 
I. Bad reputation of a whole microfinance market coupled with lower 
returns on portfolios of MFIs with high numbers of over-indebted 
clients will alienate investors, development agencies and donors. 
II. Spillover effects might be serious if the microfinance market has 
reached a certain size and is intertwined with the formal banking 
sector. The savings of non-borrowing clients could be at risk if formal 
banks lose their financial stability. 
 
To answer the overarching question of Part II of this research project – How 
can the risks of over-indebtedness among microfinance clients be 
mitigated? – I derive seven hypotheses, which illustrate and combine 
insights gained from the preceding analysis of the causes and consequences 
of over-indebtedness. These hypotheses (H1-H7) serve as a base to 
brainstorm possible implications (I1-I7) of how to mitigate over-
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indebtedness. One thesis is always followed by one or more implications. 
Finally, three approaches of how to mitigate the risk of over-indebtedness 
are present. 
10.2.1 External Factors Hypothesis and Implication 
H1 Unexpected shocks, such as price fluctuations or natural 
catastrophe, lead to higher risks of over-indebtedness among 
microfinance clients. 
I1 Despite the fact that external shocks are often unforeseeable, MFIs 
and governments are aware of the fact that microfinance clients are 
prone to such shocks. It is therefore important that MFIs and 
governments regulating microfinance markets take into account that 
microfinance clients are particularly vulnerable when either having 
them as clients or being subjects to regulations. 
10.2.2 Institutional and Systemic Perspective 
Hypotheses and Implications 
H2 Saturated markets often trigger aggressive commercialization, 
which leads to higher risks of over-indebtedness among 
microfinance clients. 
I2 Aggressive selling practices feature credit offers and advertising that 
are phrased and presented in a non-transparent and misleading 
manner (Porteous 2009, 7). Taking advantage of information 
asymmetries should be mitigated by either soft law standards or 
consumer protection regulation demanding, for example, truth-in-
lending. 
Furthermore, it was highlighted that clients are often not aware of 
their rights and could perceive even aggressive lending and 
collection practices as normal (Schicks 2010, 11). Increasing 
educational levels, especially in regard to finances is key to raising 
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awareness of good and bad practices in microfinance (Brix and 
McKee 2010, 6, 9, 21, 29). 
 
H3 Unsuitable microfinance products lead to higher risks of over-
indebtedness among microfinance clients. 
I3 Clients favor products that are easily accessible and that are flexible 
in regard to their cash flows (interview with an associate of Musoni, 
The Smart Campaign 2012, 2). Seasonality (e.g. harvest period, 
raining season) is therefore central to product design (Schicks 2010, 
10). Soft law standards could take into account that microfinance 
clients are highly dependent on seasonality and that products need 
to be more flexible. MFIs should screen their clients thoroughly in 
order to, not only assess their creditworthiness, but also their 
product needs. As a result, living up to the standard of matching 
clients with suitable products would increase the probability of 
repayment and mitigate the risk of over-indebtedness (Brix and 
McKee 2010, 13). 
Also in this case, it would benefit the clients, if they had more 
knowledge about finance and the products offered to them (Brix and 
McKee 2010, 16). 
 
H4 A lack of pooled information systems leads to higher risks of over-
indebtedness among clients. 
I4 Microfinance clients do cross-borrow. Pooled information systems, 
such as credit bureaus and informal credit information sharing 
among MFIs, serve the purpose of allowing MFIs to inspect 
information of their clients’ credit histories (Brix and McKee 2010, 
15). As argued above, these systems have weaknesses. Yet, pooled 
information systems are one possibility to make – at least – some 
credit information available to MFIs. Hence, either with state 
regulation setting in place a credit bureau or MFIs agreeing to 
exchange credit information among themselves cross-borrowing 
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could be detected and addressed by MFIs (Brix and McKee 2010, 
15). 
10.2.3 Client Perspective Hypotheses and Implications 
H5 Psychological and cognitive biases, such as having inconsistent time 
preferences or low financial literacy, lead to higher risks of over-
indebtedness among microfinance clients. 
I5 Individuals possess bounded rationality and their decisions are 
therefore limited by existing information, their cognitive capabilities 
and the time available in order to take a decision (Goodwin et al. 
2015, 184; Simon 1972, 163–164). It is important that MFIs are 
aware of the psychological and cognitive biases their potential 
clients may have. Financial literacy among microfinance clients is 
mostly low and clients are susceptible to marketing. The disclosure 
of relevant information to the client before signing a contract seems 
to be crucial. Barr et al. (2012: 40) state that before signing a 
mortgage contract, it is key for a mortgage borrower to be 
presented with coherent information that is written in simple terms. 
Studies show that loans that are offered in plain language are 
favored over more complex offers (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and 
Shafir 2004, 421). Again either state regulation or soft law 
standards could set rules of how financial products’ terms have to 
be disclosed. 
People living at the BoP generally have low levels of financial 
literacy. Clients could take better-informed decisions, if they had 
more knowledge about microfinance products and the contracts they 
are signing (Schicks 2010, 12). 
 
H6 Social influence factors, such as consumerism, expose microfinance 
clients to higher risks of over-indebtedness. 
I6 As argued above, consumerism is an issue in microfinance. Although 
most of the loans are given out to start, maintain or expand a 
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business, in many cases, clients also use the loan to satisfy short-
term consumption needs (Gonzalez 2008, 100). It is important to 
recognize that societal pressures of consumerism may represent 
sources that cause clients to make bad decisions in regard to taking 
out loans. However and agreeing with Schicks (2010, 13), we 
should refrain from „denying to the poor what we value in our own 
society”. It is important to recognize that societal pressures of 
consumerism may represent sources that cause clients to make bad 
decisions in regard to taking out loans. Consumerism is a fact that 
MFIs should be aware of and may address consumption needs of a 
household, when they assess its creditworthiness.  
Furthermore, microfinance clients might feel obliged to support their 
family or community financially. This may lead to irresponsible 
borrowing (Schicks 2010, 13). Also in this case, being aware that 
clients can also serve as local support systems, MFIs can address 
the issue of the support of other family members or relatives. 
 
H7 Socio-demographic and economic factors, such as income 
fluctuations or money mismanagement, lead to higher risks of over-
indebtedness among microfinance clients. 
I7 Especially young clients with low education levels and many or small 
children tend to take up unmanageable debt (Schicks 2010, 13–14). 
Also characteristically, they struggle with money management and 
suffer from income fluctuations (Anderloni and Vandone 2008, 15; 
Collins et al. 2011, 478). On the one hand, an increase in financial 
literacy would help clients to, for example, better manage their 
financial in- and out-flows over the repayment period (Schicks 2010, 
12). On the other hand, MFIs could assess socio-demographic and 
economic factors when they evaluate the creditworthiness and 
financial situation of their clients to offer suitable products. 
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10.3 Three Approaches to Mitigate Over-
Indebtedness 
The preceding analysis revealed roughly three possibilities to alleviate over-
indebtedness. 
I. Setting in place state regulations, which aim to balance the 
information asymmetries between the MFI and its client. 
II. Setting in place financial literacy programs, which help microfinance 
clients to make informed decisions about the financial products they 
purchase. 
III. Setting in place soft law standards, which help to establish a best 
practice among MFIs of how to supply financial products to the BoP. 
The results of my analysis go together with policy recommendations 
provided in literature. Scholars mainly address three suitable approaches to 
fight over-indebtedness (Ardic, Ibrahim, and Mylenko 2011; Davel 2013; 
Brix and McKee 2010; McKee 2013; McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 2011; 
DeVaney 2006; Tiwari, Khandelwal, and Ramji 2009; Schicks 2010; 
Lumpkin 2010; Koning and McKee 2011; Responsible Finance Forum 2011; 
Chien 2012; Center for Financial Inclusion at ACCION 2013): state 
regulations, financial literacy programs, and soft law standards. 
Being aware of the many factors that may drive borrowers into over-
indebtedness, it is key that the various stakeholders of microfinance set 
measures in place combating as many causes of over-indebtedness as 
possible. In this regard, Schicks (2010, 15) rightfully points out that none of 
these approaches ensures a complete absence of over-indebtedness in 
microfinance. It is therefore also crucial to think of and set in place 
„curative and rehabilitative” client protection procedures, which are also 
discussed in Part IV of this research project. 
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11 Conclusion 
Due to the fact that money is fungible after entering a household, MFIs only 
have insufficient knowledge of what happens between loaning the money 
and being repaid. In that period MFIs struggle to know how well a client 
manages her debt. Despite the insecurity about how clients will use their 
loans, it was argued in Part I that MFIs can elicit a certain repayment 
behavior from their clients by setting incentives with specific lending 
techniques. However, the fact that a client repays her loan does not 
necessarily mean she is managing all her debt well. She could, for example, 
have repaid her outstanding loan with another one and already find herself 
in serious debt stress. 
The detailed analysis of the causes of over-indebtedness revealed the 
many triggers on the individual, institutional, and systemic level. As diverse 
the causes are, the consequences of over-indebtedness may be far-reaching 
and devastating. Over-indebtedness seriously threatens the well-being of 
clients, the financial sustainability of MFIs, and the systemic stability of 
microfinance markets. The analysis suggests that microfinance stakeholders 
should reduce the risks of over-indebtedness from different angles and by 
these means protect microfinance clients. In doing so the negative spill over 
effects of over-indebtedness on MFIs and microfinance markets can be 
alleviated. Also literature holds the view that different actors should 
contribute to protecting microfinance clients from over-indebtedness: the 
state by employing consumer protection regulation, the MFIs and other 
stakeholders by establishing and applying soft law standards, and a range 
of actors (e.g. state, NGOs, MFIs) by creating educational programs to 
enhance financial literacy (Schicks and Rosenberg 2011; Schicks 2010; 
Gonzalez and Lopez 2012; McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 2011; Brix and 
McKee 2010; Chien 2012). Based on these coherences there is a need for a 
more comprehensive framework that accounts for the mitigation of over-
indebtedness. This practical framework should be built upon and compatible 
with the extended definition of microfinance. 
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In the following Parts III and IV of this research endeavor, it is argued 
that the extended definition of microfinance in combination with the three 
approaches to face over-indebtedness can be connected to an 
encompassing framework, which potentially adds to the lasting protection of 
microfinance clients. Representing a coordinated and cooperative effort of a 
diverse set of public and private actors it is introduced as the ‘multi-
stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance’ and includes state 
regulations, financial literacy programs, and soft law standards that fight 
over-indebtedness. 
In Part III, I argue that there is a close link between the extended 
definition of microfinance and the framework of responsible microfinance. 
First, responsible microfinance is defined. Second and this is the main 
target of Part III, I underpin the framework of responsible microfinance with 
an approach to responsibility. In other words I elucidate on the meaning 
and functions responsibility could have in such a framework. In Part IV, I 
concentrate on shedding light on the different approaches (i.e. state 
regulations, financial literacy endeavors, soft law standards) deduced from 
Part II and analyze the potential of tangible strategies to mitigate over-
indebtedness. 
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PART III – TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF 
RESPONSIBLE MICROFINANCE 
12 From the Extended Definition to a Framework 
of Responsible Microfinance 
Part III of this research endeavor elucidates how microfinance stakeholders 
could establish a framework of responsible microfinance within which 
individual, as well as institutional and systemic risks connected to over-
indebtedness among microfinance clients, can be alleviated. In Part I, it was 
emphasized how the quality of MFIs’ services potentially affects their 
clients. The quality of services is closely linked to the risk of microfinance 
clients to slide into over-indebtedness. However, over-indebtedness levels 
among microfinance clients do not solely depend on whether or not MFIs 
comply with client protection standards. It is rather the interplay of many 
factors that may enhance the risk of getting over-indebted, including 
psychological and cognitive biases, sociological influence factors, external 
factors, regulations and political interferences as the analysis in Part II 
revealed. The many causes of over-indebtedness mirror the difficulty to find 
„the one solution” to minimize the risk of over-indebtedness. Over-
indebtedness cannot be mitigated with one solution but has to be addressed 
by different actors from several angles including more than MFIs focusing 
on how to supply microfinance products. Therefore, Part III connects the 
extended understanding of microfinance to a comprehensive framework of 
responsible microfinance and has two main goals: 
I. Responsible microfinance is a practical framework that lacks a 
common definition. I construct a possible common definition of 
responsible microfinance.  
II. Literature neglects further to define the possible functions 
‘responsibility’ could have within this framework. Therefore, a specific 
focus is put on the possible meanings of responsibility within this 
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framework. The aim is to underpin the framework of responsible 
microfinance with an approach to responsibility hoping to spark a 
debate about how narrow or wide responsibility shall be interpreted 
in responsible microfinance. 
The overarching research question for Part III therefore is: What is 
responsible microfinance and how could responsibility be interpreted in this 
context? 
Part III is structured as follows: After introducing Part III in Chapter 12, 
I develop the concept of responsible microfinance and categorize it as being 
a specific domain of responsible finance in Chapter 13. Responsible 
microfinance is based on the assumption that due to the vulnerability of 
microfinance clients and the threats and risks over-indebtedness pose to 
the individual well-being, the MFI’s financial sustainability and the systemic 
stability, microfinance stakeholders have a responsibility to mitigate the 
risks of over-indebtedness. On the bases of the following three demands of 
responsible microfinance that McKee, Lahaye, and Koning (2011) refer to, I 
develop a definition of responsible microfinance that is currently lacking: 
MFIs balance their financial and social performance, which includes not only 
making profit but also have client protection and social performance 
management in place (1), microfinance stakeholders contribute to enabling 
and enforcing responsible microfinance (2), and microfinance stakeholders 
have a responsibility to mitigate over-indebtedness, and MFIs are 
specifically required to hold themselves responsible for achieving their social 
mission (3). The first two demands of responsible microfinance are both 
subject to Part IV of this research project. In this part, I exclusively 
elaborate on the overall demand of responsible microfinance: responsibility. 
A specific focus is laid upon the MFI and its responsibility to mitigate over-
indebtedness. 
The meaning of the concept of responsibility in regard to responsible 
finance or responsible microfinance is, to the best of my knowledge, 
indeterminate. Therefore, I underpin the framework of responsible 
microfinance with an approach to responsibility in Chapter 14. What does 
responsibility in the context of microfinance mean? And further, could MFIs, 
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as the main actors in the framework of responsible microfinance, be held 
responsible, legally or morally, if they fall short of their own commitment or 
the exogenously attributed responsibility. Can corporate agents in general 
be held responsible for their conduct? With reference to Pettit (2007b) it is 
argued that MFIs would at least have a moral obligation to act upon their 
responsibility and could be socially sanctioned for their harmful conduct. 
Concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 15. 
13 Responsible Microfinance: A Definition and its 
Three Demands 
The framework of responsible microfinance is, within the scope of this 
study, introduced as a specification of an already existing framework, which 
finds its roots in the post global financial and economic crisis debate: 
„responsible finance” 39  40  (McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 2011; Brix and 
McKee 2010; Social Performance Task Force 2012; Koning and Wardle 
2014; Responsible Finance Forum 2011; UNPRI 2015). The aim of 
responsible finance is that key stakeholders (i.e. providers of financial 
services, regulators, consumers, advocacy organizations) get active in the 
areas of creating regulations, enhancing financial literacy, and establishing 
and abiding by voluntary standards (Responsible Finance Forum 2011, 7). 
Responsible finance, is however, a term of wide comprehension, including a 
diverse set of types of businesses. It aims, among other things, to mitigate 
over-indebtedness. In the following, I advocate keeping the main 
cornerstones of the responsible finance framework but further sharpen and 
concretize it to the specific case of microfinance. 
                                       
39 In this regard, special importance is ascribed to the Responsible Finance Forum (RFF), 
which coined the term responsible finance around 2010 (see for example Responsible 
Finance Forum 2011). 
40 Responsible finance took on further practical significance in the process of the 
implementation of many public and private initiatives, such as the Financial Inclusion 2020 
campaign initiated by the Center for Financial Inclusion at Accion, Visa Inc. and Citi in 2013. 
The campaign emphasizes the responsibility financial service providers have to, for example, 
treat their clients and employees with respect, design appropriate products or apply 
transparent pricing (Center for Financial Inclusion at ACCION 2013, 32). 
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The main institution that is working to form a concept of responsible 
finance is the Responsible Finance Forum. „[A]n interinstitutional 
community of practice for knowledge exchange and consensus building on 
responsible finance” (Responsible Finance Forum 2013, VI) 41 , which 
concentrates on establishing a framework of responsible finance that is 
widely applicable and aims at „creating more transparent, inclusive and 
equitable financial markets” (Responsible Finance Forum 2011, 1; 
Responsible Finance Forum 2013, 1; Haebig and Gross 2012, 10). 
Responsible finance as a concept is still a work in progress. In the original 
consultation draft of 2011, the Responsible Finance Forum has shown an 
equal focus on the microfinance and commercial banking sector. Later 
publications, like a report concerning the catalytic function of responsible 
finance to enhance responsible business, define responsible finance also as 
„creating more transparent, inclusive and equitable financial markets” 
(Responsible Finance Forum 2011, 1), however, only with a focus on 
„sustainable/responsible lending”, „sustainable/responsible investment” and 
„impact investing” (Haebig and Gross 2012, 10–12) giving more weight to, 
for example, environmental, social and governance standards (ESGs) as 
they are commonly known and applied in the commercial banking sector. 
Hence, responsible finance serves as an umbrella term including all sorts of 
endeavors making financial markets more transparent, inclusive and 
equitable. There are mostly broad definitions of responsible finance to be 
found in literature, such as responsible finance serves as a „guiding 
principle for how financial services should be delivered to live up to the 
challenge of promoting sustainable development” (Responsible Finance 
Forum 2011, 2) or responsible finance is the „delivery of retail financial 
services in a transparent and equitable fashion. The focus is on products, 
processes, and policies that appropriately balance customers’ interests with 
those of providers’ and avoid harmful or unfair treatment” (Brix and McKee 
2010, 1). 
                                       
41 The founding bodies include the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
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Responsible finance is a broad concept that is equally applicable to 
traditional finance and to microfinance (McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 2011; 
Responsible Finance Forum 2011; Brix and McKee 2010; McKee 2013). 
Therefore, microfinance is normally subsumed under the term responsible 
finance (Responsible Finance Forum 2011, 1; McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 
2011; Brix and McKee 2010). In this research project however, responsible 
microfinance is developed as a specific case of responsible finance. Although 
responsible microfinance is based on the existing responsible finance 
framework, it has its particularities accruing from the microfinance 
business. The first and main reason for this distinction is connected to the 
associations we have with finance. Finance is linked to many proceedings 
we observe in the economy. It ranges from having a bank account, to 
loaning money to the BoP, making stock offerings or investing in the private 
equity of a firm. So responsible finance is rightfully associated with the 
many areas that finance covers, for example how to invest responsibly 
(Responsible Finance Forum 2011, 10) 42 . Microfinance in contrast is 
concerned with a very specific business supplying products to a specific 
clientele. Second, microfinance always faces vulnerable clients as was 
argued in Part I of this research project. This is different in finance, where 
intermediaries predominantly work with average clients 43 . Third, the 
motives of finance and microfinance can differ greatly. Microfinance, by 
definition, has a social mission and does not mainly aim to make profit as 
                                       
42 See for example the voluntary United Nations-Supported Principles for Responsible 
Investments (UNPRI), which emphasize the importance of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors of investing (UNPRI 2015). The Equator Principles are another 
case of soft law principles to come under responsible finance (Equator Principles 2011). They 
aim to mitigate environmental and social risks that can evolve in project financing. One 
example could read as follows: An investor enters into a contract with a mining company in 
Zambia whose workers suffer from bad working conditions. The Equator Principles concern 
such situations and demand the investor to address this deficiency. The investor hereinafter 
either refrains from investing or only invests if the investee meets certain conditions, such as 
improving working conditions. 
43 See again the distinction between vulnerable and average consumers. The average 
consumer is defined by the ECJ as „reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect“ (Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky [1998] ECR I-4657, para 31. 
Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61996CJ0210&from=EN [last accessed 25.04.2016]). In 
contrast, vulnerable consumers need a more intense level of protection relative to other 
consumers (Benöhr 2013, 17, 22, 23; Cartwright 2011, 7–8; see also Case C-382/87, Buet v 
Ministh·e Public [1989] ECR 1235, para. 13. Online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:61987CJ0382&from=EN [last accessed 25.04.2016]). 
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finance does44 . Finally, literature addresses one point that the authors 
underline as being especially applicable to microfinance and not to finance 
in general. It is the objective of social performance management (McKee, 
Lahaye, and Koning 2011, 3; see also Responsible Finance Forum 2011, 
10). Social performance management evaluates whether MFIs succeed in 
attaining their social mission. Finance normally does not make use of such 
instruments since the main focus is the financial performance. On the bases 
of these four arguments in favor of a distinction between responsible 
finance and responsible microfinance, I argue that responsible microfinance 
is, at best, a specific case of ‘responsible finance’ and that is why 
exclusively the term ‘responsible microfinance’ is used hereafter. Since 
finance and microfinance are based on different premises and applied to 
varying working fields of finance and microfinance I discriminate and 
understand them as two separate concepts. Also the so far described 
coherences in this research project are limited to microfinance and to guard 
against and remove ambiguity, I henceforth use the term responsible 
microfinance. 
The concept of „responsible microfinance” serves as a connecting factor 
to embed the extended definition of microfinance into a comprehensive 
framework, meaning a framework that does not only address MFIs but also 
other microfinance stakeholders (e.g. investors, clients, regulators, NGOs). 
It accounts for the roles all the actors involved in such a framework may 
take. The concept is based on the assumption that due to the threats over-
indebtedness poses to the individual well-being, the MFIs’ financial 
sustainability and the systemic stability, microfinance stakeholders have a 
responsibility to mitigate over-indebtedness. McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 
                                       
44 Finance primarily aims to make profit. Admittedly, not only since the global financial 
and economic crisis there is a growing debate in philosophy, ethics and economics about 
responsibilities the financial sector bears and takes towards its clients and society that go 
beyond making profit (Ratner 2001; Neuhäuser 2011; Addo 2014). However, traditionally 
there is no further social purpose driving the business of financial institutions other than 
maybe creating jobs. The social dimension comes into play however – and with social I mean 
something a corporation does, which has a direct or indirect positive impact for society – 
when the corporations business is somehow connected to a wider corporate social 
responsibility strategy. In fact, one could argue that responsible finance can be well 
understood as an instrument to further the corporate social responsibility of financial 
institutions. 
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understand responsible microfinance both as an „end-state vision” and as „a 
pragmatic focus on client protection and social performance management” 
(2011, 1). They provide three main elements to describe responsible 
microfinance (McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 2011, 2): 
 
I. Due to the vulnerability of microfinance clients, microfinance social 
mission, and the risks over-indebtedness brings to the individual, 
institutional, and systemic level, microfinance stakeholders have a 
general responsibility to mitigate over-indebtedness. Additionally, the 
responsible microfinance definition specifically requires MFIs to hold 
themselves responsible for achieving their social mission. 
II. Responsible microfinance further demands the financial performance 
of MFIs to be balanced with the benefits of the clients. Therefore, 
MFIs should have an eye on both, their social as well as their financial 
performance. MFIs are defined by pursuing a double-bottom line. 
MFIs hence want to achieve a social mission and at the same time 
aim to reach profitability. Traditionally, MFIs measure their financial 
performance with established financial indicators (e.g. return on 
investments (ROI)) and their social performance with indicators that 
mirror the progress the MFI makes in reaching their intentional 
clientele, empowering women or how the provided financial services 
fit clients’ needs and cause positive effects on the livelihoods of their 
clients (McKee, Lahaye, and Koning 2011, 3)45. 
III. The final demand of responsible microfinance is that stakeholders 
establish and sustain a framework within which responsible 
microfinance can be enabled and enforced (see also Brix and McKee 
2010; McKee 2013; Responsible Finance Forum 2011). Actors 
involved in such a framework could include main actors such as MFIs, 
microfinance clients, governments, but also investors, donors, NGOs 
and IOs. 
                                       
45 Against the pertaining theory that microfinance cannot be done without a trade-off 
between social and financial performance and that investors will consequently lose interest in 
MFIs that focus on both (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2009; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Morduch 2011; Vishwanath and Kaufmann 2001), recent surveys show that there is no 
significant loss if the MFI focuses on financial and social performance (Dewez and Neisa 
2009; Bassem 2012; Argüello et al. 2013; Augustine 2012). 
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Inferred from the three elements and mainly referring to McKee, Lahaye, 
and Koning (2011, 2), I deduce the following definition of responsible 
microfinance: 
Responsible microfinance is characterized by MFIs that balance 
their financial and social performance. MFIs should aim to initiate 
or have procedures in place to hold themselves responsible for 
achieving their social mission, which includes the implementation 
of client protection and social performance management. 
Furthermore, stakeholders such as MFIs, governments, investors, 
donors, NGOs and international organizations try to create and 
maintain a framework that enables responsible microfinance and 
further the coordination of their actions and their cooperation. 
Responsible microfinance thereby focuses on the three areas of 
action (i.e. state regulation, financial literacy, soft law standards) 
to especially enhance consumer protection and thereby mitigate 
over-indebtedness. 
The demand for enabling and enforcing responsible microfinance is the main 
subject of Part IV of this research project and the demand to balance the 
financial and social performance is addressed in Chapter 19 of Part IV. In 
the following, I concentrate on the overall demand of responsible 
microfinance, which is responsibility. A special focus is put on the MFIs and 
their responsibility to mitigate over-indebtedness among their clients. 
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14 The Overall Demand for Responsibility in 
Responsible Microfinance 
In general responsibility is referred to as an obligation or duty (Bentham 
1970, 294) to adequately perform or complete a task that we either commit 
ourselves to, in the sense of a promise, or that we are appointed to from an 
authority46 , in the sense of an exogenous assignment (Raz 1988, 82; 
Simmons 1979, 76). Failing to fulfill that obligation normally implies that 
sanctions are appropriate; these can have a legal or social character. This 
common understanding of responsibility refers to possible sources and 
consequences of responsibility. Sources of responsibility could either be for 
example that a state, society or a NGO delegates certain tasks to a certain 
agent (‘exogenous assignment’) or that a commitment is voiced by the 
same agent as the one who is taking the responsibility (‘promise’ or ‘self-
commitment’). Finally, being the addressee of a responsibility translates 
into bearing a duty, which, if not fulfilled, implies the appropriateness of a 
sanction as a consequence. 
Acknowledging the demand for balancing the financial and social 
performance, and the demand for enabling and enforcing responsible 
microfinance, the definition also requires MFIs to hold themselves 
responsible for achieving their social mission. Furthermore, a general claim 
that microfinance stakeholders are responsible to mitigate over-
indebtedness underlies the framework of responsible microfinance. There 
are two main issues in regard to having responsibilities and holding 
someone responsible. First, responsible microfinance is based on the 
assumption that due to the vulnerability of microfinance clients, the social 
mission of microfinance, the threats over-indebtedness pose to the 
individual well-being, the MFI’s financial sustainability and the systemic 
stability, microfinance stakeholders have a responsibility to mitigate over-
                                       
46 Raz (1988) uses the concept of a ‘legitimate’ authority and explains what is necessary 
in order for an authority to be legitimate. For the extent of this research project, this cannot 
be further discussed. An authority in this context is defined as an entity, which has a certain 
influence and voice in regard to MFIs doing their business. Authorities can be NGOs, states, 
transnational and international organizations, or investors. 
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indebtedness. Second, the responsible microfinance definition requires MFIs 
„to aim to initiate or have procedures in place to hold themselves 
responsible for achieving their social mission, which includes the 
implementation of client protection and social performance management”. 
This requirement primarily allows for two interpretations. Either the MFI 
commits itself to take steps that prove its responsibility by the means of 
self-reporting, such as publishing annual reports about the state and 
progress of the MFI’s social performance, and more specifically evaluating 
their progress regarding their client protection and social performance 
endeavors. Or the MFI decides to abide by specific social performance and 
client protection standards (e.g. Universal Standards for Social Performance 
Management, Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles). In this case 
the MFI consents to undertake the obligation to obey these standards and 
risks getting sanctioned for non-compliance47. 
In this chapter, it is briefly sketched why and towards whom MFIs, 
states, clients, NGOs and international and transnational organization, and 
investors potentially bear responsibility. Possible consequences, such as 
social or legal sanctions, of these obligations are presented. Furthermore, it 
is examined whether MFIs as group agents can be held responsible for their 
harmful conduct. With reference to Pettit (2007b) it is argued that MFIs 
would at least have a moral obligation to act upon their responsibility and 
could be socially sanctioned for their non-compliance. Additionally, it is 
debated how these insights are applicable to the context of microfinance. 
  
                                       
47 As we will see, the sanctions for soft law standards are normally of a social and not 
legal character. 
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14.1 Sources and Consequences of Responsibility 
Below, I describe the responsibilities MFIs, states, clients, NGOs, and 
international and transnational organizations, and investors potentially have 
in the context of microfinance and especially in regard to minimizing over-
indebtedness. Note that this chapter is summarily and there is no 
completeness claimed.  
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
In regard to MFIs it makes sense to proceed from the extended definition to 
evaluate the potential obligations MFIs have in a framework of responsible 
microfinance. There are three sources of responsibility for the MFI, which 
fall into the category of ‘self-commitment’: 
I. It is the MFI’s responsibility to provide small-scale financial services 
that might include credit, savings, insurance and money transfer to 
low-income individuals or low-income communities48. Hence, the duty 
of the MFI is to provide products and fulfill the contracts it entered 
into with its clients. 
II. The second source of responsibility is to comply with certain 
standards, without being certified or actively endorse such standards, 
while doing their business. This duty accrues from the social mission 
inherent in microfinance, the fact that MFIs supply products to 
potentially vulnerable clients, and over-indebtedness crises that have 
lately occurred. 
III. MFIs also have a responsibility towards their employees and their 
shareholders. MFIs have the duty to act according to the employment 
contracts they enter with their employees and to keep their 
agreements with shareholders. 
There are also duties, which are exogenously ascribed to MFIs by other 
stakeholders, such as the state, clients, NGOs, international and 
transnational organizations, and investors. These claims seem to find their 
justification in the post over-indebtedness crises being a demonstration 
                                       
48 The outstanding balance of microfinance products should thereby not exceed 250 
percent of the averaging income per person (GNI per capita). 
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effect showing that some MFIs had in fact conducted harmful practices. In 
the aftermath, many initiatives and regulations established by transnational 
organizations (e.g. Smart Campaign, Social Performance Task Force), 
international organizations (IOs) (e.g. UN Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights) and states 
(e.g. consumer protection regulations) emerged and assigned MFIs with the 
obligations of refraining from harmful practices and of better protecting 
their clients, if they pledge themselves to abide by one of these standards. 
 
States 
The state commits itself to protecting microfinance clients and has an 
interest in mitigating institutional and systemic risks. This commitment 
stems from the general idea that the state protects its citizens, also in 
regard to products that may threaten their health-related, social or 
economic well-being (Adcock 2014, 228; W. Wilson 1898, 42; Heyman 
1991; Beermann 2014). But states also have tasks that are assigned to 
them. Governments traditionally depend on their constituency. If citizens do 
not agree with certain policies, they will voice their disapproval and will not 
vote for the ruling party or parties, or will voice their disapproval with the 
government through other channels (e.g. demonstrations, riots, putsches). 
Also responsibility that is assigned from advocacy organizations and IOs to 
states increases. Pressure rises from civil society organizations and may 
affect policy choices in certain areas. 
 
Clients 
In the form of a commitment, clients may, at the moment of purchase, 
make a commitment to themselves that if they take out a loan they also 
want to repay49. In the form of an exogenous assignment, MFIs but also the 
state assign certain tasks to microfinance clients. For example clients should 
exercise care when taking out a loan and be aware of the consequences a 
                                       
49 This assumption however only holds if clients have given their informed consent to 
the product they purchase or if they do not already plan on strategically defaulting when 
purchasing a product. 
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non-repayment may have, such as a negative entry in their credit record 
that might lead to being rejected for future loans or simply a worsening of 
their own life situation. 
 
Transnational and International Organizations (IOs) 
Transnational organizations commit to a certain issue voluntarily. They may 
be assigned with responsibility from other actors, such as states, NGOs, 
MFIs, clients and investors. Transnational organizations, as in the case of 
Smart Campaign, aim to simplify communication and coordination between 
several actors regarding the specific topic of microfinance client protection. 
If they act against their self-commitment or against exogenously assigned 
responsibility, they probably will suffer from reputational damage and 
internal dividedness. 
IOs are state-centered institutions, and tasks are traditionally received 
from the international community of states (Archer 2001: 33). Ever since 
the 1990s though this view has been challenged and the UN increasingly 
allows for stakeholder participation. In case of acting against self-
commitments and exogenously received responsibilities, IOs might lose in 
reputation and might suffer from internal dividedness. 
 
Investors 
Investors can commit themselves to protect clients from over-indebtedness 
indirectly through their investor policy. They could, for example, only invest 
money in MFIs that underwent a due diligence in regard to their social 
performance and client protection endeavors. Hence, investors may apply a 
specific investment policy accounting for factors such as minimal standards 
their investees must meet. Investors can also be assigned with 
responsibility from actors such as MFIs, states, and transnational and 
international organizations. Also investors might call upon themselves in 
order to apply certain investment standards. So a group of investors might 
also build awareness among other investors to follow their example. One 
case is the Equator Principles, a soft law framework built by financial 
institutions, which aims to minimize environmental and social risks that are 
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likely to arise in project financing (Equator Principles 2013, 2). If investors 
do not live up to the responsibilities they commit to or are assigned from 
other actors, they most probably suffer from reputational damage and 
might be flagged as untrusted or irresponsible investors. If there was also a 
hard law forbidding certain business conduct of investors, they would 
obviously not only suffer from social but also legal sanctions. 
In the following chapter, I discuss the consequences of responsibility for 
MFIs in detail and turn to an issue, which is part of an ongoing debate in 
philosophy, business ethics and international law on how to understand 
business entities’ responsibilities towards society, clients and the 
environment (Neuhäuser 2011; Ratner 2001; OHCHR 2011; Prior and 
Argandoña 2009; Michalowski 2012; OECD 2011; Ruggie 2013; Pettit 
2007b). The main question is: Can corporate agents, such as MFIs, be held 
responsible for their conduct? This question follows from the definition of 
responsible microfinance stating that MFIs hold themselves responsible for 
achieving their social mission, which includes the implementation of client 
protection and social performance management and the overarching claim 
of responsible microfinance that all stakeholders bear the responsibility to 
mitigate over-indebtedness. However if we can hold MFIs responsible for 
their conduct, it is a question of whether MFIs as group agents are fit to be 
held responsible. In line with Pettit, it is deliberated that MFIs are in fact fit 
to be held responsible for their actions, at least morally, and that neglecting 
this responsibility implies sanctions, at least social ones. 
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14.2 Discussing Responsibility and Corporate Actors 
If we assume that we take the concept of responsible microfinance 
seriously, so that especially MFIs account for the risks that arise when 
working with extremely vulnerable clients, there are two main questions 
arising. How could the demand for responsibility be translated into practice 
and how could a certain control be established? This is an important 
question, which is addressed in Part IV. 
If we take one step back, there is however an equally important 
question to ask. Responsible microfinance but also responsible finance uses 
the term ‘responsibility’ without defining it or addressing the issues that 
might result from using the concept of responsibility within the corporate 
context. And, given the fact that MFIs are corporate agents, the question 
arises whether MFIs are even fit to be held responsible in the case they 
contravene their responsibilities (e.g. obliging by certain standards in doing 
business with vulnerable microfinance clients but still conducting harmful 
practices). This question is the subject of this chapter. 
The overarching claim of responsible microfinance is that it lies in the 
responsibility of microfinance stakeholders to mitigate over-indebtedness 
among microfinance clients. What happens however if MFIs, which are the 
focus of this chapter, fail to take this responsibility? If MFIs cannot live up 
to the soft law standards they pledge to obey and thereby jeopardize the 
social and economic well-being of their clients, is there a way to hold the 
MFIs responsible? Many scholars negate the assumption that corporations 
as group agents can be held responsible for transgressing regulations or 
soft law standards. They deny corporations’ moral or legal responsibilities 
and claim that responsibility can only be attributed to individuals, such as 
the employees of a corporation or their chief officers (May 1987; Crane 
2002 paraphrazed in Pettit 2007b, 172). In order to be morally responsible 
corporations require the capability of agency, rationality, and autonomy. 
Methodological individualists defend the view that only individuals can be 
moral persons. Agency, rationality and autonomy cannot be ascribed to 
corporations they argue. Individuals are seen as real, and observable 
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persons. Corporations however are understood as abstractions that cannot 
be directly observed (Fisse and Braithwaite 1988, 476). The overarching 
debate in metaphysics is between nominalists and realists. Nominalism 
understands corporations as an aggregation of individuals where there is no 
collective personality. In contrast, realists see corporations as being a moral 
and legal body in itself. Assuming that corporations are only collections of 
individuals moral and legal responsibility cannot be ascribed to the 
corporation as such but to its individual employees. Realists assume that 
corporations are more than collections of individuals. They conceptualize 
corporations as actors to whom moral and legal responsibilities could be 
ascribed (Soares 2003, 144). The idea that legal and moral responsibility 
can be attributed to corporations and that on these grounds, corporations 
can be in fact held responsible for their wrongdoing is elaborated in the 
following. Doing so, I mainly consult the work of Pettit, which advocates still 
a „minority position” that responsibility cannot only be assigned to a 
corporate actor but also corporate actors can be held responsible for their 
conduct even when individual responsibility is lacking (Pettit 2007b, 172)50.  
In his article, „Responsibility Incorporated”, Philip Pettit argues that 
corporate agents are fit to be held responsible for their actions. He takes 
the example of Herald of Free Enterprise, a ferry that sank in the English 
Channel on March 6, 1987. Almost 200 people drowned and it soon became 
clear that the company running this ferry majorly neglected its maintenance 
and did not carry out the usual routines to ensure its operationality. Despite 
the obvious sloppiness of the company operating the Herald of Free 
Enterprise, the company did not undergo any punishment because the 
courts could not attribute fault to specific individuals (Pettit 2007b, 171). In 
this regard, Colvin (1995, 18) cited a commentator on the case: „The 
primary requirement of finding an individual who was liable […] stood in the 
way of attaching any significance to the organizational sloppiness that had 
been found by the official inquiry”. Pettit infers that although individuals 
may lack a „high degree of personal responsibility, together as a corporate 
                                       
50 For similar positions, please see French (1979; 1984) and French, Nesteruk, and 
Risser (1992). 
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enterprise they should carry full responsibility for what occurred”. He 
advocates that even when no responsibility can be assigned to an individual 
the incorporated agency induces incorporated responsibility. If Pettit’s 
theory on the fitness of corporate actors to be seen as moral and legal 
persons and that they can in fact be held responsible for their actions can 
serve as a foundation for the framework of responsible microfinance is 
assessed in the following. A common understanding that corporations can 
be conceptualized as moral and legal entities – and that therefore 
corporations cannot easily ascribe responsibility to single persons, especially 
if the wrongdoing was done or connected to many decisions that had been 
taken by a diverse set of employees from different levels – potentially 
minimizes the risk of corporations to hide behind responsibility-diffusion 
scenarios where they simply attribute the responsibility to the one who sits 
at the desk where the buck stops. 
Hereinafter, I introduce Pettit’s views on the responsibility of corporate 
actors and follow his line of argument in answering the questions: 
I. What are corporate agents? 
II. What does holding responsible mean? 
III. Which conditions render a corporate agent fit to be held responsible? 
IV. Do corporate agents meet these conditions and if so, is there an 
argument in favor of applying these conditions even in combination 
with proof of a personal responsibility? 
As a last step, I discuss the applicability of Pettit’s theory to the context of 
responsible microfinance. 
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14.3 What Are Corporate Agents? 
Pettit (2007b, 172) gives a wide definition of corporate agents. The term is 
interchangeably used with corporations, group agents, and organizations. 
Corporate agents may be universities, NGOs, firms, political parties, 
churches, but also looser „collections of individuals” such as partnerships, 
voluntary organizations, and town meetings. The main agents of these 
entities are their members, staff or representatives. However, the corporate 
identity of a bank is not altered if this bank lets go a large part of its 
personnel. The tasks to be done will be the same; only the agents executing 
them will be different ones. Normally, corporate agents have procedures in 
place of how to go about achieving certain benchmarks, like growth and 
profit margins, numbers of members or achieving a certain impact for a 
certain cause. Corporate agents apply processes to check whether they 
have attained their goals and review the decisions they have been taken to 
reach these goals. If decisions turned out to be hurtful to the goals set, they 
would have procedures in place to adjust either the goals or the ways to 
make decisions. Depending on the corporate agent, the method of applying 
changes either follows a rather participatory approach as typical for 
voluntary organizations or a rather hierarchical approach as typical for 
companies. 
14.4 Holding Responsible: What Does it Mean? 
In Pettit’s understanding, holding responsible is best defined in the 
distinction to other related attitudes, such as causal responsibility, holding 
someone accountable, or thinking someone responsible. First, being held 
responsible is more than just perceiving a causal responsibility for 
something that has been done. Pettit uses the example of domestic 
animals. If your cat soils the carpet in your living room, you can clearly 
assign the causal responsibility to your cat. However, that is not the 
understanding Pettit has of being held responsible. The cat urinated on your 
carpet. What has been done is bad, you might be frustrated and you might 
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intensify her training but she is no agent that is a „candidate for blame”. 
So, holding someone responsible differs from „the mere assignment of 
causal responsibility” (Pettit 2007b, 173). Second, holding someone 
responsible is different from holding someone accountable. Holding 
responsible is more than just identifying one person that puts her neck on 
the line for something that was wrongfully done or raises a cheer for 
something done which is praiseworthy. A parent might be accountable for 
what the underage son has done. However, the parents are not responsible 
for his behavior, he is. In contrast to being held accountable, being held 
responsible comes with many more conditions that have to be fulfilled. 
Third, being held responsible includes one further element than just 
thinking a person is responsible. By thinking a person is responsible, we 
assume that this person is also blame- or praiseworthy. Holding this person 
responsible would however include actually blaming or approving this 
person. In the case when something bad has been done, eschewing the 
blame denies that there is some sort of creditor: That there is „someone to 
whom at least an apology is owed” (Pettit 2007b, 174). 
Pettit’s understanding of holding responsible hence encompasses three 
steps. If an agent is causally responsible for something good or bad she is a 
candidate for blame or approval. However an agent is only held „responsible 
when we go one further step and actually blame or approve” (Pettit 2007b, 
173). So, the agent who is a candidate for blame or approval has to actually 
get blamed or approved. In a last step, what she has done has to be 
identified „with the stance of a creditor – someone to whom a debt is owed” 
(Pettit 2007b, 174). In sum, Pettit asks for three elements in order to hold 
someone responsible: Causality, blame- or praiseworthiness of an action, 
and action calling for a compensation of some kind. 
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14.5 Are Corporate Agents Fit to Be Held 
Responsible? 
In the foregoing chapter the necessary elements of holding someone 
responsible are presented. Applying these three elements to the group 
agent case and giving an answer to the question, when group agents are to 
be fully held responsible for their conduct, is the focus in the following.  
In line with other political philosophers and based on the Roman Catholic 
moral theology51, Pettit proposes to adopt the following three necessary 
conditions to assess whether a group agent is fit to be held responsible (see 
also Neuhäuser 2011, 57; Hart 1968, 140 f.). 
Value relevance. – The group is an autonomous agent that faces a 
significant choice between doing something good or bad or right or 
wrong. 
Value judgment. – The group has the understanding and access to 
evidence required for being able to make judgments about the 
relative value of such options. 
Value sensitivity. – The group has the control required for being 
able to choose between options on the basis of its judgments 
about their respective value. (Pettit 2007b, 177) 
In order to evaluate whether corporate agents can also be held responsible, 
three questions are addressed: 
Q1 Does a collective of individuals constitute an agent and can this 
group be understood as an autonomous agent? 
Q2 Are group agents capable of making value judgments? 
Q3 Are group agents capable of acting in line with value judgments 
they make? 
  
                                       
51 The necessary conditions for a mortal sin being it must be a grave matter (1), it must 
be committed with full knowledge (2), and it must be committed with deliberate consent (3) 
(Pope John Paul II 1984). 
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14.5.1 First Condition – Value Relevance 
For the first condition, it boils down to the question whether or not group 
agents qualify as autonomous agents, because if they do, they – at least at 
some point – will have to make value-relevant choices. To answer this 
question, it has to be elaborated whether a collective of individuals 
constitutes an agent and whether this group can be understood as an 
autonomous agent. In doing so, Pettit (2007b, 178) argues in favor of both 
statements. 
T1 Groups may constitute agents. 
T2 Groups may constitute autonomous agents. 
In the following, I describe Pettit’s argument (T1 and T2) claiming that 
group agents can be held responsible in the scope of the first condition. 
 
(T1) Groups may constitute agents 
In order for an individual or group to qualify as an agent, they have to form 
and reform 
1. „action-suited desires” that are realizable and describe how the 
environment should be and 
2. „action-suited beliefs” that are „sensitive to incoming evidence” 
and describe how the environment currently is (Pettit 2007b, 
178). 
An agent then should be able to act upon the analysis of how it is and how 
it should be. If the belief does not yet match the desire, the agent will 
reform the current situation until the desire is realized. In reality, someone 
or something that aims to qualify as an agent may not in every single case 
succeed to form his, her or its desires or to act upon these desires. 
However, an agent must generally „display a robust pattern of attitudinal 
and behavioral rationality” (Pettit 2007b, 178). Pettit (2007b, 178) 
illustrates these systems of beliefs and desires with an example of robots 
and argues that even a simple robot can qualify as an agent. Imagine a 
wheeled robot that rolls around on a table. There are various cylinder-
shaped objects scattered all over the table. The robot has arms to put them 
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in different positions. This robot is equipped with an „on-off desire”, which 
is „cylinders should be upright”. The robot has a device to scan the table for 
objects. As soon as it spots a cylinder lying on its side (i.e. belief), it 
approaches the object and acts according to its desire. It uses its robotic 
arms to put the object into the desired, upright position. Although some of 
the objects lying nearer to the edges of the table might get pushed off, the 
observer would still notice the pattern of behavioral rationality the robot 
follows52. If we can accept a simple, or more complex robot as an example 
of an autonomous agent, we can also accept corporate agents, which are 
equipped with more complex systems of beliefs and desires, which their 
agency follows to be autonomous agents in the light of this analysis. 
In order for a group agent to act on certain desires it should implement 
„conditions that ensure agency” (Pettit 2007b, 179). Therefore, group 
agents have some sort of shared intention to perform tasks as a „single 
unified agent”. Every single individual does her bit to enable the agent to 
act in a certain way. However, being able to act as a unified agent does not 
mean that every individual has to have the same knowledge or influence 
concerning the detailed strategies of such an agent. Whereas some may 
play big roles in decision taking processes, others may only be aware of the 
role they are required to play. Nevertheless, every single member of a 
group agent has its role, whether it is big or small, to create an action-
suited body of desire and belief. Group agents might coordinate themselves 
differently. Most commonly though they will form a leading group of 
                                       
52 McFarland (2000, 34–40) presents a detailed analysis if and how machines might be 
able to make rational choices. He concludes that robots can show behavioral rationality of 
the process they are designed to follow. Let us take the example of a robot working in an 
assembly line of a car manufacturer, which is programmed to assemble one side of the car. 
Imagine that the robot is not only capable of lifting a car door and putting it into a certain 
position, but is also able to install the door at the correct spot on the car body. Furthermore, 
the robot is programmed in such a way that it is able to detect whether the doors it is 
assembling are defective or accurate. Hence, the robot is able to decide between superior 
and inferior choices. His desire is much more complex then the desire of the robot on the 
table (i.e. „cylinders should be upright”). A more complex robot has several desires that 
come in a certain order. To be mounted to the car body, the „doors should be accurate” if 
they are not, they are put in a certain box. If the robot’s scan detects a defective door (i.e. 
belief), it acts according to its desire when doors are defective, namely „defective doors 
should be put in box y”. If the robot’s scan detects an accurate door (i.e. belief), it acts upon 
its desire when doors are accurate, namely „accurate doors should be mounted to the car 
body”. 
  110 
members that will deliberate about the agent’s goals and action plans (i.e. 
desires). Subgroups or single individuals will implement these plans and will 
report the progress to their superiors. Hence, they assess how a certain 
task is executed (i.e. belief) and how it should be executed under the new 
proposition (i.e. desire) given by an authorized group. Periodically, the 
leading group or subgroup leaders will assess whether their goals and action 
plans are successfully accomplished or if their adjustments to the strategy 
have to be made. Under this analysis, group agents can be understood as 
agents. 
 
(T2) Groups may constitute autonomous agents 
Groups may only constitute an autonomous agent, when there is evidence 
that a group attitude is not only the result of a „summative kind” as Quinton 
(1976, 17) called it. French (2016) presents the methodological 
individualism view on corporations as follows: 
[A corporation] is understood to be nothing more than a 
contractual nexus, a collection of self-interested humans acting 
either as principals or agents with respect to each other. […] A 
corporation is but the financial and contractual ‘playing field’ for a 
number of individual dealings, and it has no existence independent 
of those dealings. 
This traditional view of group attitudes is however hard to advocate against 
the backdrop of existing group agents, which are equipped with highly 
complex decision making procedures and organizational structures. This is 
why defenders of the traditional view like Quinton apply their theory of how 
group attitudes are formed to participatory agents 53  only. Imagine a 
participatory group is about to decide on a certain question. Every single 
member of that group voices her opinion about whether to answer the 
question with no or yes. The resulting group attitude is, for Quinton, a mere 
majoritarian function of the corresponding attitudes of every individual 
participating in the decision making process. Pettit confronts this view by 
claiming that due to ‘discursive dilemmas’ there is no „general rule group 
                                       
53 In a participatory group all individual members participate not only the vocal few. 
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attitudes can be a majoritarian function of member attitudes” (2007b, 
181)54. And associated impossibility theorems as they are presented in List 
and Pettit (2002, 96–100) elucidate that group attitudes cannot be a 
majoritarian or non-majoritarian function of individual attitudes. To 
illustrate this point Pettit (2001, 271–276) uses the example of a ‘discursive 
dilemma’. The staff of a company can vote whether they want to waive a 
pay-rise in favor of enhancing security measures to protect them from 
electrocution at their workplaces. The employees will consider two 
questions: 
1. How serious is the threat of being electrocuted at my work desk? 
2. Is the money that all employees will forego enough in order to 
minimize the risk of being electrocuted in such a way that it would 
eliminate the seriousness of the threat of this event? 
Each employee has to deliberate the seriousness- and the effectiveness-
question in order to decide on whether to sacrifice the pay-rise or not. 
Imagine the following decision matrix: 
 
 Seriousness (S)? Effectiveness (E)? Pay-Sacrifice 
(P)? 
Member A. Yes No No 
Member B. No Yes No 
Member C. Yes Yes Yes 
 
This matrix illustrates that the outcome differs on whether the decision is 
driven by the premises (first two columns), or whether the decision is 
driven by the conclusion (Pettit 2001, 273). Although a majority of the staff 
supports the premises, the pay-sacrifice is rejected. Should the opinions on 
the premises or the ones on the conclusion drive the group decision?  
A majoritarian system to decide on certain issues shows a lot of 
inconsistency in the outcome of such a vote. A solution could be to apply a 
                                       
54 Law and economics scholars working in the field of social-choice described discursive 
dilemmas that occur while aggregating judgments and called them the doctrinal paradox 
(Kornhauser 1992, 442; see also Kornhauser 1986; Brennan 2001; B. Chapman 1998), also 
in political science Daudt and Rea discussed the compound outcomes of majority decisions 
and developed the Ostrogorski-Paradox (1976). 
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procedure allowing for internally consistent decisions of the group agent. 
Such a procedure means that decisions of a group agent would no longer be 
a mere majoritarian function of the individuals attitudes „and will cast it to 
that extent as an autonomous subject” (Pettit 2007b, 182). Autonomy is 
possible if group judgments are „functionally independent” of the 
corresponding individual attitudes. How could autonomy be proved in 
practice? 
List and Pettit (2008) and Pettit (2007a) present some possibilities how 
to establish autonomy and I briefly point out two of them. First, group 
judgments to be rational judgments cannot be functionally dependent on 
the individual judgments of the group members but they „must be a 
function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions” 
(List and Pettit 2008, 85). In order to know what the group thinks about a 
certain proposition, such as S, E or P, it is negligible to know each individual 
opinion about a single proposition. The authors conclude that if group 
members decide about sets of propositions instead of single propositions, 
the group agent acts autonomously (2008, 95–97). In this scenario the 
group takes a majority vote on each of the propositions (i.e. on S and E) 
and follows a constraint that says that there is only a pay-sacrifice if and 
only if both propositions (i.e. seriousness and effectiveness) are affirmed. 
So the propositions are to be looked at together as a set of propositions. 
This premise-based procedure entails the advantage that with the individual 
vote on the set of propositions we can automatically establish the group 
judgment on the issue; hence the individual attitudes on the conclusion R 
are inadequate to identify the group’s decision about the conclusion R but 
are also superfluous (List and Pettit 2008, 97). Second, Pettit (2007a, 512–
514) also advocates the straw-vote procedure. This procedure entails to 
take a straw vote on every issue that has to be discussed. If inconsistency 
occurs, the procedure allows feedback. The group deliberates about the 
inconsistency and tries to resolve it. The newly formed judgment comes to a 
vote again and so on and so forth (Pettit 2007a, 512–513). This procedure 
focuses on the deliberation about judgments that raise inconsistencies and 
therefore breaks away from the focus on individual attitudes. 
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14.5.2 Second Condition – Value Judgment 
Can group agents form judgments about the relative value of any options 
they are confronted with? A judgment will be made over premises that are 
presented to, for example, a group meeting or a meeting of an authorized 
subgroup. By following certain procedures (e.g. set-wise decision, straw-
vote) this group decides on the issues at hand. Since individuals are able to 
discuss and bring forward propositions in their private lives, they are also 
able to present and discuss propositions within a group. Group agents are 
therefore capable of making judgments about the relative value of options 
they are confronted with (Pettit 2007b, 187). 
14.5.3 Third Condition – Value Sensitivity 
I presented Pettit’s argument that groups are able to make judgments 
about the relative value of options they are confronted with. For the third 
condition, the question is if a group agent is able to respond to these 
judgments. Are groups in „reason-sensitive control” of their judgments 
(Pettit 2007b, 188)? Do they reliably take action and follow the judgments 
they have made? The main problem with advocating in favor of reason 
sensitivity of groups is on whatever judgment the group acts upon; it will 
always be an individual member carrying out a certain task in the name of 
the group agent. It is likely that in practice an individual that acts in a 
group agent’s name is in complete control over how the task is performed 
and also is likely to be completely responsible for what it is doing. With 
reference to Thomas Aquinas55, Pettit (2007b, 189) deduces the following 
argument: 
  
                                       
55 In 1946, Eschmann published a paper on corporate delict and collective guilt. He 
analyzed the writings of Thomas Aquinas and especially his views on society and community. 
Pettit deduces his argument from the following excerpt: „Excommunication […] is only to be 
inflicted when one has committed a mortal sin. Now a sin consists in an act. Yet, in most 
cases, an act is not done by the whole community but by some persons […]. Hence these 
persons from among the community may be excommunicated, but not the community itself” 
(Eschmann 1946, 11). 
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Whatever a group agent does is done by individual agents. 
Individuals are in reason-sensitive control of anything that they do 
and so in control of anything they do in acting for a group. 
One and the same action cannot be subject both to the reason-
sensitive control of the group agent and to the reason-sensitive 
control of one or more individuals. 
Hence, the group agent cannot be in reason-sensitive control of 
what it does; such control will always rest with the individuals who 
act for the group. 
As far as this analysis has progressed, the first two premises can be 
approved. The problem comes with the third premise. Assuming that a 
group agent only acts reason-sensitive because its individual members do 
so: Can group agents acquire the reason-sensitive control necessary in 
order for them to be held responsible? 
Pettit affirms this question and makes use of an analogy. Imagine a 
closed flask filled with water that is brought to its boiling point. Inevitably, 
the flask breaks into pieces after some time. Pettit argues that there are 
two critical factors in that process. First, the water is boiling. This is 
described as the higher-level event. Without this requirement, the flask 
would not break. Thus, the factor ‘boiling water’ programs the flask to 
break. Second, however the water molecules have to be distributed or 
moved to bring the water to its boiling point, there will be one molecule that 
triggers the breaking with its position that is sufficient to break the glass at 
one point. This is described as the lower-level event. In conclusion, being at 
boiling temperature the water programs the glass to break and being 
positioned in a certain way the molecule „implements that program; it plays 
the immediate productive role” (Pettit 2007b, 191). The higher- and lower-
level event (i.e. boiling and triggering the breaking) is causally relevant. 
Thus, according to the situation we might refer to either of the two causal 
explanations of how the flask broke. 
Imagine a practical case where there is an individual member of a 
corporate agent fulfilling a certain task on behalf of this group. Is the 
corporate agent able to exercise reason-sensitive control over how a task is 
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executed? Referring to the analogy with the flask we could infer that the 
corporate agent can do so because it shares the control. Group agents take 
on the task of programming what and how something will be done and the 
individual member undertakes the active role by implementing this program 
(Pettit 2007b, 191). What the analogy does not cover is how a group can 
execute reason-sensitive control. As mentioned above, the group is able to 
form judgments and attitudes of its own and sets constitutions in place, 
which determine how these attitudes are to be formed. Also this control 
accounts for which of the individual members will carry out certain tasks in 
which way and, in case of failure, has a back up plan how to assign this task 
to other members that are capable of executing this task. Also the 
individual who is responsible for the task will control her actions in a 
reason-sensitive way and will ensure that it is she and not someone else 
carrying out that task. It is therefore the corporate agent, which is 
responsible in its role as „the ultimate, reason-sensitive planner at its 
origin”. However, not only the group agent has to answer for what it has 
done, but also the group members have to answer for their actions and thus 
keep their responsibility as „enactors of the corporate deed” (Pettit 2007b, 
192)56. 
14.6 Individual versus Corporate Responsibility 
Corporate agents are fit to be held responsible. This was shown in the 
precedent argument. How though is the relation between individual and 
corporate responsibility evaluated? If all relevant individuals who are part of 
a corporate agent and responsible in a certain case are found, would it not 
be redundant to argue that we also should hold the corporate agent 
responsible as a whole? Pettit (2007b, 194) advocates the thesis that 
                                       
56 Pettit adds the notion that an individual only has responsibility if she could have said 
no to fulfilling a task but did not. This notion, in my opinion, is debatable since: First, the 
task could not constitute an obvious wrong-doing, and second, there might be other factors 
involved such as pressure from superiors or simply „I have to keep my job”-considerations. I 
doubt that, under these conditions, one could ascribe absolute responsibility to a single 
person. 
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although all important enactors of a group can be held responsible, it is vital 
to be able to hold the corporate agent responsible as well. 
Imagine again the ferry disaster in 1987. The sinking of the Herald of 
Free Enterprise in the English Channel caused the drowning of almost 200 
people. As mentioned above, the court assessed that the corporation 
operating this ferry was extremely sloppy in maintaining the ship. The 
corporation omitted to properly maintain, repair and check the ship. In this 
case, the court did not manage to assign any responsibility to single 
individuals, since it was the collective and creeping omission that led to the 
ferry catastrophe. In light of Pettit’s argument, the court would have had, at 
least a moral bases to assign responsibility to the ferry corporation. Under 
these circumstances, there is no ground to hold individuals responsible for 
what they have done in the name of a group agent. However, the corporate 
agent should be held responsible for what it has programmed the individual 
members to implement. In the case of falling short of attributing 
responsibility to individual members there is reason to complementarily 
hold the group agent responsible. 
Instead of only seeing group responsibility as a backup if enactor 
responsibility fails, there are two reasons why we should always consider 
group responsibility. First, to prevent shortfalls in individual responsibility, 
group responsibility should be assessed by default. Second, if there is no 
regime for group responsibility, individual members may abuse their status 
within a group to act in such a way that they cannot be held responsible yet 
profiting from their self-serving conduct. Pettit (2007b, 197) concludes: 
The regime I envisage would hold individual enactors responsible 
for any harm that they might have refused to do and didn’t. And it 
would hold the corporate agent responsible for having organized 
things so that such harm was likely or inevitable. 
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14.7 Applicability of Pettit’s Theory of Corporate 
Responsibility to the Responsible Microfinance 
Framework 
One of the goals of this chapter was to define responsibility in regard to the 
framework of responsible microfinance. Responsibility was introduced as a 
duty or obligation to satisfactorily perform or complete a task. This task 
represents either an exogenous assignment or a self-imposed commitment. 
Not fulfilling this task is blameworthy and makes a sanction appropriate. 
This sanction can be of legal or social character. Furthermore, I aimed to 
give the framework of responsible microfinance a foundation, an approach 
to responsibility, which underpins the framework with a common 
understanding of the sources and consequences of responsibility in 
microfinance, which it was lacking before. Pettit’s approach on the fitness of 
corporate actors to be seen as moral and legal persons and on their fitness 
to be held responsible for their actions, can serve as a possible foundation 
for the framework of responsible microfinance. If the framework starts out 
from a common understanding that corporations are responsible for their 
conduct as moral and legal entities and that they, even if it only concerns 
soft law standards, can be held responsible for their actions and that they 
will feel, at least, social sanctions, can help enhance the enforceability of 
these standards. 
Seeing corporations as legal and moral entities might at first not seem 
to be useful in the realm of soft law standards. However, as shown later in 
this third part, especially the soft law standards representing one pillar of 
the responsible microfinance framework are starting to harden and with a 
common approach of how to understand responsibility the interpretative 
scope of what responsibility might mean in this regard is inevitably 
narrowed and exit options and deflecting, are getting increasingly difficult. 
This topic is therefore closely linked to enforcement issues. Finally if the 
framework of responsible microfinance ought to have some potential to 
mitigate over-indebtedness and the therewith-connected individual, 
institutional and systemic consequences, and aims to be widely recognized 
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and enforceable, having a common understanding of the sources and 
consequences of responsibility in microfinance is necessary. 
15 Conclusion 
In Part III, I constructed a definition of responsible microfinance and 
especially elaborated on its overall demand for responsibility. Putting a 
focus on responsibility and shedding light on what it could mean within a 
framework of responsible microfinance was important due to the fact that 
responsible finance and responsible microfinance literature seem to neglect 
defining what responsibility and holding MFIs responsible for their conduct 
could entail. The contribution made to the discussion in this research 
project is offering one possibility to underpin the framework of responsible 
microfinance with an approach to responsibility, hoping to have sparked a 
discussion about how narrow or wide this concept shall be interpreted in the 
context of responsible microfinance. 
In Part IV, I examine ten cases to illustrate how microfinance 
stakeholders help attain responsible microfinance’s demand to enforce and 
enable practical strategies to mitigate over-indebtedness in each of the 
three pillars (i.e. state regulations, financial literacy endeavors, soft law 
standards). Furthermore, the demand for MFIs to balance their financial and 
social performance and initiate or have procedures in place to hold 
themselves responsible for achieving their social mission, which includes the 
implementation of client protection and social performance management, 
will be addressed in Chapter 19. 
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PART IV – ENFORCING AND ENABLING 
RESPONSIBLE MICROFINANCE 
16 The Three Pillars of Responsible Microfinance 
Responsible microfinance builds upon the extended definition of 
microfinance presented in Part I of this research project and is a broader 
framework incorporating various actors which all contribute and cooperate 
to further and realize the goals of responsible microfinance. It puts an 
emphasis on the mitigation of the vulnerability of clients against over-
indebtedness and in a wider sense also on the alleviation of institutional and 
systemic risks, which can be triggered by high numbers of over-indebted 
clients. Its three main pillars are the implications derived from the over-
indebtedness analysis in Part II of this research. 
• Pillar I: state regulations 
• Pillar II: financial literacy endeavors 
• Pillar III: soft law standards 
In general, responsible microfinance understands the three pillars as key in 
order to protect microfinance clients from over-indebtedness and therefore 
also to reduce the individual, institutional and systemic risks connected to 
it. The three pillars include the practical strategies to enable and enforce 
responsible microfinance and its targets. In Figure 4 the three pillars and 
the main microfinance stakeholders involved in the framework are 
presented. 
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Figure 4: The Multi-Stakeholder Framework of Responsible Microfinance (revised 
and updated from Responsible Finance Forum 2011) 
The demand for enabling and enforcing responsible microfinance applies to 
the three pillars to mitigate over-indebtedness within the framework of 
responsible microfinance. These pillars compose the approaches deduced 
from the analysis in Part II. The definition of responsible microfinance calls 
for a framework whose structures enhance the coordination and cooperation 
of the stakeholders in such a way that responsible microfinance is furthered 
and corresponding standards and regulations that advance the goals of 
responsible microfinance are better enforceable. 
The claim to enable the coordination and cooperation between all 
stakeholders in regard to responsible microfinance would be relatively easy 
to attain. MFIs, states, investors, IOs and NGOs, which are already 
endorsing one or the other standard accounting for responsible microfinance 
or financial literacy initiative could promote such practices and motivate 
other actors to do likewise. 
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The demand for enforceability is also relatively easy to fulfill in regard to 
state regulations, however more difficult to attain in the case of soft law 
standards established by transnational and international organizations. Of 
the three pillars, state regulations are the instrument with most 
enforceability power to further the goals of responsible microfinance and 
they may even reinforce the other two pillars. States can implement rules 
that consider the area of tension between access-friendly market-conduct 
laws and obstructing policies. Furthermore, they may accelerate and 
support financial literacy initiatives or help establish, spotlight or even 
incorporate soft law standards into their regulations. State regulations may 
also use incentives, such as rewarding good practices (McKee, Lahaye, and 
Koning 2011, 2). In contrast, soft law standards are by definition voluntary 
and therefore traditionally lack enforcement power (Abbott and Snidal 
2000). Nevertheless, such standards can also become quite powerful. In 
recent years, standard-setting international and transnational institutions 
have started to incorporate extensive stakeholder participation into their 
standard-setting processes to widen recognition and facilitate enforceability. 
Financial literacy programs undoubtedly have less of an enforcing power 
but are crucial to empower clients in regard to their financial knowledge and 
rights in this regard and raise awareness about the risks connected to over-
indebtedness. In this sense, financial literacy endeavors bear the potential 
to empower microfinance clients in various ways and therefore mitigate the 
risks of over-indebtedness. 
 
In order to enable and enforce responsible microfinance the framework 
proceeds from the following three assumptions: 
I. State regulations mitigate the risk of over-indebtedness among 
microfinance clients and the therewith-connected individual, 
institutional and systemic risks (Chapter 17). 
II. Financial literacy programs reduce the risk of over-indebtedness 
among microfinance clients and the therewith-connected individual, 
institutional and systemic risks (Chapter 18). 
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III. Soft law standards mitigate the risk of over-indebtedness among 
microfinance clients and the therewith-connected individual, 
institutional and systemic risks (Chapter 19). 
Below, the three pillars the analysis of the causes and consequences of 
over-indebtedness suggested in Part II (i.e. state regulation, financial 
literacy programs, and soft law standards) are presented and practical 
strategies that mitigate over-indebtedness in regard to every pillar are 
explored in order to show how responsible microfinance could be enhanced 
and enforced. I am comparatively brief on the consumer protection state 
policies and financial literacy strategies and put the focus on the soft law 
client protection and social performance standards. The overarching 
research questions for Part IV are: 
• What could a framework of responsible microfinance look like? 
• What are the possible actors involved and which practical strategies 
to mitigate over-indebtedness could they further? 
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Part IV is structured as follows: The first pillar is presented in Chapter 
17 and concerns state regulations. I argue three hard cases that contribute 
to the alleviation of over-indebtedness. 
 
Case I Consumer Protection Regulations 
In the past decade, scholars and policymakers have started to 
recommend consulting behavioral models to help create 
regulations (Ardic, Ibrahim, and Mylenko 2011; Barr, 
Mullainathan, and Shafir 2009; Elliehausen 2010). Therefore, 
regulations should account for what governs the decisions of 
credit-interested households instead of factoring in the idea of 
how a rational household should behave. 
 Starting from these assumptions, it is argued in Chapter 17.1 that 
consumer protection regulations should include disclosure 
requirements, rules on fair treatment, and recourse mechanisms. 
Relying on empirical evidence the potential and limits of the three 
elements are discussed. 
 
Case II Credit Bureaus 
Credit bureaus serve the purpose of helping to detect cross-
borrowing. The state is able to identify cross-borrowing 
tendencies within the microfinance market and MFIs are able to 
receive information about the creditworthiness of their clients. 
In Chapter 17.2 the assets and drawbacks of credit bureaus are 
examined. Furthermore, existing credit bureaus in South Africa 
and Ghana are taken into account in order to approximate ‘role-
model’ cases of credit bureaus. 
 
Case III Private Insolvency Systems 
 In Chapter 17.3 I explore the potential benefits of creating 
private insolvency systems, which could, as a means of last 
resort, provide over-indebted microfinance clients with a fresh 
start. 
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The second pillar affects financial literacy endeavors. In Chapter 18 
three practical cases are brought forward to show how financial literacy 
projects mitigate over-indebtedness. 
 
Case IV SEWA Bank’s Financial Literacy Program 
 Based on the understanding that the provision of financial 
services should be oriented by an in-depth knowledge of clients’ 
needs (Kilara and Rhyne 2014, 1; Datar, Epstein, and Yuthas 
2008, 40; Wardle 2014, 9), I present the case of SEWA Bank in 
Chapter 18.1, which developed an approach to easily gather the 
information necessary to assess whether a client needs additional 
explanation or educational training regarding the products she 
purchases. In doing so, SEWA Bank can apply educational 
measures appropriately and punctually to mitigate the risks of 
over-indebtedness. 
 
Case V The Kenyan Soap Opera ‘Makutano Junction’ 
Makutano Junction, a Kenyan TV educational drama series that 
disseminates educational content aims to reach a large audience 
and to educate them on specific issues in an entertaining way is 
introduced in Chapter 18.2. Referring to empirical evidence, it is 
shown that the content of educational soap operas in fact has a 
lasting impact on viewer’s perceptions on, for example finances. 
 
Case VI The Gamification of Financial Literacy 
 The use of game mechanics in non-game contexts (i.e. 
‘gamification’), such as health or finances, aims to incentivize 
individuals to learn something about these topics while playing a 
game. In Chapter 18.3, three digital games are introduced and 
their applicability in the microfinance context and their potential 
to mitigate over-indebtedness is assessed. 
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The third pillar presents soft law standards having the potential to 
mitigate over-indebtedness (Chapter 19). Instead of solely presenting the 
cases and evaluating their potential to mitigate over-indebtedness, I put a 
specific focus on soft law standards. Soft law standards are voluntary in 
character and represent best practices (Mattli and Woods 2009, 3). They 
have mainly two targets. First, they aim to be „technically competent 
standards” contributing to the coordination between actors and defining 
concepts, which are key in specific economic domains (Richardson and 
Eberlein 2011, 217). Second, because soft law standard-setting institutions 
operate outside of the sovereignty of states, the challenge lies within the 
establishment of standards that are nevertheless legitimate and enforceable 
(Richardson and Eberlein 2011, 217). 
As the main goal of Part IV is to find practical strategies, which do 
mitigate over-indebtedness and thereby enable and enforce responsible 
microfinance, it is vital to assess whether the four cases of soft law 
standards are applicable to the context of microfinance and therefore are 
‘technically competent’. Furthermore, it is important whether the standards 
are established in a legitimate way and whether they can be enforced. In 
order to reflect upon these problems, the analytical framework of the 
common interest theory of Mattli and Woods (2009, 12–42) is adopted 
(Chapter 19.1). The analytical framework requires the process of creating 
soft law standards to be open to a wide array of actors (‘institutional 
supply-side conditions’). However, proper due process and open forums are 
yet insufficient for a soft law standard to be labeled in the common interest. 
Being in common interest, these participatory channels have to be actually 
used by various actors representing the societal demand (‘demand-side 
conditions’) for creating or revising these soft law standards. Against the 
backdrop of the common interest theory, the following four soft law 
standards are presented (see Chapters 19.2 to 19.5) and analyzed: 
 
• UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection (Case VII – Chapter 19.2) 
• UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Case VIII – 
Chapter 19.3) 
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• Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and Certification 
Program (Case IX – Chapter 19.4) 
• The Social Performance Task Force’s Universal Standards for Social 
Performance Management (Case X – Chapter 19.5) 
Whether the processes to establish and revise these soft law standards 
meet the requirements of the common interest theory is argued in Chapter 
19.6 to 19.9. Furthermore, the applicability of the four cases to the context 
of microfinance is discussed in Chapter 19.10. 
The conclusion of how the ten cases analyzed contribute to the 
mitigation of over-indebtedness within a multi-stakeholder framework of 
responsible microfinance is discussed in Chapter 19.11. 
17 Pillar One: State Regulations 
Traditionally, consumer protection is one of the three main functions of 
financial regulation57. Financial institutions might conduct their business in 
an inadequate or harmful way and consumers should be protected from 
such business practices by state regulation (Staschen 1999, 5). In the 
following, I draw on three examples for policy implications in the realm of 
consumer protection regulation that assumingly contribute to the mitigation 
of risks of over-indebtedness. Case I is very much connected to the 
discussion about behavioral economics in Chapter 10.1.1.3 and elaborates 
on the question on what consumer protection regulation should entail. Case 
II concerns the possibility states have to mitigate information asymmetries 
between lenders and borrowers through credit bureaus. And Case III 
addresses the yet widely neglected possibility of implementing personal 
insolvency systems especially in developing countries where they are 
usually lacking. 
                                       
57 The second function of financial regulation is the maintenance of the systemic 
stability, which could be threatened by the failure of financial institutions. And the third 
function is connected to prudential concerns about the liquidity and institutional health of 
financial institutions (Staschen 1999, 5; Llewellyn 1999, 9, 13–21). 
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17.1 Case I: Behaviorally Informed Consumer 
Protection Regulation 
As discussed in Chapter 10.1.1.3 neo-classical economic theory assumes 
that individuals act rationally and with full information when making 
decisions. However, behavioral research showed that the rationality of 
consumers is in fact bounded by cognitive biases, the information 
accessible, and the time available when making a decision (Akerlof 1991, 1; 
Goodwin et al. 2015, 178, 183). Although empirical behavioral research has 
shown that human behavior is guided by impulses, conceptions and wishes 
rather than by deliberative intent or normative ideals, regulators still often 
rely on the normative analysis that consumers make rational decisions 
(Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2009, 27). 
Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2009, 39–49) take the example of the 
U.S. mortgage crises and clarify the mismatch between the complex 
financial products and the common consumer who wanted to buy a house. 
In the light of classical policy thinking, the behavior of consumers should be 
guided by rational considerations. Yet in fact, the consumer is lacking 
perfect information and prudence, which are both presupposed in the 
context of rational decision-making. Hence, regulations should factor in 
consumer behavior. The authors hypothesize that if the mortgage products 
had been straightforward and understandable – in practice they suggested 
for example an opt-out home mortgage plan with a standard fixed-rate loan 
– the scope of the crises could have been weakened (2009, 43–49). Due to 
such studies, researchers and policymakers have recently started to 
recommend taking behavioral models as an assistance to creating 
regulations (Ardic, Ibrahim, and Mylenko 2011; Barr, Mullainathan, and 
Shafir 2009; Elliehausen 2010). Therefore, regulations should account for 
the reasons that govern the decisions credit-interested households take 
instead of factoring in the idea of how a rational household should behave. 
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Disclosure, Fair Treatment and Recourse Mechanisms 
The research findings in the field of behavioral economics provide insights 
regarding how to best mitigate information asymmetries between financial 
institutions and their clients. These findings are of special importance 
concerning disclosure requirements. Although there is wide agreement on 
the key role of disclosure, the challenge how to most effectively disclose 
information remains. In their policy paper, Porteous and Helms (2005, 3) 
state that due to transparent disclosing of loan terms to borrowers, 
borrowing costs can be reduced. Reducing borrowing costs, especially 
regarding the prevention of excessively high fees and interest rates, is a 
key policy goal (Porteous and Helms 2005, 4). Often, however, regulators 
try to reach this goal by setting interest caps, which can have market-
distorting effects. Regulating how credit terms have to be disclosed is a less 
interfering option (Brix and McKee 2010, 8). Clark (2006, 155), Prialé Reyes 
and Dias (2010, 7), and Chien (2012, 1–2) show that regulations regarding 
disclosure requirements, have the potential to lower prices and in fact led to 
a drop in credit costs not only in Cambodia and Peru but also in Eastern 
Europe and Ghana. 
In spite of their importance, disclosure requirements vary greatly from 
country to country and there is no general understanding of them regarding 
what is to be disclosed, when it has to be disclosed and how the information 
has to be displayed (Ardic, Ibrahim, and Mylenko 2011, 4). An often-
criticized approach is to provide the borrower with as much information as 
possible. Information overload is though unconducive and diminishes the 
helpfulness of disclosure (Ebers 2004, 8). Ebers (2004, 8–10) suggests one 
main approach, „reducing information complexity by standardizing”58 by 
using simplified but standardized language (see also Porteous and Helms 
2005, 2). There is wide agreement that, especially in low-access 
environments, consumer protection regulations should draw on simplified 
                                       
58 He also suggests „transforming information complexity”, which means that there is a 
multi-level system of information. The highest level contains all information for a certain 
financial product, the lowest level contains a widely simplified version of all information that 
is available for a certain product. Hence, even though the borrower might inform herself 
about a product by the means of the simplified version of product information, she always 
would have access to all the information available on the product she purchases. 
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language and that regulations urge MFIs to eschew complex calculations or 
formulas (Collins et al. 2011, 135; Brix and McKee 2010, 11). Borrowers 
favor knowing the total costs of a credit product, how much every 
installment will be and how many installments it will take them to pay off 
their loan (Chien 2012, 3). By discussing the debate that arose with the first 
drafted truth-in-lending bills in the United States and Canada in the 1960s, 
Zeisel and Boschan coined a standard in 1968 declaring what pricing 
information should be disclosed. This standard is still applicable. They 
elaborated that „any lender or vendor selling on credit must provide his 
purchaser with a clear statement of the credited amount, mode of 
repayment, initial finance charges, true annual interest rate and total 
amount of interest that will accrue” (Zeisel and Boschan 1968, 827). What 
current initiatives, such as MFTransparency, in microfinance have in 
common with Zeisel and Boschan (1968) is how they all try to provide a 
concise list, a standard, of what information financial institutions ought to 
disclose to their clients. 
Zeisel and Boschan (1968, 828) rightfully state „[t]hat it is a simple 
task to provide this information”. Nevertheless, microfinance practice shows 
a different picture. Although MFIs might support transparent pricing in 
theory, many still refrain from transparently disclosing their pricing 
information. Normally, MFIs should disclose their prices with the annual 
percentage rate (APR): It „takes into account the amount and timing of all 
the cash flows associated with the loan, including not only things that are 
explicitly designated as ‘interest’ and ‘principal’ but also any other expected 
fees or charges, as well as compulsory deposits that are a condition of the 
loan” (Rosenberg et al. 2013, 4). However, MFIs often present APRs that do 
not include any charges (e.g. upfront fees, compulsory savings) or say 
anything about how the interest rate is calculated (i.e. flat or declining 
interest rates59). Hence, MFIs do not evaluate their costs and information 
                                       
59 Interest is the price a person pays for his or her loan. How much interest a client pays 
depends on the interest rate that has been stated and on the method of how interest is 
calculated, namely based on a flat or declining balance method. When an MFI bases its 
interest calculation on the full loan amount over one loan cycle it applies the flat interest 
rates method. When an MFI calculates interest rates „on the outstanding loan balance – the 
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they disclose with reference to a certain standard of disclosure. This leads 
to confusions among clients trying to choose between different products 
from different providers. And, as Chuck Waterfield, the CEO of 
MFTransparency puts it; even MFIs wishing to display their prices 
transparently are confronted with incentives suggesting doing the opposite: 
Once the industry began widely employing confusing product 
pricing, it became very difficult for MFIs to convert to transparent 
pricing. To do so, the MFI would advertise what appeared to be the 
highest price in the market, even though their true price could 
actually be the lowest. As a result, the vast majority of MFIs 
practice non-transparent pricing even though many would prefer 
to do otherwise. (Chuck Waterfield, CEO MFTransparency, 2009 
cited in Argüello et al. 2013, 174–175) 
This result is also facilitated by the therewith-connected fear that 
transparent pricing equals losing clients and suffering financial losses. 
Argüello et al. (2013, 174) present empirical evidence based on quantitative 
and qualitative data that suggests otherwise. They cite Xavier Pierluca, 
Bamboo Chief Investment Officer: „The commercial microfinance sector is 
about 25 years old. The organizations that have tried to grow and have not 
practiced transparency have failed” (Xavier Pierluca, Bamboo Chief 
Investment Officer, cited in Argüello et al. 2013, 194–195). Receiving 
misleading information, for example about the APR of a loan, deprives 
clients from taking informed decisions. In contrast, practicing pricing 
transparency empowers clients to take informed decisions and enhance the 
economic performance of the MFI60 (Argüello et al. 2013, 174–175; see also 
Augustine 2012). Hence, there is neither a practical nor business related 
reason to refrain from demanding pricing transparency as an imperative 
                                                                                                                
balance of money that remains in the borrower’s hands as the loan is repaid during the loan 
term” it makes use of the declining or reducing balance method (MFTransparency 2014, 2). 
Applying the flat interest rate method is much more profitable and results in almost double 
the revenues in interest compared to the profits resulting from the declining balance method 
(MFTransparency 2014). 
60 Argüello et al. (2013, 174) also support other implications of pricing transparency, 
such as healthier competition in microfinance markets and a de-stigmatization of high 
interest rates that are charged to the extreme poor living in remote and rural areas. 
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feature of responsible microfinance. Therefore, regulators could help to set 
clear rules in what has to be disclosed. 
Unfortunately, introducing truth-in-lending regulations alone is 
insufficient to ensure the protection of consumers. Other problems evolve 
leaving microfinance clients unprotected. For example, there are further 
products that might not be as easy to understand, such as insurance 
products, which require different, more complex information to be 
disclosed. In this case, the interplay of financial literacy and consumer 
protection regulation comes to the surface. But even if consumers were 
financially literate and disclosure requirements were obeyed, well-
functioning consumer protection regulation is not guaranteed. Again there 
are other problems, such as inadequate selling practices that may bring 
large gains to MFIs but leave consumers over-indebted. Hence, fair 
treatment is also playing a key role in regard to effective consumer 
protection regulation. Nevertheless, if fair treatment requirements are 
demanded, they should not impede or discourage potential clients from 
access to financial products. Furthermore, fair treatment requirements are 
not easy to implement. Each country, maybe even each consumer might 
have a different perception of what fair treatment might signify (Brix and 
McKee 2010, 13). Principally, disclosure and fair treatment requirements 
represent the main regulatory tools to minimize the information 
asymmetries between providers and borrowers, but there is also a further 
aspect. If borrowers feel mistreated or want to voice a complaint, it is key 
that they are able to turn to a third-party recourse mechanism. Hence, 
another element of consumer protection regulation could be that either the 
state provides microfinance clients with an institution to turn to in case of 
mistreatment or complaint, such as an ombudsman or a complaints office, 
or that the state requires the MFIs to establish complaint offices. Brix and 
McKee (2010, 18) advise that establishing internal dispute resolution 
mechanisms would be a good start and, at least for the beginning, more 
feasible than third-party recourse mechanisms imposed by regulators. 
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17.2 Case II: Credit Bureaus 
Credit bureaus serve the purpose of helping to detect cross-borrowing (i.e. 
taking out loans to repay former loans). The state and MFIs equally benefit 
from this information. The state is able to identify cross-borrowing within a 
certain market and MFIs are able to gain information about the 
creditworthiness of single clients. As was argued above, cross-borrowing is 
one reason why microfinance clients slide into over-indebtedness. Scholars 
hypothesize that effective pooled information systems may mitigate over-
indebtedness rates among clients (Brix and McKee 2010, 15). There are 
roughly two ways to gather information about the credit history of clients: 
credit bureaus run by the state or informal sharing of credit information 
among MFIs in case of the absence of a credit bureau. The usefulness of 
such a system is however greatly affected by the sort of information that is 
collected. 
Let me explicate the goals and practicability of information gathering 
systems using the example of state credit bureaus. First, they aim to enable 
microfinance providers to gain insights into borrowers’ current and past 
debt and repayment history so MFIs can assess the riskiness level of a 
possible client. Second, they aim to prevent borrowers from taking out too 
many loans that cannot be redeemed and at the same token they help 
borrowers build up credit records. The third goal is that pooling systems 
help policy makers to gain a market overview. They reveal debt trends in 
the market as a whole or in certain segments. 
Nevertheless, there are reported challenges to information-pooling 
systems. Firstly, often credit bureaus only track the negative records of a 
client’s credit history. Hence, only defaulted loans are registered, which 
signals MFIs that a client with an entry in a credit information system is by 
default a risky client and is therefore likelier to be rejected from loans. 
Although costlier, pooling systems should record positive and negative 
credit history of clients so that MFIs are provided with a more complete 
picture of the potential client (Brix and McKee 2010, 15). Yet, there is a 
growing debate conflicting with the question of the legitimacy of collecting 
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and disclosing any credit information. The debate contrasts the mitigation of 
over-indebtedness with the privacy of data. This conflict is recognized by a 
few researchers stating that information gathering systems may only be 
allowed if there are clear rules guiding the collection process and 
determining within which scope information might be disclosed (Niemi 
2009, 96; Brix and McKee 2010, 16). Brix and McKee (2010, 16) argue that 
with rising competition in credit markets also governments should foster the 
accessibility to „high-quality credit information” to facilitate responsible 
lending and further transparency in the market. Sharing credit information 
however always bears the risk of eroding client data privacy. The authors 
suggest establishing procedures accounting for this risk, such as informing 
clients about the collection and sharing of their credit information with third 
parties. Furthermore, clients should be informed about what consequences 
a default has and they should be allowed to look through their credit record 
and be permitted to correct any erroneous entries. Such systems as the one 
proposed have already been realized in the South African National Credit 
Act and the fair credit reporting laws in Ghana (Brix and McKee 2010, 16). 
Secondly, many developing countries lack effective credit bureaus. If 
this is the case, MFIs have the possibility of sharing credit information 
among them. This strategy though has often proved incomplete, since MFIs 
share this information voluntarily. MFIs do not have to share any data or, if 
they do, they might share incomplete information. This results in MFIs 
lacking the access to reliable information about future clients’ debt and 
repayment records. 
Thirdly, existing credit bureaus often exclude MFIs that are not 
regulated or do not possess a banking license, letting alone the entire 
informal lending sector (i.e. private money lenders) (Brix and McKee 2010, 
16). It is evident, and this also holds true for informal sharing of credit 
information among MFIs, that information sharing systems might not prove 
overly effective. However, they constitute one strategy to have, at least, 
access to some credit history information of clients (Brix and McKee 2010, 
16). 
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17.3 Case III: Private Insolvency Systems 
One issue that has not yet been addressed in microfinance literature is the 
possibility of setting in place or reforming private insolvency systems. As a 
last resort, besides debt counseling, an office of an ombudsman or MFIs’ 
internal dispute resolution mechanisms, it could be beneficial for over-
indebted individuals to have the possibility of escaping from their debts by 
means provided by private insolvency systems. Almost all European 
countries know proceedings, which govern insolvency, debt restructuring, 
bankruptcy and foreclosure in private as well as in the professional sphere. 
Also the possibility to discharge debt has gained importance in Europe in 
the past thirty years. England, Austria, France, Germany, Scandinavian and 
Benelux countries (Niemi 2009, 100–101) and the United States (Miehe 
2015) recognize, for example, debt cancellation. Private debt cancellation is 
also an issue in Eastern European countries. In January 2015, Croatia 
canceled the debts of approximately 60’000 citizens. Under the condition 
that a citizen is not earning more than 1,250 Kuna ($184) per month, rents 
and does not own a property and is not able to liquidate the debts is given 
up to 35,000 Kuna ($5,146) (Szu 2015). Although a large-scale debt 
cancellation might be highly political, it also symbolizes that debt is a 
problem many countries struggle with and that there are no simple 
solutions to problems such as over-indebtedness, also in industrialized 
countries. 
Analyzing the situation in developing countries there are predominantly 
no personal insolvency laws in place (Shah 2013). Boraine and Roestoff 
(2014, 93) and Shah (2013, 33–34) discuss a choice of transition and 
developing countries, which make it burdensome for own-account workers 
and small to medium size enterprises (SMEs) to be even eligible for a 
personal insolvency proceeding (i.e. South Africa) or completely lack such a 
procedure (i.e. Egypt and Vietnam). In Vietnam, for example, only larger or 
state-owned enterprises are eligible for bankruptcy procedures. Even 
owning a registered SME will not allow accessing bankruptcy procedures. 
The Vietnamese bankruptcy regulation therefore misses the majority of 
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Vietnamese businesses, which are largely composed of sole proprietors such 
as household-run businesses (Shah 2013, 34). A further feature of a 
bankruptcy system considers how fast after a bankruptcy an entrepreneur 
can again be integrated into the economy. In Australia and also Egypt, 
entrepreneurs that failed with their business are limited to engage in new 
ventures or simple legal proceedings because passports of the debtors are 
seized by either the court in the case of Egypt or the trustee in the case of 
Australia (Shah 2013, 35). 
As stated above, private insolvency systems are a means of last resort; 
however, they could be useful in the realm of responsible microfinance. 
Discharging debts can give a microfinance client with a small enterprise a 
‘fresh start’. Nevertheless, the issue of private insolvency has not been 
greatly discussed in microfinance literature so far and needs more work. 
One question would clearly concern the incentives such systems would give 
to microfinance clients. 
17.4 Interim Conclusion – Client Protection Policies 
In Chapter 17, I explored three possibilities to mitigate over-indebtedness 
over state regulations. By considering the insights from behavioral 
economics, it was shown for Case I that consumers do not take purely 
rational decisions. Their rationality is bounded and consumers often follow 
their urges and ideas and are not guided by deliberative intent or normative 
ideals. What microfinance consumer protection regulations should entail 
was the question addressed for Case I. The first factor was disclosure. The 
analysis showed that the true APR should be disclosed, including all costs 
incurred. There is no ‘one size fits all approach’. However, literature agrees 
on the strategy to simplify and standardize information about microfinance 
products. Policy makers could contribute to this target and set clear rules 
about how, when and what information should be disclosed. The next two 
factors discussed were fair treatment and accessible recourse mechanisms. 
Fair treatment has gained in importance due to abusive lending practices 
that were increasingly observed within microfinance business conduct. If 
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fair treatment requirements are to be included into consumer protection 
regulations, they should neither impede nor discourage potential clients 
from access to financial products. If clients feel mistreated, recourse 
mechanisms are key because they give the clients an opportunity to voice 
their complaints and potentially improve their situation. Optimally, these 
recourse systems are provided by a third-party imposed by regulators, at 
the moment, however, recourse mechanisms for microfinance clients are 
still in their infancy so often only MFIs offer internal dispute resolution. 
In Case II, I presented credit bureaus as a regulatory instrument to 
mitigate over-indebtedness. By means of pooling information about 
microfinance clients’ credit records, MFIs can more easily detect whether a 
client may slide into over-indebtedness when taking out another loan or 
not. If deemed effective or not depends on the type of information gathered 
and on which financial institutions are designated to share the information. 
Furthermore, the quality of shared information will suffer if, for example, 
MFIs share credit information voluntarily due to the absence of a credit 
bureau. 
As a last possibility how states regulations could mitigate over-
indebtedness I introduced private insolvency systems as Case III. Private 
insolvency systems are a largely neglected topic in the realm of 
microfinance. In sum, such systems offer over-indebted households a ‘fresh 
start’ and could lift the stigma of being over-indebted. As the examples of 
Egypt, Vietnam and Australia have illustrated, a private insolvency 
programs nevertheless may discourage those affected, if hurdles to be 
eligible for the program or re-entering the economy are too high. 
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18 Pillar Two: Financial Literacy Programs 
As already has been briefly discussed in Chapter 10.1.1.3, low financial 
literacy seems to be positively correlated with poor financial decisions. 
Although, empirical research on financial literacy and awareness of financial 
concepts is sparse, this chapter provides some research findings on the 
relation between financial literacy and over-indebtedness and presents 
practicable possibilities of how to enhance financial knowledge.  
Over-indebtedness can be prevented, if individuals know their financial 
in- and outflows and how much they, in total costs, need to pay back for 
every installment61. At least studies conducted in industrialized countries 
find that lower financial knowledge raises the risk of getting over-indebted. 
Lusardi and Tufano (2009) researched a national sample of Americans with 
very low levels of debt literacy, especially among women, elderly, and 
minorities, and a strong correlation between debt literacy and debt loads. 
Also Gerardi et al. (2010) found a significant negative correlation between 
numerical ability and default rates and hence found proof that in fact 
financial literacy has had its role in the subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S. 
Another study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2010, 
17) elucidates that people with limited language skills are more susceptible 
to „fraudulent and predatory practices” than people with better language 
skills. In the light of an earlier GAO study (2006, 46), which states that 
information about fees and rates, in this case for credit cards, are written in 
a complex manner and entail confusing and even conflicting information, 
consumers with low levels of financial literacy must have struggled greatly 
understanding this complex information. Other studies conducted in 
Australia further indicate that low levels of financial literacy are positively 
correlated with being victims of abusive lending practices and unawareness 
of recourse mechanisms and consumer protection regulations (Schetzer 
2007, 51; see also T. Wilson, Howell, and Sheehan 2009). The studies cited 
                                       
61 This assumption makes clear how interconnected financial literacy and consumer 
protection regulations are. If loan prices are not disclosed in an understandable manner, 
even a household knowing its financial in- and outflows cannot judge whether it will be able 
to afford a certain product or not. 
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were all conducted in industrialized countries. Since there is evidence that 
financial literacy is low among the poor in developing countries, there is 
reason that financial literacy problems are even higher in developing than in 
industrialized countries. 
In the following, I turn to the few studies conducted in developing 
countries. Miller et al. cite a 2008 internal working paper of the UK 
Department of International Development (DFID) by Godfrey, reporting that 
60 percent of a survey sample in South Africa did not know what the term 
‘interest’ meant (Miller et al. 2009, 4–5). Similar financial literacy problems 
are reported for Zambia, where more than nearly 70 percent of a survey 
sample had no understanding of basic financial products. There is also 
another interesting Indian case study, reporting that over 50 percent of 
self-employed workers in rural areas stack their cash at home (Shukla 
2010, 83). This alone is not yet a proof of low financial literacy, however 
Miller et al. (2009, 4) discuss the risks of combining stacking cash at home 
with high-interest loan products. Enhancing financial literacy could minimize 
the resulting problems. The authors elaborate that this behavior (i.e. saving 
money at home and taking out high-interest loans) might peak in a 
worsening of the financial situation of a poor household. Keeping money at 
home means having no interest on savings and is further connected to two 
risks. First, savings are in danger of being stolen, and second, savings are 
likely to be spent on avoidable consumables. Hence, saving at home 
combined with high-interest loans might deteriorate the financial situations 
of poor households62. 
This brief review of empirical research reveals that illiteracy, first-time 
contact with financial products, difficulties in comprehension (e.g. lack of 
translation into indigenous languages or dialects), and differing cultural 
backgrounds partly contribute to whether a client slides into over-
indebtedness or not. Therefore, it seems to be crucial to enhance the 
                                       
62 Nevertheless, we must not forget that, even formal MFIs might not all be allowed to 
take savings. So even if a household wanted to save formally, it could not. Also informal 
saving options, such as ROSCAS, might not be available in certain regions. 
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awareness and understanding of financial products. The main question is 
how to reduce these vulnerabilities by means of education? 
As discussed above, financial literacy levels are generally low in 
developing countries. At the same time, struggles with the comprehension 
of financial concepts, budgeting, financial in- and outflows, savings, credit 
but also insurance and money transfer might prove to be highly individual. 
Basically, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to financial literacy issues. 
Keeping that in mind, I present three cases of how the problem of financial 
literacy can be tackled. Case IV is the financial literacy program of SEWA 
Bank operating in India. The Case V concerns a Kenyan educational soap 
opera that is the result of a collaboration between the public and private 
sector. Finally, Case VI introduces digital games, which aim to educate the 
player on the topic of financial services. 
18.1 Case IV: The Financial Literacy Program of 
SEWA Bank 
SEWA Bank is a MFI providing the BoP with microfinance services but also 
with financial education in Ahmedabad, India. They use a client-centered 
approach63 in all their operations. This means that they assume that the 
provision of financial services should be oriented by an in-depth 
understanding of clients’ needs (Kilara and Rhyne 2014, 1; Datar, Epstein, 
and Yuthas 2008, 40; Wardle 2014, 9). Only if the MFI has in-depth 
knowledge about its clients, can it improve their know-how about financial 
products. 
In the following, I argue that collecting in-depth knowledge about a 
client is required on the one hand to figure out what level of financial 
literacy a certain client has and on the other to elaborate whether the client 
needs additional explanation or educational training regarding the products 
she purchases. I describe on what insights SEWA Bank’s financial literacy 
program is based and what it entails. My description follows a presentation 
                                       
63 Please note that recently the term customer-centered or costumer-centricity is used 
interchangeably with the term client-centered. 
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held at the SEBI/OECD International Conference on Investor Education64 
(Vyas 2012). In order to set in place a financial literacy program SEWA 
Bank starts from one main assumption that the financial literacy program of 
SEWA Bank should account for the financial behavior of its clients. They 
presuppose that clients manage their money on a day-to-day basis and take 
impulsive decisions. Furthermore, SEWA Bank realized that most of their 
potential clients think that credit is the accurate product for all their life 
cycle events. Hence, it is key to create a program that focuses on building 
awareness about how to make a budget, plan for the future, what products 
there are, and what life cycle event matches the products. SEWA Bank uses 
different tools to first, assess their clients financial behavior and knowledge 
and second, to build awareness of how important financial planning and 
budgeting is. 
 
Tools to collect in-depth household knowledge 
SEWA Bank relies on in-depth knowledge about their clients’ households. 
Therefore, local staff interviews households in order to find out more about 
the ways they manage their money. SEWA Bank applies different tools to do 
that. Due to the low literacy levels of households, the staff tries to use tools 
that are easy to understand and do not absolutely require the clients to 
read or write. The first tool is similar to the life cycle I introduced in Figure 
1. SEWA Bank shows life cycle events with corresponding pictures, which 
aim to enhance comprehensibility, to the client and they discuss what 
situations she has already encountered and how she managed these 
situations. Did she make use of any microfinance product? And if so, did she 
use the accurate product, for example, a weather insurance to limit the 
damage in case of a flood? Discussing life cycle pictures is helpful to assess 
the understanding the client has about the risks she has faced or will face in 
the future and how likely these events are to happen. The second tool 
consists of a capital formation graph. Local staff asks the potential client to 
report her gains and declines in capital. On the bases of this data, the 
interviewer draws a life-graph displaying the capital formation of the client. 
                                       
64 If not indicated otherwise, the information provided is taken from this presentation. 
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In the exemplary graph (see Figure 5) one can see that while this woman 
was saving for old age needs, her husband died and that put a serious dent 
in the household’s finances. A life-graph is not only helpful to see what lies 
behind but also, and this might go along with looking at possible life cycle 
events, seeing what may lie ahead. If we assumed that the business this 
woman opened in her early twenties still makes profit, the priority would 
probably be to create a plan to again start to save for old age needs. Also 
the focus would be to hedge potential risks, such as health problems, with 
insurance. 
 
Figure 5: Capital Formation Life-Graph (own figure) 
Drawing a life-graph is an easy economical way for SEWA Bank 
personnel to quickly comprehend the struggles the clients have encountered 
in their lives and how they have coped with these life situations so far. 
Clients’ narratives give an idea about their financial knowledge and what 
financial products they have used in which life situation. Furthermore, in 
time a client’s life-graph grows. Staff can continue to record the capital 
formation of the same household within the same life-graph over the time 
the household is with SEWA Bank. Life-graphs are an informative low-cost 
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tool to keep track of the gains and declines of a household, and also help to 
assess in hindsight whether educational measures, such as training in 
budgeting, have proved fruitful. 
 
SEWA Bank’s Financial Literacy Program 
SEWA Bank assumes that financial literacy programs should have three 
cornerstones: financial planning (1), savings (2) and understanding the 
products (3).  
Building awareness regarding the importance of financial planning plays 
a key role in SEWA Bank’s financial literacy endeavors. They normally 
illustrate this with the story of the ant and the grasshopper, which is a fable 
credited to Aesop.  
In a field one summer's day a Grasshopper was hopping about, 
chirping and singing to its heart's content. An Ant passed by, 
bearing along with great toil an ear of corn he was taking to the 
nest. 
„Why not come and chat with me", said the Grasshopper, "instead 
of toiling and moiling in that way?" 
„I am helping to lay up food for the winter," said the Ant, „and 
recommend you to do the same." 
„Why bother about winter?" said the Grasshopper; „we have got 
plenty of food at present." But the Ant went on its way and 
continued its toil. When the winter came the Grasshopper had no 
food and found itself dying of hunger, while it saw the ants 
distributing every day corn and grain from the stores they had 
collected in the summer. Then the Grasshopper knew: It is best to 
prepare for the days of necessity. (Jacobs 1912, 86–87) 
With this short fable, SEWA Bank tries to show that shortsightedness in 
regard to financial planning can have large disadvantages and that it is key 
to plan ahead for hard times. 
Also the role of savings is important in this regard. People are often not 
aware that if they only save a tiny amount every day, these tiny savings 
translate into a lump sum in some years. This cornerstone illustrates SEWA 
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Bank with posters showing pictures of a woman through her life. At the 
beginning she is young and does not need the extra money for medical bills 
but as she grows older these topics gain in importance and the posters 
intend to show this change in needs. Also they show their clients how 
savings can accumulate to lump sums over years by explaining and 
discussing savings plans with their clients. Furthermore, SEWA Bank 
educates clients to discern between avoidable and unavoidable expenses. 
Avoidable would be expenses for items that clients already have and of 
which they do not necessarily need an extra one. Also spending money on 
tobacco, alcohol or gambling is considered avoidable. Unavoidable, 
however, are expenses concerning the client’s and her family’s health or 
education. Again, SEWA Bank uses posters to illustrate the difference 
between avoidable and unavoidable expenses. 
The last point is the comprehension of products. I will not describe all of 
SEWA Bank’s products in detail; nevertheless I briefly touch upon loan, 
insurance and savings products. For the loan products, SEWA Bank focuses 
on explaining the difference between the productive and unproductive use 
of a loan and their loan terms and explain how interest is correctly 
calculated depending on whether the MFI uses flat or declining balance 
interest rates. In general, SEWA Bank’s approach aims to prevent credit 
products being used for all kinds of purposes. As already discussed, credit 
might be used for its stipulated purpose (e.g. business) but might also be 
used for medical bills, tuition fees, or consumables. Educating clients about 
the purposes of its products, SEWA Bank wants to enhance the impact of 
their products. The explanation of insurance products is based on the 
aforementioned concept of the importance of planning ahead and being 
aware of potential risks that might occur in the future. In regard to savings, 
SEWA Bank focuses also on the concept of financial planning for old age 
needs. They, for example, explain the advantages of regular instead of 
irregular savings. Their financial literacy endeavors aim further to explain 
the linkage among different products. Going through possible life events 
with their clients and discussing and explaining, which products are suitable 
for what life situations, serves this purpose. 
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For all educational aims, SEWA Bank makes use of posters, narratives, 
comics, videos, role-plays, and calculations. Which method is used highly 
depends on the level of literacy and comprehension. The overall goal of the 
financial literacy endeavors of SEWA Bank is to help the clients select the 
financial products which match their life situation and understand the 
products they are purchasing. Furthermore, SEWA Bank gains valuable 
insights into how their clients manage their money and with an in-depth 
knowledge about them, they are able to design suitable new products and 
adapt existing ones. The program itself is diverse. SEWA Bank conducts 
camps and training for groups and offers individual counseling. 
SEWA Bank evaluated that the educational tools helped the clients to 
plan ahead, spend their money more consciously and thereby reduce 
avoidable expenses, make use of savings and plan for old age needs. 
Purchases of insurance products increased. However, SEWA Bank also 
reports that changing the mindset of clients is a long-term venture. Despite 
the advantages SEWA Bank registered in providing microfinance clients with 
financial education, it is costly and might not be interesting for other MFIs 
to do. But the financial literacy program turned out to increase the sales of 
financial products and might help to render the program financially 
sustainable in the long run. 
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18.2 Case V: Makutano Junction: A Kenyan Soap 
Opera 
Establishing financial literacy programs is not a strategy that is only 
pursued by MFIs. To the contrary, states and international- and 
transnational organizations establish financial literacy programs that have 
worldwide outreach. One specific example is the creation of a multi-media 
project that originated in Kenya but now is well known in many other 
countries: Makutano Junction. It is a Kenyan TV educational drama series 
that aims to entertain its audience but also disseminates useful information 
about health issues (e.g. malaria prophylaxis, HIV/AIDS), rights and 
responsibilities (e.g. women’s rights awareness) and income generation 
(e.g. microcredit, how to operate a business, money management). 
Thereby the soap opera aims to build capacity for all kinds of life 
situations65. Makutano Junction episodes have over 6.5 million viewers in 
Kenya and other countries. To provide and cover important and pressing 
issues within the soap opera, the producers work closely together with 
NGOs, governments, bilateral donors, scholars and universities. For 2015 
and 2016 the main topics were „tracking education of children, improving 
education in schools through teacher and parent participation, women’s 
empowerment and agribusiness entrepreneurship” (MEDIAE.org 2015)66. 
Disseminating information via mass media is one possibility of reaching 
a large crowd and addressing several issues at the same time. There is no 
study measuring the isolated impact that financial literacy contents of 
Mukatano Junction have on viewers. However, there is evidence of the 
impact mass media has on personal behavior. One of the biggest and 
longest public health campaigns in Egypt, whose cornerstone was a soap 
                                       
65 See http://www.makutanojunction.org.uk/the-soap.html [last accessed 16.02.2016] 
for character profiles and insights on the stories of the different families involved in the soap 
opera Makutano Junction. 
66 Interestingly, Mukatano Junction is recently used in other countries to be part of 
primary and secondary school’s global learning curriculum. The subject of global learning 
includes topics, such as globalization, interconnections between people, cultures and 
countries around the world, social justice, poverty and human rights and aims to reduce 
prejudice towards and explore similarities with people living in developing countries 
(Makutano Junction 2014). 
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opera, enhanced the usage of oral rehydration therapy and diminished child 
mortality rates significantly among viewers (Abdullah 2004). Also other 
studies have shown that media may positively influence individual behavior 
and perceptions. Levy Paluck (2009) provides evidence concerning the 
reduction of intergroup prejudice and conflict by using a radio soap opera in 
Rwanda. 
In regard to the impact of financial literacy content that is weaved into a 
soap opera there are two recent studies stating a significant positive 
relationship between treatment (i.e. seeing the content) and informed 
decision making (Berg and Zia 2013; Bernard et al. 2014). The first study 
by Berg and Zia (2013, 3) included financial education messages into a 
popular South African soap opera that is called ‘Scandal!’. The main 
character slides into over-indebtedness and the story tells how she finds 
help to get out of her debt trap. For two months, the ‘debt-trap’ story lasts 
until she finds herself again in a better social and economic situation. The 
study includes three surveys; two surveys while the storyline is still playing 
out and one survey four months after the last show including the storyline 
was aired. Due to a symmetric encouragement design, the control group 
was incentivized to watch another soap opera airing at the same time as 
‘Scandal!’ but containing no financial education messages and the treatment 
group was incentivized to watch ‘Scandal!’. The results were quite 
astonishing and I present the two most significant results below. Besides 
the fact that 96 percent of the people surveyed actually watched the soap 
operas they were supposed to, the impact of financial education messages 
were very encouraging. The study showed „significant improvements in 
content specific financial knowledge […] and no improvements in knowledge 
of financial concepts that were external to the soap storyline” (Berg and Zia 
2013, 4). Similarly positive were the results of the impact of the ‘high 
interest charges and hidden cost’ content that was central to the storyline. 
The likelihood of the treatment group to refrain from borrowing from private 
moneylenders instead of turning to formal lenders is 22 percent higher than 
before watching the show. The control group had an increase in the 
likelihood of only 13 percent. The storyline also featured a counselor of the 
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South African National Debt Association that helped the main character of 
the soap out of her debt trap. The counselor was only part of the cast for 
this particular storyline and disappeared again afterwards. One interesting 
insight of the survey was that although results kept being significant even 
for the last survey conducted four months after the ending of the storyline, 
there had been one exception. The counselor of the South African National 
Debt Association was only remembered as being part of the show and 
recalled as being employed by this association for the first two rounds of 
the survey. However, for follow-up survey, which was scheduled four 
months after, participants neither remembered the counselor nor the South 
African National Debt Association. Berg and Zia (2013, 24) attribute the 
lacking „emotional connections and familiarities” with the counselor and the 
association for forgetting about their purpose in contrast to characters that 
were present before and after the storyline played out. The second study by 
Bernard et al. (2014) presented similar findings for the case of rural 
Ethiopia. The treatment group watched a one-hour documentary featuring 
different life stories of individuals with similar backgrounds as the treatment 
group participants. The main topic of the documentary was how the 
subjects enhanced their economic status. The leading question was if the 
participants would take the narrators as role models and show a shift in 
their perception of the future (e.g. aspirations) or actual behavior. „We 
found that this intervention changed aspirations, as well as future-oriented 
behavior, namely about saving, use of credit and investment in education, 
six months after the screening” (Bernard et al. 2014, 3). The authors do not 
address the issue of emotional connections and familiarities, nevertheless I 
hypothesize that the length of the treatment in combination with the fact 
that the interview subjects came from a similar background as the 
treatment group, led to a lasting effect. 
In conclusion, mass media is a powerful tool to convey educational 
messages; however, emotions and familiarity with radio or TV personalities 
may play a crucial role, whether the dissemination of these messages 
proves fruitful or not. 
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18.3 Case VI: The Gamification of Financial Literacy 
The most recent innovation to enhance financial literacy is the so-called 
‘gamification’. Using game design techniques to promote services and make 
them more understandable has been designated as ‘gamification’ (Hamari 
2013, 236). So the use of game mechanics in non-game contexts, such as 
health or finances, aims to incentivize individuals to learn something about 
these topics. Finances and financial services are seen as tedious and 
complicated to understand. Teaching the workings of services and how to 
make informed financial decisions via traditional teaching methods might be 
boring for many. However, people normally are interested in and have fun 
solving quizzes and playing games. By putting „game-like actions into 
everyday tasks” gamification enables MFIs to combine the interest of their 
clients to play games with imparting knowledge about finances in general 
and specific financial services (York 2015). Two examples of games that 
aim to improve the financial literacy of people are: 
 
I. ‘Thrive ‘n’ Shine’ is a mobile app game where the player can choose 
an avatar with whom she can pursue different goals and is 
independent regarding the choice of financial services she might want 
to use. The player has to fulfill specific tasks, so-called ‘quests’. If the 
player manages to accomplish a certain number of quests, she is able 
to access the next level, which builds on what she has learned so far. 
The higher the level, the more freedom she will attain to choose from 
different services and the more complex the quests will get. One of 
the main aims of Thrive ‘n’ Shine is to teach the importance of 
savings and seeing the value of saving money to be able to save up 
for old age needs or use savings for unavoidable expenses (York 
2015). 
 
II. Financial Football is a game that might be played on the computer or 
over smart phones and tablets. It is a joint venture of Visa and the 
U.S. National Football League (NFL). Players may choose the team 
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they want to play with and the opponent team. Levels of difficulty 
range from ages 11-14, ages 14-18 and ages 18+. If the multiple-
choice questions, which the player has to answer before every move, 
are answered correctly the player can choose from different football 
formations and is able to move down the field and make touchdowns. 
The player can either play in single player or head to head mode 
(Practical Money Skills for Life 2015a). There are also similar games 
featuring other sports, such as soccer (Practical Money Skills for Life 
2015b). Questions range from „If a girl purchases 10 apps a month 
at $4.95 each, how much per month is she paying total?” (ages 11-
14), „How long does negative financial information (excluding 
bankruptcy) stay on your credit report” (ages 14-18), to „What is 
debt consolidation?” (ages 18+) (Practical Money Skills for Life 
2015b). 
 
Gamification, as it is known in industrialized countries, might not be 
very helpful in enhancing the financial literacy of microfinance clients in 
developing countries at the moment. Evidence shows that internet access is 
strongly linked to income per capita and therefore poorer households are 
often not able to afford internet access or a smart phone (Poushter et al. 
2015, 8). Nevertheless, people are more and more using either cell- or 
smart phones and MFIs find ways of using the phones to educate customers 
about products or general financial topics (Poushter et al. 2015, 17). Absa, 
a South African bank, realized that with the Shesha Game. This game is one 
example of how games working on cell phones can be used in order to 
enhance the usage of a service and to improve the understanding of 
financial concepts. 
 
III. Absa’s Shesha Game is a game that can be played on cell phones. 
Although 50 percent of Absa’s low-income clients enabled mobile 
banking (mainly for checking account balances) over their cell 
phones, they did not use this service. Instead, clients undertook long 
and costly journeys to get to the regional offices to see what their 
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balance was. Absa developed a Shesha Game, Shesha means quick-
quick. Absa sent text messages to the clients inviting them to play 
Shesha. First, the client had to answer questions about her finances 
with the possibility of winning airtime. Second, the client had to use 
her newly gained knowledge and check her account balance. For the 
second part of the game, clients could win a cash prize. Absa 
registered an increase in „balance check activity” of the clients 
participating in the game by 54 percent after two months and by 61 
percent after six months (Coetzee 2015). 
18.4 Interim Conclusion – Financial Literacy 
Endeavors 
Financial literacy of the BoP is low. I shed light on three different 
possibilities to educate the BoP on financial services and thus reduce the 
risks of sliding into over-indebtedness. Case IV served to discuss how MFIs 
could help their clients better understand the specifics of their products. I 
showed that, with low capital expenditure, MFIs can gain in-depth 
knowledge about their clients’ and may take according measures to inform 
them about products. Case V addressed Mukatano Junction, a Kenyan soap 
opera, which is concerned with weaving problems such as money 
management and health issues into the storyline and thereby educate its 
viewers. Case VI talked about gamification and how digital games and 
applications can be used in microfinance. Although the use of smart phones 
and computers is still minimal among the BoP, most microfinance clients 
own cell phones, which MFIs can use to help clients understand financial 
products they offer. I gave two examples of games that can be played on 
computers and smart phones and I presented the example of Absa’s Shesha 
Game, which was developed for use on cell phones. 
Educating microfinance clients can be achieved with different strategies. 
In this chapter, I showed how MFIs singlehandedly or in partnership with 
private actors or state departments aim to improve the financial literacy of 
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the BoP. Although MFIs might not want to also provide financial education 
to their clients in the sense of ‘microfinance plus’ due to the therewith 
connected costs, I showed with the case of SEWA Bank that enhancing 
financial literacy could come at a relatively low cost for MFIs, helps to gain 
in-depth knowledge of the client base to detect risks and locate where there 
is need for improvement, and may even increase the uptake of certain 
products adding to the financial sustainability of the MFI itself. 
In the following chapters, I elaborate on the third pillar of the 
responsible microfinance framework, which concerns soft law standards. 
Analyzing four cases of soft law standards that have a connection to client 
protection and social performance in microfinance, I show how applicable 
these standards are to the responsible microfinance framework and whether 
and to what extent these standards are established in the public interest. 
The leading question of the following chapters is which standards are best 
applicable to microfinance and entail the qualities of a standard, which was 
established in the interest of the thereof affected. In doing so, I evaluate 
the four different standards against the common interest theory presented 
by Mattli and Woods (2009). 
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19 Pillar Three: Soft Law Standards 
Both transnational and international standards usually show characteristics 
of soft law. They are voluntary and represent best practices (Mattli and 
Woods 2009, 3). On the one hand soft law standards aim to be „technically 
competent standards” that help coordinate and define concepts which are 
key in specific economic domains (Richardson and Eberlein 2011, 217). On 
the other hand, and due to the fact that soft law standard-setting 
institutions operate outside the sovereignty of states, they are presented 
with the challenge of how to best establish standards that are nevertheless 
legitimate and even enforceable (Richardson and Eberlein 2011, 217). This 
chapter about soft law standards addresses the common interest regulation 
theory, which aims to understand why some transnational and international 
regulations represent narrow interest as a consequence of regulatory 
capture, while others seem to represent the public interest. These 
theoretical deliberations preceding the four cases I present, addresses the 
problem of how to best establish standards which address key issues in a 
specific economic domain and are in the common interest and therefore 
pursue legitimacy and strive for better enforceability. After having 
introduced the analytical framework of the common interest theory, I 
conduct the analysis of the four cases and categorize them within the 
framework. 
Nye and Keohane (1971, 331) define transnational relations as 
„contacts, coalitions, and interaction across state boundaries that are not 
controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments”. 
Transnational relations that are institutionalized and generate standards 
through certain procedures are called trisectoral policy networks (Risse 
2004, 303), private regulations (Cafaggi 2012; Scott, Cafaggi, and Seden 
2011), transnational regulatory standard-setting institutions (Abbott and 
Snidal 2009b; Abbott and Snidal 2009a), private governance (Lipschutz and 
Rowe 2005; Pattberg 2005), non-state market driven governance (Cashore 
2002), and network governance (Carllson and Sandström 2008). Normally, 
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transnational bodies are multi-stakeholder institutions67 including market, 
government and civil society actors. In contrast, international bodies are 
traditionally state-centered institutions that consist of „formal, continuous 
structures established by agreement between members from two or more 
sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of 
membership” (Archer 2001, 33). 
In regard to both, transnational and international standard-setting, 
scholars repeatedly have addressed the problem of participation. Dahl 
(1999) argues, for example, that IOs are non-democratic. In IOs 
the opportunities available to the ordinary citizen to participate 
effectively in the decision of a world government would diminish to 
the vanishing point (Dahl 1999: 22). […] If it is difficult enough for 
ordinary citizens to exercise much influence over the decisions 
about foreign affairs in their own countries, should we not 
conclude that the obstacles will be far greater in international 
organizations (Dahl 1999, 32)? 
The ‘participation gap’ has been identified and repeatedly addressed in 
publications of the late 1990s (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern 1999; Reinicke et 
al. 2000; Reinicke 1998) that give possible answers to Dahl’s critique. Kaul, 
Grunberg, and Stern (1999, xxix–xxxii) for example discuss the role of 
participation in the realm of the use and management of public goods. The 
authors advocate a novel form of ‘tripartism’68. The claim of improving 
political participation of and deliberation among the stakeholders in regard 
to a certain political issue materializes within the theories of responsive 
regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), hybrid governance (Bäckstrand 
2006a, 471), proceduralization (Black 2000), civil regulation (D. Vogel 
2009), and common interest regulation (Mattli and Woods 2009; Büthe and 
                                       
67 Institutions are here defined as the „entities featuring continuity, longevity, and 
stable contexts for action“ (Goodin, paraphrased in Dryzek 1996, 103). 
68 The form of tripartism Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern propose finds its origins in the 
theory of social corporatism, which attempts to explain that social peace is enabled by giving 
a voice to different actors: The private sector, labor unions and governments cooperating as 
’social partners’ (Katzenstein 1984, 27). Although Ottaway (2001) has deliberated a 
reinvention of corporatism on the transnational and international level, her idea was never 
reconsidered and other theories focusing on the participatory and deliberative elements to 
explain the successful cooperation between the private and public sector, such as the 
theories of hybrid governance or common interest regulation, have been given prominence. 
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Mattli 2011). „The dominant call is to develop procedures and institutional 
structures that will enhance deliberation and enable participation” (Black 
2000, 597–598). All of the theories mentioned above allow for and 
encourage the participation of public and private stakeholders and 
especially emphasize the role of deliberation in order to give an answer to 
the critique of decision-making processes being illegitimate on the 
international and transnational level. Dahl’s critique is further challenged by 
practical evidence. The multi-stakeholder approach of the UN is pursued 
ever since the Rio de Janeiro ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. These summits „have 
emerged as an important arena in which experiments with new forms of 
stakeholder participation have gained prominence” (Bäckstrand 2006b, 469). 
For example Article 71 of the UN Charter stipulates that the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) may consult NGOs on issues falling in ECOSOC’s 
competencies (United Nations 1945).  
According to Dahl (1999, 33) democratic elements are very unlikely to 
occur in „bureaucratic bargaining systems”. „Even if the threshold is pretty 
hazy, I want to argue that international systems will lie below any 
reasonable threshold of democracy” (Dahl 1999, 22). Rightfully, Dahl claims 
that ceteris paribus possibilities to partake in decision-making in small 
democracies are greater than in larger democracies, let alone IOs. However, 
in a highly politicized sphere dominated by bargaining national states, it 
was, for example, possible for the first time that a „normative text [the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights] that governments did not 
negotiate themselves” was approved (Ruggie 2013, xx). But most 
importantly and also for the first time, intensive and myriad consultations 
preceded this norm-setting process. Ruggie and his team of researchers 
created a precedent making use of this approach.  
Arguing that the example of how the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights came about would negate Dahl’s claim of international IOs 
being non-democratic would stretch a point. Nevertheless, I would like to 
accentuate the fact that the mandate of operationalizing and endorsing the 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy framework’, which is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 19.3, did include intense consultations with a wide array of 
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stakeholders: experts, affected individuals, companies, NGOs, workers’ 
organizations and so on and so forth (Ruggie 2013, xx). Theories, such as 
the common interest regulation, try to explain why it is important to include 
a diverse set of stakeholders into standard-setting processes to enhance 
legitimacy and potential enforceability in the transnational and international 
realm. 
In the following, I first elaborate on the common interest69 regulation 
theory Mattli and Woods (2009) present. They define common interest 
regulation as a proceduralist concept: A regulation is in the „public interest 
if it is arrived at through a deliberative process that allows everyone likely 
to be affected by it to have a voice in its formation” (Mattli and Woods 
2009, 13–14). Second, I evaluate the four hard cases, which are either 
directly connected to soft law client protection and social performance 
standards in microfinance or are addressing the issue of general corporate 
responsibility towards consumers. 
19.1 The Analytical Framework of Common Interest 
Regulation 
Mattli and Woods (2009, 4) present a theoretical framework that tries to 
answer the question why some transnational and international regulations 
„entrench narrow interests” as a consequence of regulatory capture, while 
others realize „broader public purposes” (i.e. common interest). ‘Regulatory 
capture’ „is the control of the regulatory process by those whom it is 
supposed to regulate or by a narrow subset of those affected by regulation, 
with the consequence that regulatory outcomes favor the narrow ‘few’ at 
the expenses of society as a whole” (Mattli and Woods 2009, 12). Defining 
‘public interest’ is more complicated since there are differing definitions 
(Downs 1962, 11; Schubert 1960). Mattli and Woods (2009, 13–14) 
attribute the different uses of ‘the public interest’ to three schools of 
thought: Idealists define public interest as the line of action which serves 
                                       
69 Common interest is hereafter used interchangeably with public interest. 
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society as a whole. In order to do that, governments apply an „absolute 
standard of values“, such as welfare economics use standards of economic 
efficiency but these do not have to meet the actual desires of society 
(Downs 1962, 11). Rejectionists believe that there is no public interest, due 
to the fact that they presuppose only individual actors and interest groups; 
however, neither society nor the community as a whole partake. The 
proceduralists start from the assumption that public interest is connected to 
the regulatory process itself. So „the public interest is defined by the 
interest process” (Cochran 1974, 342). This interest process has to be 
deliberate, so all the parties that are likely to be affected by a certain 
regulation have the opportunity to voice their views and thereby influence 
its formation. The acceptance of a regulatory outcome is more likely if the 
stakeholders see the procedures as suitable to provide them with the ability 
to voice their opinion, even if the regulation does not turn out in their favor 
in the end (Mattli and Woods 2009, 14; Esty 2006, 1511). 
Mattli and Woods take on the proceduralists view but they refine the 
analytical framework further. They argue that welfare economists, who are 
here subsumed under the idealist school taking economic efficiency as a 
benchmark for regulating, wrongfully assume that the state will always 
effectively eliminate deficiencies through regulations. Proceduralists on the 
other hand account for the ever-changing institutional context within which 
regulations are established. They propose a thorough assessment of the 
institutional context and the procedures connected therewith that establish 
regulations in order to see to what extent the public interest is reflected. 
However, proceduralists rely on the hypothesis that putting due process 
institutions into being necessarily eventuates in regulations that reflect the 
public interest. Mattli and Woods (2009, 15) claim that „proper institutional 
supply needs to be met by robust societal demand (from the public and 
private sectors alike) for common interest regulation to emerge”. 
As Mattli and Woods criticize the proceduralist approach, public interest 
regulations will not automatically be triggered by institutional supply 
including due process channels. People might be uninformed about 
regulations that affect them regardless of them being greatly or only faintly 
  157 
impacted. In comparison to non-state actors, which gained importance and 
power in shaping transnational and international standards in the past 
decades, individual members of society are likely to get lost and miss the 
chance to voice their opinions. This, however, would miss the mark of public 
interest regulations. Mattli and Woods (2009, 15) fear that without a „broad 
societal demand, industry and other concentrated groups targeted for 
regulation may be the most frequent users of due process channels”. Hence, 
regulatory outcomes cannot only be considered in the public interest when 
the institutional possibilities of participating in the regulatory process are 
extensive. There has to be also a broad societal demand for regulations. 
Mattli and Woods (2009, 16) understand societal demand for establishing 
regulations or changing regulations as a function of information, interests 
and ideas. Their analytical framework accounts thus for the gap in the 
proceduralists’ approach and includes not only an institutional supply but 
also a societal demand dimension. 
Mattli and Woods’ (2009, 12) analytical framework explains the differing 
outcomes of „the politics of global regulation […] ranging from pure capture 
regulation to common interest regulation”. They conceptualize ’institutional 
supply’ as having two possible characteristics: limited or extensive. The 
same applies for the ‘demand side’ of a regulation, which can either be 
limited and narrow or broad and sustained. As illustrated in Figure 6, 
depending on the combination, regulations are either pure capture 
regulations (C), de facto capture regulations (D), capture regulations but 
with concessions and compromises (A), or common interest regulations (B). 
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Figure 6: Regulatory Outcomes (adapted from Mattli and Woods 2009, 16) 
Let me further illustrate the possible regulatory outcomes in their analytical 
framework. Information asymmetries and different levels in financial capital 
and expert knowledge among stakeholders may result in de facto capture 
regulation, even if all parties had access to influence the formation of a 
regulation. Powerful non-state actors are equipped with the necessary 
resources, capacity and expertise to bias the regulation in their favor and 
thereby further their narrow interest (‘the haves’) to the disadvantage of 
the public broader interests (‘the have-nots’). Although originally the 
institutional design may have aimed to privilege the broader interests, it 
resulted in privileging the narrow interest of the biggest players (see D, 
Figure 6). Pure capture regulation is attained if institutional supply and 
demand is limited. The most powerful stakeholders will be able to push their 
interests through and the institutional context, which is closed and exclusive, 
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will facilitate total capture (see C, Figure 6). The opposite case, where the 
institutional supply is extensive and the societal demand is broadly 
supported, creates common interest regulation (see B, Figure 6). 
Nevertheless, even with the broadest demand for changing the regulatory 
status quo, if the possibilities to participate in the formation of the 
regulation are limited, the most powerful players will, ideally, account for 
the public interest in the form of concessions and compromises. This is 
however only the case if the societal demand is demonstrated in such a way 
that naming and shaming of particular actors, or other pinpricking 
strategies, result in forcing the more powerful players to make compromises 
and concessions in the regulatory formation process (see A, Figure 6). 
Common interest regulation theory could make a valuable contribution 
in evaluating the four practical cases of transnational and international soft 
law standards and help assess in which category they fall. The analytical 
framework presented hereinafter provides an instrument to evaluate 
whether the four soft law standards are in the public interest or not. The 
proposed explaining variables in the analytical framework of common 
interest regulation theory are the extent of institutional supply and societal 
demand. 
19.1.1 Institutional Supply-Side Conditions 
Regulatory entities differ greatly in regard to their transparency, openness, 
participation and accountability. Mattli and Woods (2009) argue that only if 
deliberative mechanisms are included in the regulatory process, which 
passes five stages (i.e. agenda-setting, negotiation of standards, 
implementation monitoring, enforcement) (Abbott and Snidal 2009b, 46), is 
the regulation legitimate and all stakeholders 
accept outcomes as being in the public interest as long as they feel 
that existing procedures of consultation and involvement offer 
them a fair chance to put their views across and influence 
regulation in their own favor, even if they are not always 
successful. Proper due process mechanisms are said to produce 
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regulation most likely to benefit most in society. (Mattli and Woods 
2009, 14) 
Acceptance and acceptability of a current social and political order is how 
legitimacy is conceived here (Hurd 1999, 381). This conception of 
legitimacy includes an „empirical measure of legitimacy (acceptance of a 
rule or institution as authoritative) and a normative argument concerning 
whether the authority possesses legitimacy (providing reasons that justify 
it)“ (Bernstein 2005, 142). 
One way of political science and theory to think about legitimacy is 
through the concepts of input- throughput- and output legitimacy. The 
normative concepts of input-, throughput- and output legitimacy originated 
in the works of Scharpf (1970; 1997; 1999) and capture „Lincoln’s famous 
dictum about democracy requiring government by the people (political 
participation), of the people (citizen representation) and for the people 
(governing effectiveness)” (Schmidt 2013, 4). The conception of legitimacy 
as input-, throughput- and output is comprehensive but yet demanding 
when thinking about applying this framework in the international let alone 
the transnational sphere of standard-setting institutions. Rules are drafted, 
implemented, monitored, and enforced within the institutional structure that 
is charged with forming the regulation. As presented in Figure 6 the 
institutional supply may be extensive and therefore characterized by „open 
forums, proper due process, multiple access points, and oversight 
mechanisms”, or it might be limited and therefore possibilities of 
participating in regulatory formation is „exclusive, closed, and secretive” 
(Mattli and Woods 2009, 17). 
As addressed before, international and transnational rule making is 
described as increasingly opening-up to and already applying various forms 
of participation from non-state actors, such as NGOs, companies, and 
individuals. Mattli and Woods (2009, 19) evaluate the power of the 
formation of regulations by including many stakeholders as potentially 
strong. However, they assume the positive evaluation of rule-making on an 
international level, as especially brought forward by legal scholars, as 
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overstated70. The mere provision of institutionalized processes to impact 
rule-making does not automatically translate into a demand to use these 
participation channels. The authors argue that supplying deliberative 
mechanisms within a rule-making process is necessary yet not sufficient to 
assume that the regulatory outcome reflects common interest. They present 
four weaknesses of an analytical framework, which only focuses on 
institutional supply of participatory channels. First, including non-state 
actors in rule-making processes may be beneficial for the regulation to be in 
the public interest but is not a guarantor for it. Due to asymmetries in 
resources and information, big players may be able to bias regulations in 
their favor and therefore enhance capture. Second, frequently only the rule-
making process is open for many; however, how to manage implementation 
and enforcement is often the task of an exclusive few. Thus, the regulatory 
process is still vulnerable to capture. Third, in most cases of international 
and transnational forums we lack an overarching sovereign institution. 
National systems have legislatives, and other actors (e.g. review boards, 
inspectors, whistle blowers), which hold regulators responsible for their 
conduct. This problem is not overly severe in IOs, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), where organizations are mostly controlled by states and therefore 
can be held responsible for their conduct. The picture is different for 
transnational organizations, which are composed by mostly non-state 
actors. Although many stakeholders may be able to participate in the rule-
making process, this is usually not the case for the implementation and the 
enforcement phase, which is usually led by a club of actors. Actors that are 
engaged with transnational regulatory processes are not subject to many 
constraints in the implementation and enforcement phase due to the 
emphasis on participation in the rule-making process (see Table 3 in Grant 
and Keohane 2005, 40). These institutions traditionally lack an oversight 
body, which holds the key actors in the implementation and enforcement 
                                       
70 Kingsbury et al. (2005, 4), for example, describe the procedure of including open 
forums and the like in the regulatory formation process as a general trend, however do not 
account for capture that might be prevailing despite the existence of possibilities to 
participate. 
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phase responsible for their conduct. Fourth and as mentioned above, the 
mere existence of an institutional context, which allows for participation, 
does not automatically translate into great demand from society to voice 
there opinions through these channels. Providing the institutional context to 
enable broad access during the regulatory processes (i.e. agenda-setting, 
implementation, monitoring, enforcement) is a necessary condition to 
render common interest regulation attainable. However, also demand-side 
conditions have to be met in order to empower the public to actually 
participate. 
19.1.2 Societal Demand-Side Conditions 
Why are demand-side conditions important for international and 
transnational regulations to be in the common interest? Matters which are 
regulated on a global level are further away from the public eye than 
national ones. Gathering information about planned regulations and 
shortcomings of existing regulations is costly, and without opportune 
information stakeholders might surrender first-mover advantages to a 
comparatively more powerful stakeholder (Mattli and Büthe 2003, 4). In 
order to have a significant impact on the regulatory process, actors must be 
equipped with know-how and financial resources, which are usually the 
privileges of the more powerful players (Mattli and Büthe 2005, 242). This 
results in a few having the power to collect the information needed and the 
resources to induce regulatory change in their favor, irrespective of how the 
institutional supply-side is positioned (i.e limited or extensive). 
How then have the demand-side conditions to be set in order to 
facilitate effective participation of a broad range of societal groups and 
enhance their willingness to do so? What variables explain the variation 
from a narrow and limited to a broad and sustained demand for regulatory 
change in society? Mattli and Woods present three demand-side conditions 
that have to be fulfilled: information, interests, and ideas. 
Information 
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The dissemination of information is able to provide society with knowledge 
about the costs of regulatory capture and motivate societal groups to act for 
change (Mattli and Woods 2009, 21). In times of crises, scandal or 
environmental disasters, information is key to detect the „extent of failings, 
abuse, or incompetence of regulators” (Mattli and Woods 2009, 22). Mass 
media and the internet may boost these demonstration effects further and 
may show the public „negative externalities of no or poor regulation” and 
motivate change (Mattli and Woods 2009, 4). By revealing the cost of 
capture to the broader public, information triggers a demand for regulatory 
change in society, whereas the demand for change rises with the severity of 
the externality (Mattli and Woods 2009, 26). Information is therefore the 
first indicator reducing the vulnerability to capture and enabling common 
interest regulation. 
 
Interest 
Converging interests play a vital role in regulatory processes. If regulatory 
failure occurs, the public requires pro-change forces that conflate their 
interests (Mattli and Woods 2009, 21). This is especially important because 
to sustainably impact and change regulation, the so-called entrepreneurs of 
regulatory change have to be active throughout the whole regulatory 
processes, which is lengthy and includes agenda-setting, negotiating 
standards, and implementing, monitoring and enforcing them (Mattli and 
Woods 2009, 26, 28). Entrepreneurs for regulatory change might be of 
private or public character. Mattli and Woods differentiate between 
nongovernmental, public official and private sector entrepreneurs (2009, 
28). Nongovernmental entrepreneurs traditionally have the role of 
watchdogs and are engaged in pointing a finger at regulatory failure and 
mobilizing support in the formation of new regulation, which privileges the 
public interest (Vogel 2009, 153). However, NGOs need allies to effectively 
urge regulatory change, since they often lack financial resources to change 
regulations single handedly (Mattli and Woods 2009, 29). Although public 
officials, ranging from legislators to experts of special agencies, are seen as 
being vulnerable to capture the authors argue that if officials use their 
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authority to further public interest, as for example John Ruggie as a UN 
special representative did in the case of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, they may play a crucial role in impacting 
regulations into the common interest direction (Mattli and Woods 2009, 32). 
There are at least four types of private sector entrepreneurs, which all have 
different motivations to engage in changing regulations. Corporate 
consumers buy regulated goods and services. If these goods and services 
are subject to capture regulation, corporate consumers are put at a 
disadvantage and will be motivated to change these regulations. Corporate 
newcomers often face hurdles to enter markets which are controlled by 
already established companies. Newcomers have therefore an incentive to 
oppose the regulatory status quo. Corporations at risk are also an important 
actor when it comes to regulatory change. Companies facing financial 
difficulties have an extra strong motivation to induce regulatory change if 
this change ensures economic survival. Further, corporate leveler of the 
playing field suffer from constraints because they are subject to stricter 
regulations than other players elsewhere. These companies have an 
incentive to change regulation in such a way that all corporations should 
abide by these rules. This especially applies to companies operating on a 
global scale. European corporations, for example, face stricter rules in 
regard to environmental improvement than their Asian or American 
counterparts (Mattli and Woods 2009, 28–35). The entrepreneurs of 
regulatory change introduced above have special knowledge about their 
field of operation and how regulation should be adapted in this regard. 
Private-sector but also specialized official actors have the potential to 
change regulation in the public interest. 
 
Ideas 
Walking in the same direction concerning the goals of regulatory change 
and shared ideas are key. Demonstration effects question prevailing ideas, 
values and ideologies. They challenge the status quo and the legitimacy of 
existing regulations, which opens up room for other ideas to arise (Mattli 
and Woods 2009, 36–37). Shared sets of ideas ideally provide a common 
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ground to effectively urge change and act as glue to build coalitions 
between different entrepreneurs of regulatory change (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993, 12, 17; Mattli and Woods 2009, 21). Mattli and Woods 
conclude that 
the set of ideas most likely to triumph after a crisis is not only that 
which best expresses the interest of powerful entrepreneurs and a 
coalition to form, but that which fits most easily into existing and 
not discredited institutions and mechanisms, representing the 
smallest step into the unknown. (Mattli and Woods 2009, 39) 
In the following, I present four hard cases, which are concerned with 
corporate responsibility in general, and client protection and social 
performance in microfinance. All of the cases include at least some 
possibilities for stakeholder participation. These cases contrast the 
viewpoints of skeptics bringing forward the argument of a legitimacy deficit 
in international and transnational organizations. Two of them fall into the 
category of standards set by state-centered bodies with allowance to 
consult with a diverse set of stakeholders (Case VII and VIII). The other 
two cases presented are hard cases due to their specificity to setting 
exclusively client protection and social performance standards in 
microfinance with the help of extensive stakeholder involvement (Case IX 
and X). The scope of this research project and the problem of availability of 
data does not allow for a conclusive discussion of the four cases, however 
the cases will be discussed in as much detail as possible. If there was a lack 
of data concerning certain points, I indicate them as such. The analysis of 
the institutional supply-side conditions are summarized in Chapter 19.7 
(Tables 1 to 4) and the results from the societal demand-side conditions 
analysis are presented in Chapter 19.8. The categorization within the 
analytical framework and the discussion of the applicability of the cases to 
the multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance are discussed 
in Chapter 19.9 and Chapter 19.10. 
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19.2 Case VII: UN Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection: Financial Services Chapter 
In 1981, ECOSOC passed a resolution which requested the UN Secretary-
General to work towards establishing a set of consumer protection 
guidelines addressed to member countries. The resolution requested the 
Secretary-General to especially factor in the needs of the developing 
countries. ECOSOC was presented with a first set of consumer protection 
guidelines in 1983 and they were adopted by a consensus resolution of the 
UN General Assembly in 1985 (UN General Assembly 1985). The guidelines 
were first revised in 1999 when a new chapter on sustainable consumption 
was added (ECOSOC 1999). The guidelines include building blocks of 
consumer protection systems which further economic, environmental and 
social goals, such as protecting consumers from malpractice and hazardous 
products, promoting sustainable consumption and securing access to basic 
needs products (e.g. water, food, health services), and accessing remedies 
(e.g. dispute resolution, redress) (UNDESA 2003). The 1999 set of 
guidelines went through another critical phase of revision from 2012 
onwards. 
The revised guidelines of 1999 lacked factoring in the newest insights 
about consumer protection and did not mirror the current situation of 
consumer protection in UN member countries (UNCTAD 2012). Starting in 
2012 member countries, NGOs, and advocacy organizations were asked to 
hand in inputs and comments on how to revise the guidelines. The 
document inviting member states and international organizations to 
comment on the existing UN guidelines for Consumer Protection states:  
In order for these Guidelines to continue to provide an important 
framework, a number of areas have been identified for their 
improvement. Firstly, […] their content does not reflect the issues 
covered in […] contemporary consumer protection laws and 
policies. Secondly, their scope of application does not correspond 
with the usual powers of modern consumer protection authorities. 
Thirdly, the Guidelines are not backed by a state-of-the-art 
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compilation of the best practices and common trends in the field of 
consumer protection. (UNCTAD 2012, 1) 
In 2013, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) issued a draft including all feedbacks71 from member countries, 
NGOs and international consumer organizations. Out of 47, 12 contributions 
were from consumer organizations and NGOs, the others were either from 
states or state-centered institutions (i.e. OECD, EU). Several expert groups 
were formed and meetings were conducted to determine key areas that 
should be included into the revised principles (i.e. e-commerce, financial 
services, data protection) or that needed further consideration before 
including them (i.e. data protection, misleading advertising, energy, cross-
border trade, transport, universal services, access to knowledge, tourism, 
class actions, and housing) (UNCTAD 2014, 1). The second expert group 
meeting held in July 2013, for example, focused on implementation issues 
and argued unanimously in favor of international implementation and 
monitoring mechanisms. 
All experts agree that there is a need for international 
implementation or monitoring mechanisms. Following proposals 
expressed earlier, the questionnaire proposed a hypothetical UN 
Commission or the creation of an intergovernmental structure on 
consumer protection within UNCTAD. 
[…] Regardless of the institutional structure, experts called for the 
creation of an international body to undertake the following 
activities: reports on consumer rights; consumer law and policy 
reforms; reports on national compliance with UNGCP; exchange of 
best practices and common actions; and development of common 
policies. According to some experts, this body should be 
independent, concerned solely with consumer issues, and 
proactive in policy recommendations. (UNCTAD 2015a, §84) 
Furthermore, four working groups with the following national leaders have 
been formed: e-commerce (France), financial services (Malaysia), other 
                                       
71For a complete list of the contributions, please see http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ 
DITC/CompetitionLaw/UN-Guidelines-on-Consumer-Protection.aspx [last accessed 
12.12.2015]. 
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issues (Brazil and Germany) and Implementation of the principles (Gabon) 
have been formed (UNCTAD 2015a, 5). 
As of the beginning of July 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
revised Guidelines for Consumer Protection, the main adjustments being 
two new chapters addressing topics of e-commerce (chapter I.) and 
financial services (chapter J.) and the creation of an intergovernmental 
group of experts on Consumer Protection Law and Policy72 (UN General 
Assembly 2015, §44, §97). How the feedback of member states, IOs and 
NGOs influenced the ‘tone’ and vigor of the document becomes visible in a 
document of UNCTAD highlighting the adjustments before and after the 
revision (UNCTAD 2015b). This vigor finds, for example, expression in 
Article 66 of the financial services chapter J. that is of special interest here. 
Including the corrections, it reads as follows: „Member States should [work 
towards] establish[ing] or encourage[ing], as appropriate”. The main 
cornerstones of the financial services chapter (see Art. 66 to 68) are that 
member states should establish or encourage 
66. (a) financial consumer protection regulatory and enforcement 
policies; 
(b) oversight bodies with the necessary authority and 
resources to carry out their mission […]; 
(e) fair treatment and proper disclosure [including all fees], 
ensuring that financial institutions are also responsible and 
accountable for the actions of their authorized agents. […]; 
(f) responsible business conduct by financial services providers 
and authorized agents, including responsible lending and the 
sale of products that are suitable to the consumer’s needs and 
means; 
(g) appropriate controls to protect consumer financial data, 
including from fraud and abuse […]; 
67. Member States should adopt measures to reinforce and 
integrate consumer policies concerning financial inclusion, 
                                       
72 Despite two NGOs voted against establishing an intergovernmental structure and 
instead favored a UN commission in the expert group meeting in July 2013, the UN General 
Assembly Resolution featured an intergovernmental body of experts (UNCTAD 2015a, §84). 
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financial education and the protection of consumers in 
accessing and using financial services; 
68. Member States may wish to consider relevant international 
guidelines and standards on financial services and their 
revisions thereon, and, where appropriate, adapt those 
guidelines and standards […], as well as collaborate with other 
Member States in their implementation across borders. 
(UNCTAD 2015b, Art. 66–68) 
While the Guidelines for Consumer Protection are not obligatory, they 
have marked a milestone as a normative and soft law document to further 
and enhance consumer protection on an international level. Furthermore 
and despite its soft law character, the UN Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection significantly influenced consumer protection policies in numerous 
countries (ECOSOC 1995; see also UN Secretary-General 1993). 
The UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection do not only address the 
rights consumers have but furthermore emphasize the duty member states 
have to fulfill, establish and encourage the claims and policy propositions 
featured in these consumer protection guidelines (see also Benöhr 2013, 
103). This shows the emphasis the UNCTAD wanted to convey with their 
revision of the guidelines and the amended wording mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, the intergovernmental expert group on Consumer Protection 
Law and Policy and its subsidiary institutions mandated to help the 
endorsement of the guidelines are not allowed to, in any way, „pass 
judgment on the activities or conduct of individual Member States or of 
individual enterprises in connection with a specific business transaction” (UN 
General Assembly 2015, §98). Hence, the implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms of the Guidelines for Consumer Protection are still in the hands 
of the member states and are prone to capture. 
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19.3 Case VIII: UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights regulate the roles 
businesses and governments take in facilitating the affirmation that 
companies respect human rights73 in their operations and throughout their 
business relationships. A team led by Professor John Ruggie established the 
principles. The UN Secretary General appointed him Special Representative 
for Business and Human Rights in 2005. He first proposed a UN ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ Framework to the UN Human Rights Council in 2008. 
This framework is based on three pillars: 
1. the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including business entreprises, through appropriate 
policies, regulation, and adjudication; 
2. an independent corporate responsibility to respect human rights, 
which means that business entreprises should act with due 
diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and address 
adverse impacts with which they are involved; 
3. the need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both 
judicial and nonjudicial. (Ruggie 2013: xx-xxi) 
After his proposition, the Human Rights Council extended Ruggie’s mandate 
for another three years. He was instructed to operationalize and endorse 
the framework. In 2011, Ruggie and his team presented a set of principles 
within the report „Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework”. The framework includes foundational and operational 
principles for states’ duty to protect human rights and corporations’ 
responsibility to respect human rights. Furthermore, it structures how 
states and corporations alike should ensure that those affected have ‘access 
                                       
73 The human rights addressed by the principles are the International Bill of Human 
Rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with its „instruments through 
which it has been codified” (i.e. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), and the eight core 
conventions of the ILO (OHCHR 2011, 14; see also UN General Assembly 1966b; UN General 
Assembly 1966a; UN General Assembly 1948; ILO 2003) 
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to remedy’ (OHCHR 2011, 27–35). In the following, I briefly address some 
of the responsibilities corporations have in regard to respecting human 
rights. Principle 11 entails the core demand that corporations „should 
respect human rights […] wherever they operate” and applies regardless of 
the „states’ abilities or willingness to fulfill their own human rights 
obligations” (OHCHR 2011, 13). Principle 13 (b) states further that 
corporations have a responsibility to „prevent or mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations”. Although it is 
acknowledged that SMEs may struggle to meet all the requirements of the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights due to less capacities, and 
more informal procedures and management than bigger corporations, also 
SMEs can cause adverse human rights impacts and are equally responsible 
for their conduct (Principle 14) (OHCHR 2011, 14–15). 
Establishing the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
included intense consultations with a diverse set of stakeholders, such as 
experts, affected individuals, companies, NGOs, and workers’ organizations 
(Ruggie 2013, xx). At the presentation of the report in May 2011 in Geneva, 
Ruggie talked about methods they used to inform the Guiding Principles 
with opinions and voices from diverse stakeholders. 
With help from all stakeholder groups, the mandate convened 47 
international consultations, on every continent. Members of my 
team and I made more than 20 site visits to business operations 
and communities, learning from the diverse experiences of 
affected individuals and groups, local leaders, civil society and 
company representatives. […] Finally, the draft Guiding Principles I 
released last November were thoroughly vetted by governments in 
an informal council consultation and in written submissions, while 
an online consultation attracted comments and suggestions from 
individuals and institutions in more than 120 countries. (Ruggie 
2011: 5) 
The support for the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is 
widespread and the public and private sector endorse the principles. 
Although the support is extensive, there is ongoing criticism that the 
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principles leave loopholes and are too flexible in their interpretation. In the 
following, I touch upon the two main critiques the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights face. The first point concerns a discussion, 
which revolved around the question of whether corporations should ‘only’ 
have the responsibility to implement the principles or have a duty to do so 
(Bilchitz 2009, 8). The second point concerns the critique that the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights would require an 
oversight mechanism to check whether member states and corporations 
comply with the guiding principles (Bader 2012, 8). 
 
Corporations’ Responsibility to abide by the Guiding Principles 
In contrast to the understanding of responsibility I brought forward in 
Chapter 14, Ruggie clearly differs between responsibility and duty. Ruggie 
refers to state obligations as duties and to corporation obligations as 
responsibilities. He understands states’ duties as hard law and corporations’ 
responsibilities as the consequence of the public’s expectations. 
In addition to compliance with national laws, the baseline 
responsibility of companies is to respect human rights. Failure to 
meet this responsibility can subject companies to the courts of 
public opinion - comprising employees, communities, consumers, 
civil society, as well as investors - and occasionally to charges in 
actual courts. Whereas governments define the scope of legal 
compliance, the broader scope of the responsibility to respect is 
defined by social expectations - as part of what is sometimes 
called a company’s social license to operate. (Ruggie 2008, §54) 
This goes along with the understanding Lane (2005, 233) portrayed three 
years earlier: „Accountability in its fullest sense can only be demanded of 
corporations by and through the law”, if this is not possible the „call for 
‘corporate accountability’ sometimes appeals instead to a vaguer notion of 
informal social – rather than legal – accountability”74. In this scenario, the 
public takes on the role of the state and substitutionally demands the 
corporations to abide by human rights. Conditioning the responsibility of 
                                       
74 Accountability is here to be understood as responsibility. 
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corporations to abide by human rights on social expectations though raises 
yet another issue that is taken up by Bilchitz (2009, 45). He gives the 
example of a country that has been ruled by a dictator for several years. In 
this case, society’s expectations regarding companies which enhance their 
abidance by human rights might be very low. Furthermore, societies will not 
have the necessary information to even detect such human rights 
violations. Hence, basing the argument that companies will take their 
responsibility to respect human rights on social expectations might 
reproduce the status quo and hence human rights violations. Bilchitz (2009, 
8) claims that respect is too low a standard, and although the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights have managed to find a „global 
consensus, Ruggie’s framework goes too far in sacrificing principle for the 
purposes of achieving agreement”. 
 
Lacking of an Oversight Mechanism 
The lack of an oversight mechanism for the guiding principles is the second 
point that received a lot of criticism (Bader 2012, 8). Such a mechanism 
could render the soft law principles enforceable and therefore considerably 
harden them. The debate about the criticized soft law character of the 
guiding principles was fueled in late 2013 when several states and two 
regional country organizations75, led by Ecuador, suggested introducing a 
binding legal instrument for corporations (Ecuador Resolution 2013; Treaty 
Alliance 2015). Also over 140 NGOs supported this request and issued a 
joint statement demanding the UN Human Rights Council takes steps to 
draft such an instrument. From 2013 to December 2015 more than 400 
organizations signed the joint statement (Treaty Alliance 2015). Due to 
these developments, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights embodies the most promising global human rights framework to be 
rendered binding for corporations. Resolution 26/9 adopted by the UN 
                                       
75 The following countries called on the UN Human Rights Council: Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, the Arab League, and the 
African Group (Treaty Alliance 2015). 
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General Assembly shows the determination of the UN to establish such a 
mechanism76: 
The Human Rights Council, […] 
1. Decides to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working 
group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with respect to human rights; whose mandate shall be to elaborate 
an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in 
international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises;  
2. Also decides that the first two sessions of the open-ended 
intergovernmental working group shall be dedicated to conducting 
constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form 
of the future international instrument, in this regard[.] (UN 
General Assembly 2014, 2) 
The first draft report of the open-ended intergovernmental working 
group on transnational corporations and other enterprises with respect to 
human rights that was issued in July 2015 resonates with the criticism 
brought forward above. The report summarizes the contributions of the 
panelists, state delegations and NGOs present for the first session of the 
working group. A majority of the delegations emphasized that the UN 
Guiding Principles are too intangible regarding the language used for the 
responsibilities of corporations. They add for consideration that if the treaty 
should be binding, it has to go beyond corporate responsibility. The treaty 
should therefore include a „direct obligation to prevent, mitigate and 
redress the human rights abuses occasioned by their operations” (Garcés 
2015, §72). With this strategy „pick and choose approach[es]” in regard to 
respecting human rights selectively by corporations could also be prevented 
(Garcés 2015, §68). The issue of a lacking enforcement mechanism is 
                                       
76 Countries that voted in favor: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela, and Vietnam; countries that voted against: 
Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, South 
Korea, Romania, Macedonia, the UK, and the United States of America; countries that 
abstained: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, Mexico, 
Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and the United Arab Emirates (UN General Assembly 2014, 
3). 
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especially connected to the problem of differing domestic legal systems that 
allow for inequalities. A few delegates stated that domestic possibilities to 
file a suit in regard to human rights abuses committed by corporations were 
„patchy, unpredictable and ineffective” (Garcés 2015, §88). Several NGOs 
advocated an overarching enforcement mechanism, such as a „committee 
for compliance oversight” or a „world court or tribunal”, to complement 
domestic and regional ones (Garcés 2015, §89). Finally, most non-
governmental organizations noted that a binding treaty could fill in gaps of 
the guiding principles (Garcés 2015, §73). This however, would presuppose 
the second pillar of the UN Guiding Principles, namely that there is an 
independent corporate responsibility to respect human rights, to be well 
defined. One panelist77 argued „responsibility under international human 
rights law entails legal accountability and legal duty. However, 
‘responsibility’ as used under the second pillar of the UN Guiding Principles 
does not reflect this understanding” (Garcés 2015, §69). If the object of 
this treaty is to represent a binding instrument, there has to be a clear 
definition of what responsibility means or at least there has to be a common 
understanding of the meaning of responsibility among the parties (Garcés 
2015, §53, §55, §69). Connected to this, there is another definitional issue 
concerning the type of human rights enforceable within this binding treaty. 
This is of special importance because it is affecting whether the UN Guiding 
Principles could be applicable to the context of the framework of responsible 
microfinance. The scope of human rights that will be included in the binding 
treaty is key to whether the framework of responsible microfinance can 
benefit from it. As of the current state of affairs most panelist, delegations 
and NGOs are favoring a non-limitation approach, meaning that all human 
rights are subject to the treaty and not only gross human rights violations78 
(Garcés 2015, §56, §57). 
                                       
77 For the list of all panelist, please see Garcés (2015, Annex II) 
78 Limiting the scope could again set incentives to selectively abide by some human 
rights (Garcés 2015, §56). 
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19.4 Case IX: Smart Campaign’s Client Protection 
Principles and Certification Program 
Smart Campaign is a transnational soft law standard-setting body in the 
specific field of microfinance client protection. The aim of Smart Campaign 
is to provide a guideline – the Client Protection Principles – for MFIs to 
manage risks of having an adverse impact on microfinance clients with the 
underlining ethical maxim of ‘doing no harm’. The task of the principles 
entails specifying what to ‘do no harm’ includes in day-to-day microfinance 
practice (The Smart Campaign 2015c). In 2009, Smart Campaign as an 
institution to foster client protection principles was launched by CGAP and 
CFI. Smart Campaign, here defined as a transnational institution, is 
supported and informed by the steering committee, which consists of 21 
individuals from 13 countries that represent central banks, MFIs, 
development agencies, microfinance networks, donors and investors79. In 
addition, there is one campaign director and operational and communication 
manager. Unfortunately, there is no information on how and by whom the 
steering committee and the leadership of the campaign were elected or 
chosen.  
 
Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles 
In July 2011, Smart Campaign introduced seven ‘Client Protection 
Principles’. These principles emerged over a period of approximately two 
years and they were inspired and informed by preceding research and 
practices. Namely already in 2005, scholars argued in favor of the 
protection of microfinance borrowers and discussed most of the principles 
included in the current Client Protection Principles (Porteous and Helms 
2005). One year before, ACCION, a network of leading MFIs, which was one 
of the main initiators of the Smart Campaign, established and adopted the 
so-called ‘Pro-Consumer Pledge’, which was formulated in a quite similar 
way as the Client Protection Principles are today (ACCION 2004). Especially, 
                                       
79 A complete list of the steering committee and leadership of the campaign you find 
here: http://www.smartcampaign.org/about/campaign-steering-committee [last accessed 
10.04.2016]. 
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three developments led to the first draft of the Client Protection Principles. 
The first development was microfinance experts coming together to sign the 
Pocantico Declaration expressing their commitment to a form of 
microfinance which emphasizes client benefit and well-being and accounts 
for both social and financial performance. One of the action steps defined in 
this document was: 
Developing and promoting common principles and standards at 
various levels among existing and new actors including funders 
and financial service providers, which should address consumer 
protection, social performance, pricing transparency, and 
promotion of financial literacy through client education. 
(Microfinance Leaders 2008, 2) 
The Pocantico Declaration also called for an international task force to work 
towards enhanced client protection. The second development was CGAP 
taking the lead in merging existing codes of conduct in the field of 
microfinance client protection (e.g. Pocantico Declaration, other 
microfinance networks’ codes of conduct) into six client protection principles. 
The third development was the action research project called ‘Beyond Codes’ 
of the Center for Financial Inclusion. Acknowledging the call for an 
international task force to work towards enhanced client protection of the 
Pocantico Declaration, the center started building a coalition of MFIs, 
microfinance networks, NGOs, and professionals from the public and private 
sector, which is today known as the Smart Campaign. The six client 
protection principles put together by CGAP were the starting point of Smart 
Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and were first sent out to experts 
and practitioners to comment on in 2009. In a second round of 
consultations the draft was also directed to the wider public asking for 
comments, feedback and inputs in regard to the principles until July 2011. 
After these deliberations the principles underwent critical changes80. The 
                                       
80 Please find all principles with adaptations made in July 2011 and explanations here: 
http://www.smartcampaign.org/storage/documents/20110916_SC_Principles_Guidance_Draf
t_Final.pdf [last accessed 26.05.2015]. Changes entailed among other points, that the CPPs 
are applicable to multiple products (not only to credit), alterations in regard to wording and 
presentation order, including a non-discrimination clause (principle 5: fair and respectful 
treatment of clients) (see The Smart Campaign 2011: 1). 
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revised principles tackle all the critical issues discussed in part two of this 
research endeavor (Schicks 2010; Schicks 2011a; Schicks 2011b; Schicks 
2012; Schicks and Rosenberg 2011; Karnani 2011, 50; Ardic, Ibrahim, and 
Mylenko 2011, 8–10): 
 
1. Appropriate Product Design and Delivery 
The design of products and the delivery of products should take into 
consideration the characteristics of clients and their potential 
vulnerability (The Smart Campaign 2011b). It is important to clients 
that they may purchase products that are easily accessible and, for 
example, feature flexible repayment schedules (The Smart Campaign 
2012, 2), because clients’ investments and repayments are often 
dependent on seasonality (e.g. harvest period, raining season) 
(Schicks 2010, 10). 
 
2. Prevention of Over-Indebtedness 
MFIs take measures in order to assess whether clients will be able to 
repay without becoming over-indebted. MFIs will also „implement and 
monitor internal systems that support prevention of over-
indebtedness and will foster efforts to improve market level credit 
risk management (such as credit information sharing)” (The Smart 
Campaign 2011b). 
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3. Transparency 
Information provided by MFIs should be „clear, sufficient, [...] timely“ 
and comprehensible for clients so they may make informed decisions 
(The Smart Campaign 2011b). Regarding transparency, especially 
the disclosure of pricing information but also information on a 
product’s terms and conditions is important. 
 
4. Responsible Pricing 
The responsible pricing standard represents the double bottom line 
character of microfinance. The price, terms and conditions of a 
product will be set so it is affordable to clients and at the same time 
allowing MFIs be financially sustainable (The Smart Campaign 
2011b). 
 
5. Fair and Respectful Treatment of Clients 
Treating their clients fairly and in a respectful manner includes that 
MFIs should not apply any kind of discrimination and that there is no 
leeway for corruption. Personnel is furthermore prohibited from using 
force against or in any way abuse clients, this applies especially 
during loan sales and debt collection processes (The Smart Campaign 
2011b). 
 
6. Privacy of Client Data 
MFIs will respect the privacy of individual client data and will act in 
compliance with laws and regulations of state jurisdictions. Unless the 
client gives his or her informed consent, data will „only be used for 
the purposes specified at the time the information is collected or as 
permitted by law” (The Smart Campaign 2011b). 
 
7. Mechanisms for Complaint Resolution. 
MFIs put in place „timely and responsive” mechanisms for complaint 
resolution for the clients and „will use these mechanisms both to 
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resolve individual problems and to improve their products and 
services” (The Smart Campaign 2011b). 
 
Although financial education is important in regard to the protection of 
microfinance clients, there is no principle included addressing this issue. I 
will shortly respond to that notion. Financial IOs promoting financial 
consumer protection (G20/OECD Task Force on Financial Consumer 
Protection 2011; The OECD International Network on Financial Education 
(INFE) 2012; Hubbard-Solli 2013; The World Bank 2012). As already 
mentioned, the provision of financial education by MFIs is better understood 
as an extra, which is commonly known as „microfinance plus”81, than as a 
necessary element of microfinance. The core business of microfinance is still 
the supply of financial services to low-income individuals82. Furthermore, 
MFIs argue that financial education and education in general do not 
exclusively, or if at all, some might argue, fall under the responsibility of 
the MFI (i.e. diffusion of responsibility). For many smaller MFIs additional 
requirements in regard to financial education would be too demanding due 
to the possible lack of trained staff and moreover be too expensive from a 
financial point of view. 
In order to adapt to the change within the microfinance industry, Smart 
Campaign revises their Client Protection Standards every three years. As we 
see later on, the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles aspire to 
gather as much feedback, input, and comments as possible on the 
disputable principles from stakeholders. Smart Campaign strives to comply 
with the ISEAL Code of Good Practice on Standard Setting. The ISEAL Code 
aims to make standards more credible. To establish credible standards the 
ISEAL Code presets how the standards should be determined. It starts from 
a proceduralist thesis that credibility is reached when standards are created 
by means of deliberating the standards with all stakeholders and in a 
transparent way (ISEAL 2014). Until the 30th of November 2015, the Client 
                                       
81 Microfinance plus services include non-financial services (e.g. financial, health, energy 
or environmental education and programs). 
82 For an overview of the discussion of whether MFIs should also provide non-financial 
services please see Orbuch (2011) and Lensink, Mersland and Nhung (2011). 
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Protection Principles 3.0 comment period was in progress. Although 
scheduled to be online in January 2016, the Principles have not yet been 
published. The main changes will presumably represent the simplification of 
the principles to diminish redundancy and the allowance of new technical 
areas, especially regarding savings, insurance and digital finance (The 
Smart Campaign 2015a). 
The seven client protection principles are widely endorsed by funders, 
investors, supporting organizations, and individuals. Around 1600 MFIs 
recognize the principles83 (The Smart Campaign 2015d). Compared to data 
sharing organizations, such as Mix Market, where around 2000 MFIs are 
registered 84 , one can estimate the wide support Smart Campaign’s 
principles have among MFIs. 
 
Smart Campaign’s Certification Program 
Nevertheless, the initial and designated strategy of the principles was that 
MFIs would self-report on their degree of abidance. This strategy was 
quickly deemed insufficient. Therefore, Smart Campaign advocated a third-
party certification: the Client Protection Certification Program. The program 
was launched in 2010 and was developed, evaluated and tested for three 
years. Until 2013 it included the core products of microfinance (The Smart 
Campaign 2011a; The Smart Campaign 2013; The Smart Campaign 2014). 
For the certification program, Smart Campaign has operationalized every 
principle. So, they attributed indicators to all seven client protection 
principles to render them measurable (The Smart Campaign 2013). 
Currently, there are 46 MFIs certified providing over 21 million microfinance 
clients with financial services (The Smart Campaign 2015b). 
Coordinated by Smart Campaign, the certification procedure was a 
result of the cooperation among and consultation with microfinance 
                                       
83 The 4531 endorsers, are composed of 1600 MFIs, 186 networks and associations, 184 
investors and donors, 354 supporting organizations, 2207 individuals (The Smart Campaign 
2015d). 
84 About 2000 MFIs report their data to the Mix Market, a public data hub for MFIs to 
publish their institutional data (Mix Market 2015b). There is no difficult procedure preceding 
the registration and the MFI can also submit a very limited amount of information (Mix 
Market 2015a). 
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stakeholders, which included also consultations with clients. A certification 
task force of 43 experts representing international network organizations 
(e.g. Women’s World Banking), special interest groups (e.g. SEEP, Pakistan 
Microfinance Network), rating agencies (e.g. Microrate, Moodys, M-CRIL), 
funders and investors (e.g. Hivos, Kiva, INCOFIN), two independent 
consultants, and financial institutions (e.g. Ujjivan, FMMB), established in 
2010 led the three-year process to finalize the certification program. Again 
there is no information available how this task force was elected and put 
together. Two important outputs of the task force discussions were that 
becoming and staying certified must require a substantial commitment from 
the side of MFIs (1) and adherence should not only be verified via the 
numbers and information provided to the rating officers by the MFI, but also 
clients should be interviewed on their opinion about how their MFI 
implements client protection (2). Once an institution is certified, the 
certification has to be renewed on a two-year base. Another output is that 
the certification program features an appeals and complaints system (3). 
MFIs may appeal against certification decisions which concern themselves. 
Smart Campaign processes these appeals. If a certification body violates 
Smart Campaign’s procedures or protocols, Smart Campaign investigates 
these violations and applies appropriate measures. What these measures 
will include has yet to be concretized. In contrast to appeals, there are 
three sorts of complaints that can be filed: complaints about certified 
financial institutions, complaints against accredited certifiers, and 
complaints about Smart Campaign accreditation system or certification 
program. Complaints about a certified MFI have to be always first directed 
to the MFI itself over a grievance or redress system. If this strategy proves 
unsuccessful, the complainant should contact a relevant complaint system, 
for example a nationwide body (e.g. ombudsman for financial services). 
Only as a last step, is it possible to call on Smart Campaign to investigate 
the case. If it is a complaint directed at an accredited certifier, the 
escalation matrix is similar. The certification body should be confronted with 
the complaint. If the issue cannot be resolved, the complainant can call 
upon Smart Campaign to help resolve the problem. In the case of a 
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complaint against Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles or the 
Certification Program the first, and until now, last instance to call upon is 
Smart Campaign itself (The Smart Campaign 2014)85. It seems at least 
there is no clear information on the issue that the appeals and complaints 
system has only recently been established and is still evolving. For 
example, the complaints against accredited certifiers and against Smart 
Campaign’s principles and certification program have only two instances 
(i.e. certification body followed by Smart Campaign) and only one instance 
respectively (i.e. Smart Campaign). In both cases a higher instance is 
indicated, but not yet defined (i.e. NA). The certification program is revised 
every two years. It is possible that the complaint procedures will be 
completed by the next revision. 
The certification program proposal which the task force put together, 
was sent out for a round of consultation from October 2011 to February 
2012. It included the client protection principles against which the 
performance of the MFI should be assessed and the proposed methodology 
to do so. In 2012 Smart Campaign ran a pilot program, testing and 
adapting the program in close collaboration with specialized microfinance 
rating agencies before launching the full program in 2013 (The Smart 
Campaign 2014). 
Until today, only 46 out of 1600 MFIs that endorse the principles are 
certified and thus evaluated on a regular bases in regard to their 
compliance with the principles (The Smart Campaign 2015d). Hence, when 
taking the majority of 1550 MFIs into account, the principles are only 
enforced by a minority of MFIs over the certification program. One reason 
for the seemingly slow uptake of the Certification Program may well be 
connected to the high requirements demanded from the MFIs. As already 
discussed above: If requirements are too high, MFIs might not be able, 
even if they wanted to, to become certified due to lack of knowledge, 
                                       
85 It is questionable whether Smart Campaign is the adequate institution to manage 
complaints directed towards its own conduct or even towards the conduct of certifiers that 
work for Smart Campaign. If there is a need for an oversight body controlling standard-
setting bodies like Smart Campaign this will be discussed as a possible practical implication 
of this research project in Chapter 21.3. 
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human capital, financial resources, or infrastructure. For example, the cost 
for a certification mission of a rating agency can go up to 18,000 USD. This 
amount includes preparation, on-site visit and post visit analysis, and the 
optional progress phase. Possible certifiers are M-Cril, MicroFinanza Rating, 
MicroRate and Planet Rating, which are private companies. If combined with 
another rating, costs are about 12,000 USD (The Smart Campaign 2014). 
19.5 Case X: The Social Performance Task Force’s 
Universal Standards for Social Performance 
Management 
Established in 2005, the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF) calls itself a 
membership organization, registered as a NGO in the United States, with 
over 2700 individual members from 128 countries and 194 organizational 
members that aims to endorse the soft law standards called Universal 
Standards for Social Performance Management within the microfinance 
industry (Social Performance Task Force 2016a). The members with 
‘organizational membership’86 are eligible to elect and be elected members 
of the SPTF’s board of directors. The board of directors is composed of 13 
elected members87: 
• two donors, 
• two investors, 
• two MFIs (one NGO and one NBFI or bank), 
• three MFI associations (one global, one regional, and one national), 
• two support organizations, 
• two audit, rating and information services, 
• up to three appointed members to ensure regional diversity, 
                                       
86 To be granted organizational membership requires meeting higher standards than an 
individual membership. Applicants must write an application letter, signed by a senior 
manager or a member of the board of directors, and must proof their commitment to 
„promoting and implementing” the universal standards (Social Performance Task Force 
2016b). 
87 For a complete list of the members of the board of directors, see 
http://sptf.info/about-us/board-of-directors [last accessed 16.02.2016]. 
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• and Laura Foose, the current SPTF Director, who serves as an ex-
officio member of the board 
At the SPTF annual meeting in 2010 the member organizations decided 
to develop the Universal Standards for Social Performance Management 
(‘universal standards’), to complement the existing social performance 
initiatives, such as Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles (‘client 
protection certification standards’). The main target was to go further than 
the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles, which were developed to 
protect clients from harmful practices. As the SPTF states, the universal 
standards aim to not only live up to the maxim of „doing no harm” but 
rather to „doing good”, which means to not only protect clients but create 
value for them (Social Performance Task Force 2014b, 3). The 
encompassing and demanding universal standards developed and were 
published in 2014 (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 10). Forming the 
universal standards included extensive participatory possibilities and 
included two phases, one 18 months and one 12 months long, of 
development that were managed by the SPTF secretariat88. Phase one 
included the SPTF secretariat to outline a rough first draft on the bases of 
existing social performance initiatives, research, and data. The initial draft 
was informed by input from task force members and experts outside of the 
task force. The SPTF gained its feedbacks over several participatory 
channels: „working groups that met multiple times, surveys, webinars, and 
five public comment periods and direct discussions with microfinance 
institutions conducted by networks” (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 
10). In the final stage of phase one, the SPTF’s board of directors 
completed their last review on the universal standards and ratified them in 
June 2012. Phase two represented the beta testing stage. Eight key 
microfinance networks and ten national microfinance associations started to 
globally evaluate the implementation of the universal standards in their 
partnering MFIs. Furthermore, 40 national microfinance associations and 
their MFI members took part in an awareness-raising campaign and gave 
                                       
88 For a complete list of the members of the secretariat, please see 
http://sptf.info/about-us/secretariat [last accessed 16.02.2016]. 
  186 
detailed feedback on the universal standards89. In a last step and according 
to the input, SPTF adopted the changes, submitted the final draft for the 
last review and ratification to the SPTF’s board of directors (Social 
Performance Task Force 2014a, 10). 
In 2014, the Universal Standards for Social Performance Management 
were ratified and included six dimensions90. The Universal Standards for 
Social Performance Management also incorporate the Smart Campaign’s 
Client Protection Standards as they were introduced in Chapter 19.491. In 
the following, I summarize the main points of the comprehensive six 
dimensions of the universal standards. 
 
1. Define and monitor your social goals 
There should be indicators measuring how clients benefit from 
receiving financial services. Outputs (i.e. actions taken by the MFI to 
enhance clients’ social and economic well-being) as well as outcomes 
(i.e. changes in the social and economic well-being caused by the 
financial services provided) should be measured. The MFI collects and 
reports detailed data for every social goal it commits to (Social 
Performance Task Force 2014a, 15–16). 
 
2. Ensure board, management and employee commitment to social 
goals 
Board members know about the MFI’s social mission and their 
responsibilities in this regard. The board monitors the social 
performance data and uses insights for strategic direction. This 
includes balancing social and financial performance, and preventing 
                                       
89 See for example the detailed report on the insights from beta testing the universal 
standards summarized by the Microfinance CEO Working Group in May 2013 (Microfinance 
CEO Working Group 2013). 
90 See http://sptf.info/images/usspm%20englishmanual%202014-05-09.pdf [last 
accessed 16.02.2016] for a detailed description of the universal standards. 
91 For the complete list of client protection principles and their according standards and 
indicators, please see 
https://centerforfinancialinclusionblog.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/certification-
standards_english-1-22-mb.pdf [last accessed 16.01.2016]. 
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mission drift in case of changing the ownership structure of the MFI 
(Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 18). 
Senior management is mandated to implement the social 
performance goals into effect with a special focus on raising 
awareness about fair and responsible treatment of clients. This focus 
is mirrored in client protection certification standard 5.1 and its 
corresponding indicators. It also assesses whether the reported social 
performance data corresponds to the stated social targets. Senior 
management is held responsible for improvements regarding 
attaining the social goals (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 19). 
Employees commit to the MFI’s social targets. They are trained and 
assessed concerning both, their social and financial performance 
responsibilities. The MFI realizes policies to encourage ethics and the 
prevention of fraud as stated in client protection certification standard 
5.4. MFIs further incentivize loans that are tailored to the client’s 
needs in line with Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Certification 
Standard 2.2 (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 20). 
 
3. Design products, services, delivery models and channels that meet 
clients’ needs and preferences 
The MFI aims to collect client’s opinions about its services and 
translates the feedbacks into product design and delivery 
adjustments according to client protection certification standard 1.2. 
MFIs further evaluate client satisfaction and seek to understand why 
clients are leaving the institution (Social Performance Task Force 
2014a, 22). 
MFIs aim for appropriateness of product design, meaning to develop 
products that meet clients’ needs and do no harm (client protection 
certification standard 1.1). While providing clients with services, the 
MFI focuses on creating client benefits and refrains from using 
aggressive sales practices in line with the client protection 
certification standard 1.3 (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 23). 
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4. Treat clients responsibly 
The MFI aims to prevent over-indebtedness in conducting a thorough 
assessment of the financial situation of a client before disbursing a 
loan (see client protection certification standard 2.1). To evaluate 
repayment capacity the MFI may use credit bureau and competitor 
data (client protection certification standard 2.3). The risk posed by 
over-indebtedness is appreciated by the leading management and the 
internal audit team monitors appropriate measures that have been 
taken to mitigate over-indebtedness (client protection certification 
standard 2.5). The MFI refrains from „dangerous commercial 
practices” as they are described in client protection certification 
standard 2.6 (The Smart Campaign 2013; Social Performance Task 
Force 2014a, 25). 
In line with the client protection certification standards 3.1 to 3.5 the 
MFI is transparent in its disclosure of costs and communication. It 
provides the client with several disclosure mechanisms, enough time 
to consider the product offer, all her documents she has signed, and 
access to her account information (Social Performance Task Force 
2014a, 26). 
The MFI treats its clients fairly and respectfully (client protection 
certification standards 5.2-5.3 and 5.5-5.7). Collection practices are 
defined and appropriate. The selection and treatment of clients does 
not show any characteristics of discrimination against certain clients. 
The clients are informed about the rights they have to, for example, 
understand and make use of complaint mechanisms (Social 
Performance Task Force 2014a, 27). 
The MFI actively manages client data and its privacy. Clients are 
informed about how and when their data is used and liable to get 
their consent (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 28). 
In line with client protection certification standards 7.1 to 7.4, the 
MFI has mechanisms for complaints and their resolution in place. 
Clients are aware of the mechanisms and understand them (Social 
Performance Task Force 2014a, 29). 
  189 
 
5. Treat employees responsibly 
The MFI sets in place a human resources policy which is available to 
all employees and complies with state law. Employees have to be 
able to file a grievance through a confidential system. Further, the 
MFI refrains from forced or child labor (Social Performance Task 
Force 2014a, 31). 
All employees receive the terms of their employment and receive 
training for their corresponding job function (Social Performance Task 
Force 2014a, 32). 
The MFI oversees the satisfaction of their employees and their 
turnover and takes measures to mitigate discontent and high 
turnover (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 33). 
 
6. Balance financial and social performance 
The MFI „sets and monitors growth rates that promote both financial 
sustainability and client well-being” (Social Performance Task Force 
2014a, 35). 
All actors involved in the financing and leading the MFI (e.g. equity 
investors, board of directors, management) are committed to the 
MFI’s double bottom line and aim to put into practice a financial 
structure that accounts for the stated social as well as financial 
targets (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 36). 
In line with the client protection certification standard 4.1 to 4.3 
pursuing profit does not mean neglecting client well-being or to 
undermining the long-term sustainability of the MFI. Clients receive 
quality products for a price. The MFI considers that prices are 
market-based and non-discriminatory. There is no allowance for 
excessive fees. The board further monitors whether pricing levels are 
in line with expected returns (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 
37). 
The remuneration of the management of the MFI is appropriate to the 
MFI’s social targets. If the salary is incentive- or performance-based 
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the manager’s achievements regarding the MFI’s financial and social 
targets has to be considered (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 
38). 
 
In order to adjust to the changes within the microfinance industry, the 
Social Performance Task Force plans to revise the universal standards once 
every three years. The first revision planned to start in June 2016. In order 
to prevent for inefficiencies, the task force strives to schedule revisions 
after the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles has published their 
revised principles. The task force, Smart Campaign, and CERISE, which 
developed a social audit tool (SPI4)92 , have in fact synchronized their 
schedules of revision. This helps harmonizing the existing standards for 
client protection and social performance in microfinance and streamlining 
their reviewing processes. For the update of the universal standards in June 
2016, the task force has created a Universal Standards Technical Review 
Committee. It involves various stakeholders including ten permanent 
organizational members, three members of the SPTF board of directors, two 
to four appointed members that represent important initiatives in financial 
services supply, and up to five members elected by the organizational 
members of the task force representing practitioners from different world 
regions93. These last five members are specifically elected for the review 
process and will be elected by the organizational members of the SPTF. 
Besides the review committee also the public is given several channels to 
supply their input in English, French, or Spanish. Possibilities include 
sending emails to the SPTF94, participating in the online surveys, which will 
be open for 60 days in spring of 2016, and taking part in interviews and 
focus groups conducted in the field. The review committee is responsible for 
                                       
92 For more detailed information, see http://www.cerise-spi4.org/ [last accessed 
16.02.2016]. 
93 To see the full list of the members of the technical review committee and for the 
foreseen time schedule of the revision process within the technical review committee and 
already received inputs, see http://sptf.info/universal-standards-for-spm/http-www-sptf-
info-state-of-practice [last accessed 16.02.2016]. 
94 Emails can also be sent to Smart Campaign and CERISE, which forward the inputs to 
the SPTF. 
  191 
examining the received comments and translating the input into a revised 
set of the universal standards (Social Performance Task Force 2016d). 
The universal standards, as mentioned above, are not mandatory and 
do not include any certification. However, there are social rating agencies 
that use tools, which enable them to assess the extent of MFIs’ compliance 
with the universal standards (Social Performance Task Force 2014a, 13). 
There is also the possibility to use CERISE’s tool for MFIs to self-assess their 
levels of compliance with the universal standards for social performance 
called SPI4 (CERISE 2016). Additionally, SPTF provides MFIs interested in 
self-regulation with case studies showing in what way other MFIs have 
already put the universal standards into effect (Wardle 2014, 10–24). 
19.6 Analysis of the Cases Against the Backdrop of 
the Common Interest Regulation Theory 
I have discussed two cases of soft law standards on the international level 
and two cases on the transnational level. In the following, I will try to 
ascribe each case to one category of the analytical framework of Mattli and 
Woods (2009, 16). Therefore, it has to be determined, which scenario – 
capture regulation with compromises (A), common interest regulation (B), 
pure capture regulation (C), or de facto capture regulation (D) – has been 
fulfilled for each case. Thereby, the whole regulatory process from agenda 
setting to enforcement shall be considered for institutional supply and the 
extent of societal demand for regulatory change. 
For each case, I first state whether the extent of institutional supply is 
rather characterized by „open forums, proper due process, multiple access 
points, and oversight mechanisms” or whether it is rather „exclusive, 
closed, and secretive” (Mattli and Woods 2009, 17). The results are 
summarized in Tables 1 to 4. Second, I discuss the extent of societal 
demand for each of the four cases. I evaluate the cases with the demand-
side conditions (i.e. information, interests, ideas) that have to be fulfilled. 
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Finally, I locate the position of the cases discussed within the analytical 
framework of common interest regulation and present them in Figure 7. 
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19.7 Institutional Supply of the Four Cases 
In regard to Case VII – UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection – 
institutional supply seems to be somewhere between the two categories. 
Although many stakeholders impact agenda setting and the negotiation of 
standards, the possibility of participating weakens regarding 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement. In this regulation formation 
phase it is the prerogative of the UN member states to influence how the 
guidelines are finally implemented and enforced. 
 
 
Table 1: Extent of Institutional Supply: UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
Regulatory 
Process Phase 
Main Actors Participatory Channels Institution
al Supply 
Agenda Setting 
• states 
• experts 
• multilateral orgs. 
• national and int. 
consumer protection 
organizations 
• UN asks for 
contributions 
• Questionnaires sent out 
by UN 
• expert groups 
extensive 
Negotiation of 
Standards 
• states 
• experts 
• multilateral orgs. 
• national and int. 
consumer protection 
organizations 
• UN provides framework 
to build working groups 
to establish draft 
guidelines 
intermediate 
(access to 
working 
groups is 
limited) 
Implementation, 
Monitoring, and 
Enforcement 
• states • UN General Assembly 
adopts resolution about 
the Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection  
• intergovernmental 
group of experts 
monitors as described 
in §97 of the guidelines 
• states should establish 
or encourage 
procedures to enforce 
guidelines  
limited to 
group of 
experts 
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Regarding Case VIII – UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
– institutional supply is rather extensive over the whole regulatory process. 
Even the critical phases of the regulatory process (i.e. implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement) allow for the participation of several 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, the inter-governmental working group is 
exclusive, but allows NGOs, experts, and state delegations to contribute at 
the regular group meetings. 
 
 
Table 2: Extent of Institutional Supply: UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights 
  
Regulatory 
Process Phase 
Main Actors Participatory Channels Institutional 
Supply 
Agenda Setting 
• states 
• experts 
• academics 
• multilateral orgs. 
• NGOs 
• individuals 
• John Ruggie and team 
conduct extensive 
consultations with 
group and individual 
stakeholders to detect 
crucial issues 
• Online platform for 
individuals to comment  
extensive 
Negotiation of 
Standards 
• states 
• experts 
• multilateral orgs. 
• NGOs 
• individuals 
• John Ruggie and team 
conduct extensive 
consultations with 
group but also 
individual stakeholders 
to inform guidelines 
• Online platform for 
individuals to comment 
extensive 
Implementation, 
Monitoring, and 
Enforcement 
• state delegations 
• experts 
• NGOs 
• Open-ended intergov. 
working group 
mandated to establish 
a binding instrument 
• Meetings of the group 
open to NGOs, experts 
and state delegates 
extensive, 
with 
constraint of 
exclusiveness 
of intergov. 
working group 
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For Case IX – Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and its 
Certification Program – institutional supply is rather extensive over the 
whole regulatory process. The agenda setting process was influenced by 
several pro-change forces in the domain of client protection in microfinance; 
however, finally it was CGAP that distilled the main points of several 
existing codes of conduct into the six client protection principles we know as 
the first draft of the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles. The 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement phase constituted the 
formation of the certification program. Also in this phase various 
stakeholders were allowed to participate. Thereby, it has to be noted that 
the first round of consultation was exclusively open to the task force group 
of experts95, only the second round again allowed for wide participation of a 
diverse set of stakeholders again. 
 
                                       
95 As mentioned above though, there is no information how the task force group of 
experts was elected. 
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Table 3: Extent of Institutional Supply: Smart Campaign’s Client Protection 
Principles and Certification Program 
 
  
Regulatory 
Process Phase 
Main Actors Participatory Channels Institutional 
Supply 
Agenda Setting 
• microfinance 
experts 
• CGAP 
• Center for Financial 
Inclusion 
• There was a wide 
discussion within a 
loose coalition of 
several pro-client 
protection forces, and 
finally CGAP, which is 
already a coalition of 
diverse public and 
private actors in itself 
proposed the first draft 
of the principles 
extensive, 
the first draft 
however was 
put together 
by CGAP 
Negotiation of 
Standards 
• development 
agencies 
• microfinance 
experts 
• academics 
• NGOs 
• MFIs 
• individuals 
• two rounds of 
consultations 
1. with experts and 
academics, 
development 
agencies, clients 
2. open to all 
extensive 
Implementation, 
Monitoring, and 
Enforcement 
• task force group of 
experts 
• development 
agencies 
• microfinance 
experts 
• academics 
• NGOs 
• MFIs 
• individuals 
• two rounds of 
consultations 
1. with certification 
task force group 
of experts 
2. open to all 
extensive, 
with the 
constraint of 
not knowing 
how the task 
force was 
elected 
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Since the implementation, monitoring and enforcement phase has not yet 
been developed for Case X – SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social 
Performance Management – institutional supply is holding the balance 
between being limited and being extensive. Whereas the agenda setting 
and negotiation phase was characterized by extensive possibilities of 
participation, the implementation, monitoring and enforcement phase is still 
dominated by self-regulation of the MFIs and no enforcement mechanism is 
yet in place. At least, SPTF provides MFIs interested in implementing the 
universal standards with case studies that show how other MFIs have 
already implemented the universal standards (Wardle 2014, 10–24). There 
is further the option of applying CERISE’s tool (SPI4) for MFIs to self-assess 
their compliance with the universal standards (CERISE 2016). In addition, 
MFIs can assign social rating agencies with the task of assessing the extent 
of their compliance with the universal standards (Social Performance Task 
Force 2014a, 13). 
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Table 4: Extent of Institutional Supply: SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social 
Performance Management 
Regulatory 
Process Phase 
Main Actors Participatory Channels Institutional 
Supply 
Agenda Setting 
• SPTF secretariat 
• SPTF elected board 
of directors 
• task force members 
• experts 
• MFIs 
• affected individuals 
• first draft informed by 
existing social 
performance initiatives, 
research and data, and 
input from stakeholders 
over diverse 
participatory channels 
extensive, the 
first draft 
however was 
put together 
by the SPTF 
secretariat 
Negotiation of 
Standards 
• SPTF secretariat 
• SPTF elected board 
of directors 
• task force members 
• experts 
• MFIs 
• affected individuals 
• several rounds of 
consultations including, 
working groups, 
surveys, webinars, 
direct discussions with 
MFIs 
• SPTF’s board of 
directors adopted 
changes to universal 
standards according to 
the inputs and ratified 
the reviewed standards 
extensive 
Implementation, 
monitoring, 
enforcement 
• MFIs 
• rating agencies 
• Implementation 
functions over self-
regulation of MFIs, for 
example with CERISE’s 
SPI4 tool 
• If wished by the MFI, 
monitoring and 
enforcement is 
conducted by rating 
agencies, however 
there is no standardized 
certification process in 
place yet 
limited 
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19.8 Societal Demand in Regard to the Four Cases 
A few issues that raised public awareness in recent years fed the societal 
demand for regulatory change within the UN Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection, and especially for the financial services chapter. Although many 
countries already have consumer protection laws in the realm of financial 
services in place, an international standard is still lacking (Ardic, Ibrahim, 
and Mylenko 2011, 3). Considerable demonstration effects triggering 
extensive societal demand for regulatory change was the broad media 
coverage on the U.S. mortgage crises and the therewith-connected global 
financial crises starting in 2007. Another key function to promote regulatory 
change is ascribed to the growing financial inclusion of poorer and more 
vulnerable clients making use of financial services on a global scale that 
may need „a higher level of protection” (UNCTAD 2015a, §48; Benöhr 2013, 
17). As can be read out from the 47 contributions made regarding the 
revision of the guidelines, especially NGOs, such as Consumers 
International (CI), were strongly involved in encouraging regulatory change 
in the direction of common interest (UNCTAD 2016). Pro-change forces that 
conflate their interest are key in order to effectively impact the formation of 
regulation. One of the biggest pro-change forces in the agenda setting and 
negotiation of standards phase was CI. As the world federation of consumer 
groups, CI has over 240 member organizations in 120 countries, and 
therefore may act as a powerful actor to effectively impact regulation 
formation (Consumers International 2016). However, the influence CI has in 
the implementation, monitoring and enforcement phase is limited as this 
part of regulatory formation is dominated by states. However, CI may act 
as nongovernmental entrepreneur for regulatory change. Since the UN 
discloses minutes and reports about the developments in regard to the 
guidelines and their implementation, CI can selectively act as watchdog. 
Other entrepreneurs of regulatory change cannot be identified; this seems 
at least to be the case considering the available documents. 
Although CI already takes a big role in directing the guidelines in the 
direction of common interest regulation, there is still room to join forces 
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with other players. In its contribution of how to revise the guidelines in 
2013, CI has underlined the importance of the two ‘new issues’ – financial 
services and e-commerce – nevertheless, it has addressed other issues that 
gained less attention. In 1999 a sustainable consumption chapter, among 
other things, extended the guidelines but was never concretized with a 
notion of climate change. Such contributions offer room for other actors, 
such as sustainability and climate change interest groups, to increase their 
leverage in future debates about how to adapt the guidelines, join forces 
and raise pressure on crosscutting issues (Consumers International 2013, 
3–4). In sum, societal demand for regulatory change regarding the UN 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection is rather broad than limited. 
Nevertheless, the societal demand cannot be leveraged over the whole 
regulatory process. A tradeoff has to be made in the critical phase of 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement, which remains dominated by 
the intergovernmental group of experts and therefore national states. 
For the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights the 
societal demand for regulatory change is broad. „[N]egative externalities of 
no or poor regulation” are demonstrated by the extensive reporting on 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and their cross-border operations that 
sometimes cause terrible harm to the environment, their employees, or 
communities (Mattli and Woods 2009, 4). It is legally demanding to hold 
TNCs responsible for their actions in a country where they do not have their 
corporate headquarters. Furthermore, corporations still infringe on the 
human rights of their employees (e.g. forced labor, child labor, bad labor 
conditions, exposition of workers to hazardous substances), which is also 
frequently criticized by the media. The UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights also address the responsibility of the states to protect 
human rights and should encourage corporations domiciled in their country 
to abide by human rights regardless of where they operate (OHCHR 2011). 
As already addressed when discussing the societal demand-side conditions 
in Chapter 19.1.2, the players actively participating to further regulatory 
change are diverse. Entrepreneurs of regulatory change are public officials 
like Ruggie fighting for participative options that are as wide as possible, 
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nongovernmental entrepreneurs such as human rights NGOs, and other 
corporate entrepreneurs fighting to eradicate unequal treatment, namely 
that all corporations have to abide by the same catalogue of human rights. 
Unfortunately, much cannot be said about the influence of shared ideas on 
the extent of societal demand for regulatory change. However, the vast 
number of contributions from the public and private sector and the 
attendance of 60 country representatives, 8 intergovernmental 
organizations and 51 NGOs at the first session of the ‘open-ended 
intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights’ in July 2015 give a 
preliminary picture of the potential for future coalitions to jointly further 
regulatory change (Garcés 2015, Section B and Annex III). 
The societal demand for regulatory change regarding the Smart 
Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and its Certification Program is 
extensive within the microfinance industry. As was described earlier in this 
research project, over-indebtedness crises and especially the microfinance 
crises in Andra Pradesh, which was accompanied by a series of suicides 
committed by over-indebted farmers, served as demonstration effects and 
showed to a wider public that there is a need for regulatory change to 
mitigate over-indebtedness in microfinance. The media coverage was broad 
and the reputation of microfinance as an effective poverty reduction tool 
was seriously questioned (Bajaj 2011). There is a diverse set of 
stakeholders involved in the regulatory process of both the client protection 
principles and the certification program. Nongovernmental entrepreneurs of 
regulatory change (e.g. NGOs, microfinance networks, consumer protection 
organizations), public officials (e.g. representatives of national development 
agencies), and private sector actors (e.g. MFIs, investors, rating agencies) 
all take an active role in impacting the formation of the principles and the 
certification program, either as being consulted in one of the feedback 
rounds on the principles, or in one of the feedback rounds on the 
certification program. Although Smart Campaign is hosted at the Center for 
Financial Inclusion at ACCION, it is a new institution that was created out of 
different pro client protection initiatives. Assuming that structures had to be 
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built up from the bottom, I propose that the demonstration effects 
described above had to be so powerful that a novel institution could be 
formed. The Smart Campaign’s principles and certification program evolved 
over a relatively short period of two and three years respectively. 
Stakeholders had to have interests that pointed in the same direction, 
namely to enhance the protection of microfinance clients. Also the 
information spread about the devastating effects of over-indebtedness in 
several countries had a harsh impact on microfinance practitioners, 
development agencies, investors, funders but also on academics. Especially, 
the research conducted on the causes and wide-ranging consequences of 
over-indebtedness among microfinance clients questioned the prevailing 
conduct about over-indebtedness. Experiences in the field and research 
therefore challenged the status quo and created new sets of ideas that were 
shared by more and more stakeholders. These new insights provided a 
common ground to effectively urge change and made it possible that Smart 
Campaign’s principles and certification program developed and concretized 
so quickly. In this case it was even possible that without established 
institutions and mechanisms this group of pro-change forces developed a 
standard setting institution almost from scratch. 
The societal demand for regulatory change regarding the SPTF’s 
Universal Standards for Social Performance Management is extensive within 
the microfinance industry. The demonstration effects (e.g. over-
indebtedness crises, regulatory failures) that called for regulatory change 
were the same as the ones that triggered the wide societal demand in the 
case of Smart Campaign. Also the set of entrepreneurs for regulatory 
change was similar and sometimes overlapping with the one influencing the 
Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and Certification Program. 
Nongovernmental entrepreneurs of regulatory change, public officials, and 
private sector actors all took an active role in impacting the formation of the 
universal standards. They were, for example, involved as being a member 
of the task force, an elected member of the SPTF’s board of directors, a 
MFI, an affected individual, an expert or investor consulted in one of the 
public comment rounds or pilot phase. The SPTF’s Universal Standards of 
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Social Performance Management are one of the, if not the, youngest 
standards in the realm of client protection and social performance. Hence, 
they are still developing their processes for revisions of the standards, but 
also create new structures such as a possible certification program in the 
future. The SPTF was initiated from scratch and could not fit into an existing 
structure. Because new structures had to be formed, I propose, similar to 
the case of Smart Campaign that the demonstration effects described above 
had to be so powerful that a new institution could be formed. In a relatively 
short amount of time, the universal standards were developed and tested. 
Without all stakeholders aiming in the same direction and therefore having 
common interests, the streamlined process of the development and testing 
of the universal standards would have been less likely. The new ideas 
already spread by initiatives, such as Smart Campaign, were challenging 
the inexistence of client protection standards. SPTF was further motivated 
by the idea not only to promote a microfinance business conduct preventing 
clients from harm but also going further and actually „doing good”, in the 
sense that the focus in microfinance should be on clients’ benefits (Social 
Performance Task Force 2014b, 3). The demonstration effects and the 
existing microfinance initiatives showed where there is a need to close gaps, 
by for example synchronizing the revision procedures of different 
microfinance social performance initiatives, and maybe also by giving the 
various initiatives an umbrella organization. Due to the common ground of 
all stakeholders, also SPTF was able to establish an organization without 
any preexisting structures. 
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19.9 Categorizing the Four Cases Within the 
Analytical Framework of Common Interest 
Regulation 
In the case of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights the 
societal demand-side conditions are fulfilled and the institutional supply is 
rather extensive over the whole regulatory process. Also the 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement phase of the regulatory 
formation process allows for the participation of stakeholders. NGOs, 
experts, and state delegations are allowed to contribute at the regular 
meetings of the inter-governmental working group. Therefore, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights can be labeled a common 
interest regulation (see [B] in Figure 7). 
Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and Certification Program 
meets all the societal demand-side conditions and due to the different 
channels how stakeholders can participate of the entire regulation formation 
process also provides the necessary institutional supply to be categorized as 
common interest regulation (see [B] in Figure 7). 
In the case of the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection the societal 
demand-side conditions are met. The institutional supply-side conditions are 
extensive in the agenda setting stage, intermediate in the negotiation of 
standards stage, and limited in the implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement stage. Due to the fact that implementation and enforcement is 
still in the domain of states makes the UN Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection miss the mark of falling into the category of common interest 
regulation. Although it is likely that Consumers International (CI) and other 
NGOs undertake the function of watchdogs and use naming and shaming or 
other pinpricking strategies to pressure states to comply with the guidelines. 
The extent of pressure states receive might not be sufficient to further 
compliance. How the implementation and enforcement of the guidelines will 
develop will further greatly depend on how the mandate and work of the 
intergovernmental group and its subsidiary institutions develops. 
Preliminarily, I therefore categorize the UN Guidelines for Consumer 
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Protection as representing regulatory capture but with concessions and 
compromises (see [A] in Figure 7). 
The societal demand-side conditions for the SPTF’s Universal Standards 
for Social Performance Management are met. The institutional supply-side 
conditions are extensive in the agenda setting and the negotiation of 
standards stage, but implementation and enforcement mechanisms are still 
weak. For the SPTF’s universal standards self-regulation by MFIs prevails 
and although there are possibilities, such as agency ratings, there is yet no 
standardized procedure. Until there is a certification process in place, the 
diverse stakeholders act as watchdogs and defecting MFIs are named and 
shamed. Preliminary, the SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social Performance 
Management are best represented by regulatory capture with concessions 
and compromises (see [A] in Figure 7). 
Figure 7 summarizes the results from the preceding analysis and shows 
the approximate positioning of the cases within the analytical framework. 
 
Figure 7: Regulatory Outcomes of the Four Analyzed Cases (own figure) 
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19.10 Applicability to the Responsible Microfinance 
Framework 
Responsible microfinance starts with the assumption that clients stand at 
the center of microfinance and have to be protected from harmful practices. 
The soft law standards presented all aim to regulate business practices in 
such a way that they are not harmful. To be most effective for the 
framework of responsible microfinance, soft law standards should 
1. be directed at and applicable to corporations and especially MFIs, 
2. be widely accepted among states, civil society, MFIs, and investors, 
3. include key standards for microfinance, 
4. and should be enforceable. 
The four soft law standards that have been examined above are examples 
of how clients could be protected from malpractice 96 . Furthermore, I 
analyzed whether these standards can be classified as to be in the common 
interest. To do so, I applied the analytical framework presented by Mattli 
Woods (2009). Although the societal demand for regulatory change was 
broad and sustained in all four cases, only the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights and the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection 
Principles and its Certification Program provide extensive institutional supply 
over the whole regulatory formation process (see Table 2 and 3, and Figure 
7). Due to the fact that the implementation, monitoring and enforcement 
processes regarding the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection are still 
prerogatives to states, the institutional supply is only limited in this respect. 
Also for the SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social Performance Management 
the implementation, monitoring and enforcement processes are still 
dominated by MFIs. 
The UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection regulate what kind of 
measures states should take in order to reduce the risk of consumers falling 
victim to malpractice or hazardous products. The addressees are states so 
these standards could only be effective indirectly over the regulations states 
                                       
96 Thereby, the SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social Performance Management go even 
further and additionally aim to create client benefits in the form of the betterment of their 
social and economic well-being. 
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implement. The guidelines can be altered and address financial services as 
a central issue regarding consumer protection. Although the language 
gained in vigor after the last revision of the guidelines, a mechanism to 
ensure or promote the enforceability of the Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection is still lacking. 
The UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights regulate the 
duties and responsibilities states and corporations have to protect and 
respect human rights respectively. Although the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights directly speak to TNCs and other businesses, it 
is questionable whether MFIs, and especially small ones, will fall under the 
Guiding Principles in the suggested binding treaty. Most probably the focus 
will lie on bigger corporations and TNCs. Furthermore, they do not include 
key standards for microfinance, especially if the intergovernmental working 
group decides to only let gross human rights violations trigger the binding 
treaty, the impact on microfinance will probably be minimal97. The guiding 
principles can be altered in a direction that is better applicable to 
microfinance, so it is possible that, depending on the scope of human rights 
that will be subject to the principles, microfinance clients could benefit from 
the protection given by such a soft law standard. Bearing in mind that the 
proceedings concerning the binding treaty are still in process, the guiding 
principles are not yet enforceable. 
In contrast to the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection and the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Smart Campaign builds a 
hard case for client protection in microfinance and could represent a 
cornerstone of the third pillar of the responsible microfinance framework. 
The Client Protection Principles have wide support by MFIs, networks and 
associations, investors and donors, supporting associations, and individuals 
(The Smart Campaign 2015d). Furthermore, the principles are directed at 
MFIs and include the key points I have worked out in Part II of this research 
endeavor. The extensive comment and deliberation phase slotted in ahead 
                                       
97 They do not include key standards for microfinance (e.g. minimization of over-
indebtedness, transparency in pricing), but they do at least address for example fair 
treatment and non-discrimination. 
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of every revision of the principles ensures the wide acceptability within the 
group of stakeholders. The revisions allow them further to answer to new 
developments. Additionally, the certification program gives, although it is 
not mandatory to run through, the possibility of hardening the soft law and 
therefore making the client protection standards enforceable. Unfortunately, 
only 46 out of 1600 MFIs that endorse the principles are also certified and 
thus evaluated on a regular bases in regard to their compliance with the 
principles (The Smart Campaign 2015d). So, strictly speaking the principles 
are enforceable but the effective enforcement of the principles has only 
been realized in 46 cases so far. Hence, when taking the majority of 1550 
MFIs which endorse the principles but are not certified, still renders 
enforceability of the principles weak. One reason for the seemingly slow 
uptake of the certification program may be well connected to the high costs 
and requirements demanded of the MFIs. As already discussed above: If 
requirements are too high, MFIs might not be able – even if they wanted to 
– to become certified due to lack of knowledge, human capital, financial 
resources, or infrastructure. 
Also the SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social Performance 
Management are an important soft law standard within responsible 
microfinance. It directly addresses MFIs, is widely accepted and endorsed 
and includes key standards to protect microfinance clients. Beyond that, the 
universal standards go even further and not only include the Smart 
Campaign’s Client Protection Principles but also an encompassing catalogue 
of social performance standards that especially targets the management 
practices, which are key to producing positive outcomes in regard to client 
benefits (Wardle 2014, 9). The breadth of the universal standards however 
also seems to have its restrictions. Although the standards are widely 
endorsed and the SPTF has almost 2800 individual and organizational 
members, the universal standards are only implemented by a limited 
number of MFIs. In fact, the SPTF expects MFIs to rather gradually 
implement the universal standards than to implement them all at once 
(Koning and Wardle 2014, 2). Exact figures of how many MFIs apply the 
universal standards are not available; however, the SPTF presents several 
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case studies of MFIs, which have already implemented the universal 
standards (Wardle 2014, 10–24). Additionally, rating agencies start to 
assess the social performance of MFIs, taking the universal standards as a 
benchmark, but no standardized certification program is yet in place (Social 
Performance Task Force 2014a, 13). This notion leads to a critical point 
regarding the universal standards. They are, at the moment, not 
enforceable and therefore rather weak. The universal standards are 
encompassing, demanding, and represent a normative standard, which is 
hard to attain. In contrast to the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection 
Principles, the implementation of the universal standards is likely to be even 
more costly with the additional disadvantage of not getting a standardized 
and yet not well-known certification. Furthermore, it seems to be already a 
big and expensive step for MFIs to commit to the client protection 
principles. To commit to the even more demanding catalogue of the 
universal social performance standards, even if MFIs wanted to, is probably 
unrealistic for many MFIs. 
Due to its extensive institutional supply and wide societal demand, and 
its specific purpose, the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and 
its Certification Program is the soft law standard that most easily fits into 
and applies to the framework of responsible microfinance. Setting a very 
high benchmark of how MFIs should ideally conduct their business also the 
SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social Performance Management fit the 
framework of responsible microfinance. The standards fulfill the 
requirements of mediocre institutional supply during the whole regulatory 
process, which is due to the SPTF’s not yet effective monitoring and 
enforcement system, and extensive societal demand. The standards are 
especially designed for microfinance and also encompass the most 
important points in regard to social performance management. However, 
they are still weak due to the high requirements they put on MFIs, which 
adds to causing slow uptake. 
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19.11 Interim Conclusion – Soft Law Standards 
Being a framework of international scope, a focus was put on the 
applicability of soft law standards to the framework of responsible 
microfinance that were created on an international or transnational level. 
These voluntary standards optimally address key issues in a specific 
economic domain, in this case microfinance, and aim to be legitimate and 
enforceable. Assessing four cases of soft law standards against the 
backdrop of the analytical framework of the common interest regulation 
theory presented by Mattli and Woods (2009), it is shown that two of the 
cases can be labeled as common interest regulation (i.e. UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Smart Campaign’s Client 
Protection Principles and Certification Program). Smart Campaign’s 
principles and certification program are, however, best applicable to 
microfinance. Therefore, this analysis renders the Smart Campaign’s Client 
Protection Principles and Certification Program the soft law standards best 
applicable to the framework of responsible microfinance. 
Due to the capture by states prevalent in the implementation and 
enforcement phase in the case of the UN Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection and by MFIs respectively in the case of the SPTF’s Universal 
Standards for Social Performance Management, these standards are 
considered capture regulations with concessions and compromises. Until 
there is no change in the institutional supply within the last regulation 
phase, international watchdogs (e.g. Consumers International (CI), NGOs 
and other advocacy organizations) take the position of putting pressure on 
states and MFIs to obey the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection and 
SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social Performance Management. 
Looking at the four cases, it becomes clear that the extent to which the 
‘ordinary citizen’ addressed by Dahl is able to participate in the 
establishment of these soft law standards is still limited. However, the cases 
are a precedent of the application of altered forms of traditional individual 
political participation on the transnational and international level. And as 
shown in the case of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
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Rights, the Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and Certification 
Program, and the SPTF’s Universal Standards for Social Performance 
Management, there were possibilities for affected people to participate via 
interviews, focus groups, online consultations, and surveys. These forms of 
participation seem to provide the standard-setting procedures with a 
deliberative quality that can be framed as enhancing the legitimacy; the 
standards’ acceptability and acceptance. 
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20 Conclusion 
Part IV of this research project aimed at elaborating how a responsible 
microfinance framework could be established within which individual, and 
the therewith-connected institutional and systemic risks of over-
indebtedness, can be mitigated. The overarching research questions for Part 
IV were the following: 
• What could a framework of responsible microfinance look like? 
• What are the possible actors involved and which practical strategies 
to mitigate over-indebtedness could they further? 
Starting from the assumption that microfinance products have to be of a 
certain quality to mitigate over-indebtedness and accounting for the fact 
that not only the quality of services but also other aspects, such as 
psychological and cognitive biases, sociological influence factors, external 
factors, business malpractice, regulations and political interferences may, 
isolated or in combination, cause over-indebtedness, the main goal of Part 
IV was to develop a framework of responsible microfinance, and inform it 
with practical endeavors of how microfinance stakeholders could contribute 
to the mitigation of over-indebtedness. Responsible microfinance presumes 
that by means and combination of state regulation, financial literacy 
programs and soft law standards, over-indebtedness and the therewith-
connected individual, institutional and systemic risks can be alleviated. The 
ten practical cases presented in Chapters 17 to 19 are a selection of 
strategies to potentially reduce over-indebtedness and therefore help 
enabling and enforcing the goals of responsible microfinance. They are 
summarized in the following figure. 
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Figure 8: Multi-Stakeholder Framework of Responsible Microfinance Including 
Practical Strategies to Mitigate O-I 
For every pillar the analysis of the causes and consequences of over-
indebtedness suggested (i.e. state regulation, financial literacy programs, 
and soft law standards) three to four practical strategies that alleviate over-
indebtedness were studied in order to demonstrate how responsible 
microfinance could be enhanced and implemented. 
For the first pillar, three examples of how state regulation could 
mitigate over-indebtedness were presented. Case I starts from the 
assumption that microfinance clients’ rationality is bounded. Claiming that 
client protection regulations should account for these limitations, it is 
outlined what requirements a national client protection regulation should 
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meet. Deduced from empirical evidence there are three main characteristics 
consumer protection regulation should entail: 
I. Disclosure requirements are the first characteristic. Although there is 
no ‘one size fits all approach’, literature agrees on simplifying and 
standardizing the microfinance product information, MFIs are 
specifically advised to disclose the APR and all additional costs 
incurred. 
II. Fair treatment rules are the second characteristic. MFIs should treat 
clients in a non-discriminatory way and refrain from harmful practices 
(e.g. abusive lending practices, selling inappropriate products). 
III. Accessible recourse systems are the last characteristic. Policy makers 
could contribute to this target and set clear rules about how, when 
and what to disclose. In the case of malpractice, recourse 
mechanisms are vital to give the clients an opportunity to voice their 
complaints98. 
Case II was concerned with credit bureaus as regulatory instruments to 
mitigate over-indebtedness. Pooling information systems provide MFIs with 
the credit records of their potential clients. Credit bureaus can be effective, 
if the information gathered considers negative as well as positive credit 
records and if as many MFIs (i.e. regulated and non-regulated) as possible 
share their information over such an information pooling system. The 
analysis revealed two difficulties. On the one hand, many countries still lack 
an encompassing credit bureau and instead MFIs voluntarily decide to share 
information among each other. This strategy often proves ineffective mostly 
due to incomplete information. On the other hand, as being an only recently 
discussed issue, data privacy of client data can be an obstacle in creating 
effective credit bureaus. In Case III private insolvency systems, as a very 
current but yet scarcely discussed issue in the context of microfinance and 
developing countries, are addressed. Private insolvency systems offer over-
indebted households a ‘fresh start’ and could lift the stigma of being over-
                                       
98 Ideally, a regulator-imposed third party offers possibilities for recourse. Third party 
recourse possibilities are currently still scarce. Hence, clients often have to resort to their 
MFI’s internal dispute resolution. 
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indebted, as the cases of Egypt, Vietnam and Australia show, a private 
insolvency might still be problematic, especially when obstacles for being 
eligible for a debt relief program or re-entering the economy may be 
discouraging. 
For the second pillar, three cases of how financial literacy alleviates 
over-indebtedness were addressed. In Case IV the financial literacy 
program of SEWA Bank was analyzed in order to understand how MFIs 
could educate their clients on the specifics of their products. SEWA Bank 
manages to gain in-depth knowledge about a client’s financial situation and 
financial literacy (e.g. capital formation life-graph). Due to their effective 
information gathering system, SEWA may take the measures necessary to 
inform their clients about products with low capital expenditure. In Case V 
the Kenyan educational soap opera Mukatano Junction was introduced. 
Empirical evidence showed that educational soap operas can have a lasting 
and positive effect on viewers. In Case VI the topic of gamification was 
debated. Digital games and applications can be of great use in the context 
of microfinance. One particularly interesting game is the Shesha game 
developed by Absa, a South African MFI. Empirical evidence suggests a 
positive impact on the clients’ knowledge about how to check their balances 
over their cell phone instead of undertaking costly long distance travelling 
to check their balances in the nearest MFI branch. 
An especially strong focus was put on the third pillar. Four soft law 
standards, which all carry the potential to mitigate over-indebtedness were 
investigated. The aim of Chapter 19 was to show how applicable these 
standards are to the responsible microfinance framework and whether and 
to what extent these standards are established in the public interest. 
Transnational and international soft law is often criticized for being 
developed by few actors. Affected communities, NGOs, or other 
stakeholders when creating such standards were not taken into 
consideration for a long time. This, however, has changed with the Rio 
‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. More and more, other stakeholders than state have 
been taken into consideration when establishing soft law. Accounting for 
these developments and having a client-centered understanding of 
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microfinance, it seemed important to additionally analyze how clients and 
also other microfinance stakeholders are involved in the continuous 
development of these standards. In order to do so, I referred to the 
analytical framework of Mattli and Woods (2009), which evaluates whether 
a regulation can be categorized to be in the common interest. Among the 
four cases analyzed only Case VIII – the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights – and Case IX – Smart Campaign’s Client Protection 
Principles and Certification Program are soft law standards which meet the 
requirements to be in the common interest. Additionally and due to their 
specificity, Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and Certification 
Program surfaced as the standards best applicable to the framework of 
responsible microfinance. They bear the highest potential to help mitigate 
over-indebtedness99. 
In Part IV of this research project the extended definition of 
microfinance in combination with the concretization of the concept of 
responsible microfinance and the three approaches to combat over-
indebtedness (i.e. state regulation, financial literacy endeavors, soft law 
standards) were connected to an encompassing framework of responsible 
microfinance. Not only through singlehanded, but also coordinated and 
cooperative endeavors of microfinance stakeholders of the public and 
private sector the strategies presented contribute to the lasting protection 
of microfinance clients from over-indebtedness. 
  
                                       
99 Although very specific and even more comprehensive than the Smart Campaign’s 
Client Protection Principles, the SPTF’s universal standards revealed themselves as too 
demanding in the course of the analysis. They represent a normative ideal of a standard, 
which is hard to attain. Furthermore, they do not meet the requirements of the common 
interest regulation theory in order to be in the public interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
21 Discussion of the Results, Overall 
Contribution, and Implications 
The introduction of this study started with an excerpt from the first UN 
Human Development Report that heralded the start of a novel conception of 
development strategies from the 1970s onwards. Ul Haq argued that 
development strategies should be inclusive and should „create a conducive 
environment for people […] to develop their full potential and to have a 
reasonable chance of leading productive and creative lives in accord with 
their needs and interests” (1990, 1). Microfinance was long perceived such 
an inclusive development strategy. After years of concentrating on growth 
and outreach of microfinance it became clear that the ‘microfinance 
promise’ of the 1990s would not hold true. Especially the emergence of 
over-indebtedness, as one of the core problems of microfinance for the past 
two decades having far-reaching and devastating adverse effects on the 
individual, institutional, and market level, let microfinance scholars and 
practitioners alike demand for more client protection. Without denying 
microfinance its place within the realm of development cooperation and 
financial markets, I conducted an explorative and interdisciplinary study 
concluding that, in the light of the threat of over-indebtedness, there is a 
need to extend the current definition of microfinance by a quality-dimension 
and there is a further need to develop a comprehensive, protective, and 
multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance. In doing so, my 
reasoning was based on theories, insights, and empirical evidence from the 
fields of political science and philosophy, economics, behavioral economics, 
psychology, law, and ethics. 
Hereafter, I present brief conclusions of each of the four parts of this 
research, the overall contribution of this study and its practical implications, 
and directions for future research. 
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21.1 Concluding Remarks and Results 
Providing the BoP with financial services is not trivial. MFIs have to deal 
with the information asymmetries inherent to every loan contract but in 
contrast to traditional banking cannot rely on securities. Microfinance loans 
are typically uncollateralized. Having no collateral to seize in case of default 
requires MFIs to use particular group- and individual lending methodologies, 
which help MFIs to curb their clients from defaulting. However, the growth 
focus of many MFIs has led to lax lending practices combined with 
aggressive marketing strategies. In the course of that many clients took on 
too much debt, which, in some markets, peaked in over-indebtedness 
crises. These crises served as demonstration effects of how devastating the 
consequences of over-indebtedness can be on the client level. Since also 
academics and microfinance practitioners started to call for enhanced client 
protection to prevent clients from suffering the detriments of such crises, it 
is questionable whether the current definition of microfinance captures 
these recent developments. 
RQ I Is there ground to advocate an extension of the current definition of 
microfinance by a dimension accounting for how microfinance 
products should be provided? 
 
In Part I and on the bases of three arguments, I developed an extended 
definition of microfinance, which includes a quality-dimension100. I claimed 
that the adherence of MFIs to certain client protection standards while 
supplying financial products is fundamental to microfinance. 
 
                                       
100 Microfinance is the provision of small-scale financial services to low-income 
individuals or low-income communities, small-scale meaning that the average outstanding 
balance of microfinance products does not exceed 250 percent of the averaging income per 
person (GNI per capita). Microfinance entails the supply of one or more of its principal 
components: credit, savings, insurance and money transfer [what-dimension]. The services 
are supplied by a microfinance institution that is either regulated or non-regulated [who-
dimension]. Regarding the provision of its services, the microfinance institution complies 
with consumer protection standards and regulations, and therefore refrains from harmful 
practices [how-dimension/quality-dimension]. 
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Part II started from the assumption that money is fungible after having 
entered a household and that a repaying household does not imply a debt-
free household. Since MFIs supply uncollateralized loans, they apply specific 
lending methodologies to minimize information asymmetries. These 
strategies, however, serve a mere business purpose, namely to increase the 
probability of the MFI of being repaid. But being repaid does not say 
anything about the debt situation of the borrower at that time. The client 
could be paying back the loan with another loan of a different MFI. In fact 
she might be on the edge of being over-indebted, meaning that she 
continuously struggles to „meet repayment deadlines and repeatedly has to 
make unduly high sacrifices to meet her loan obligations” (Schicks 2010, 6). 
The dynamic of having no information about borrowers’ financial situations 
and no collateral to seize in case of default, can render MFIs’ portfolios 
increasingly at risks, which in turn might peak in entire markets losing 
stability. Aiming to find ways how to mitigate over-indebtedness and 
realizing that causes of over-indebtedness must be manifold and the 
consequences wide-ranging Part II contained a thorough analysis of these 
causes and consequences in order to deduce possible approaches to fight 
against over-indebtedness. 
RQ II What approaches are suited to minimize over-indebtedness? 
 
The analysis showed that the number of over-indebted clients is not 
only dependent on whether the MFIs supply their services abiding by certain 
client protection standards but also on an interplay of many factors, such as 
psychological and cognitive biases, sociological influence factors, external 
factors, regulations, and political interferences. Over-indebtedness 
adversely impacts the social and economic well-being of borrowers and may 
also negatively influence the financial sustainability of MFIs and the overall 
market stability. Acknowledging the manifold causes and wide-ranging 
consequences that over-indebtedness brings along, it was suggested that 
microfinance stakeholders could minimize over-indebtedness from different 
angles and therewith protect microfinance clients. By doing so the negative 
spill over effects on MFIs and markets could be alleviated as well. The 
  220 
analysis revealed that three specific approaches are suitable to fight over-
indebtedness: state regulation, financial literacy programs, and soft law 
standards. 
Getting an in-depth understanding of the causes and consequences of 
over-indebtedness had served to emphasize the centrality this issue takes 
in microfinance and to connect the extended definition of microfinance, 
which demands MFIs to protect their clients from harmful practices, to a 
comprehensive framework including tangible strategies to fight against 
over-indebtedness. 
 
In Part III it was argued that the extended definition of microfinance in 
combination with the three strategies to face over-indebtedness could be 
connected to an encompassing framework, which potentially adds to the 
protection of microfinance clients from over-indebtedness: the ‘multi-
stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance’. It is a coordinated and 
cooperative effort to enable and enforce responsible microfinance and 
incorporates three pillars: state regulations, financial literacy programs, and 
soft law standards. 
Instead of starting with the analysis of how a responsible microfinance 
framework could be enabled and enforced, I began Part III with defining 
what responsible microfinance was and how its overall demand of 
responsibility could be interpreted. The primary goal of Part III was 
therefore to define the concept of responsible microfinance, and to 
substantiate the framework with an approach to responsibility. 
RQ III What is responsible microfinance and how could responsibility be 
interpreted in this context? 
 
Besides its overall call for responsibility101, responsible microfinance was 
introduced in Chapter 13 as having three specific demands: 
I. MFIs balance their social and financial performance. 
                                       
101 Responsible microfinance presupposes that due to the microfinance clients’ 
vulnerability, microfinance’s social mission, and the risks over-indebtedness entails on the 
individual, institutional, systemic level, microfinance stakeholders have a responsibility to 
alleviate over-indebtedness. 
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II. Microfinance stakeholders contribute and cooperate in order to enable 
and enforce responsible microfinance. 
III. Microfinance stakeholders have a general responsibility to mitigate 
over-indebtedness, and MFIs are specifically required to hold 
themselves responsible for achieving their social mission, which 
includes client protection and managing their social performance. 
After having given a definition of responsibility102, a short overview of the 
different responsibilities emerging for microfinance stakeholders, such as 
the responsibilities the MFI has towards its clients, its employees, its 
investors, and also towards business standards it obeys, was presented. 
Dwelling on the demand that MFIs should hold themselves responsible to 
fulfill their social mission the question arose whether MFIs, which commit 
themselves to responsible microfinance, could be held responsible for their 
deviance. Referring to Pettit (2007b) it was shown that corporations could 
be, at least morally, held responsible for their wrongdoing. 
Responsible microfinance is still a very young concept that needs more 
work. Part III contributed to the development of a common definition of 
responsible microfinance and to an initial concretization of the meaning of 
responsibility in this context. Additionally, Part III added to the discussion 
about responsible microfinance’s continuing development. Narrowing down 
the interpretational range of what responsibility means in this context 
potentially enhances the enforcement power of soft law standards regarding 
the potential to minimize exit options and deflecting. 
 
In Part IV, I explored ten cases that enable and enforce responsible 
microfinance. The multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance 
demands that its goals are enabled and enforced via a cooperative and 
coordinated effort by microfinance stakeholders. To alleviate over-
indebtedness, the framework foresees three approaches or pillars: state 
                                       
102 Responsibility is defined as an obligation or duty to satisfactorily perform or complete 
a task that we either commit ourselves to, in the sense of a promise, or that we are 
appointed to from an authority, in the sense of an exogenous assignment (Bentham 1970, 
294; Raz 1988, 82; Simmons 1979, 76). Not fulfilling that obligation implies the 
appropriateness of a sanction be it a legal or social one. 
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regulations, financial literacy programs, and soft law standards. In order to 
present tangible strategies of how to mitigate over-indebtedness in practice, 
I explored three to four cases for each pillar in Part IV. The overarching 
research questions for Part IV were: 
RQ IV What could a framework of responsible microfinance look like? 
RQ V What are the possible actors involved and which practical strategies 
to mitigate over-indebtedness could they further? 
 
As argued in Part II, the causes of over-indebtedness are manifold and 
mirror that there is no ‘one size fits all approach’ to mitigate over-
indebtedness. The main target of Chapters 16 to 19 was to additionally 
sharpen the framework of responsible microfinance and to demonstrate that 
only a mixture of efforts by states, MFIs, clients, NGOs, and investors can 
actually help to enable and enhance responsible microfinance. The ten 
practical strategies presented in Chapters 17 to 19 are a selection of hard 
cases that aim to mitigate over-indebtedness by means of state regulations, 
financial literacy programs, and soft law standards. 
For the first pillar, three examples of how state regulation could 
alleviate over-indebtedness were explored. Demanding that client protection 
regulations should account for the bounded rationality clients have, it was 
outlined in Case I what requirements a national consumer protection 
regulation should meet (i.e. disclosure requirements, fair treatment rules, 
accessible recourse systems). Credit bureaus as regulatory instruments to 
alleviate over-indebtedness were the focus of Case IV. The effectiveness of 
credit bureaus highly depends on the type of information gathered and the 
type of MFIs allowed to provide information to the credit bureau. The 
information should permit negative and positive entries and as many MFI 
types as possible should be able to provide credit information. In Case III 
private insolvency systems were analyzed. They could offer over-indebted 
households a ‘fresh start’ and could lift the stigma of being over-indebted. 
For the second pillar, three cases were explored of how financial literacy 
programs could mitigate over-indebtedness. The financial literacy program 
of SEWA Bank was discussed as Case III. SEWA Bank gathers in-depth 
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information about their clients, by means of capital formation life-graphs, in 
order to adequately inform their clients about their financial services. 
Having that in-depth knowledge can help to detect debt stress and protect 
clients from over-indebtedness. The Kenyan educational soap opera 
‘Mukatano Junction’ was addressed as Case IV. I presented empirical 
evidence showing that educational soap operas can have positive effects on 
viewers and their knowledge about over-indebtedness. As was shown in 
Case V, digital games and applications can be beneficial in the context of 
microfinance. In the specific example of the Shesha Game, I presented 
evidence suggesting a positive impact on the clients’ knowledge about how 
to check their balances and have an overview of their finances. 
The strongest focus was put on the third pillar. The aim was to analyze 
four soft law standards, which all bear the potential to alleviate over-
indebtedness, and to demonstrate their applicability to microfinance and if 
and to what degree these standards were established in the common 
interest (Mattli and Woods 2009). Only Case VIII – the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights – and Case IX – the Smart 
Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and Certification Program could be 
classified as common interest regulation. Due to their applicability to the 
microfinance context, Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles and 
Certification Program fit the framework of responsible microfinance best and 
therefore bear great potential to help mitigate over-indebtedness. 
Part IV of this study linked the extended definition of microfinance (Part 
I) in combination with the enhanced understanding of ‘responsibility’ within 
the concept of responsible microfinance (Part III) and the three approaches 
to combat over-indebtedness (Part II and IV) to a comprehensive multi-
stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance. The practical cases 
discussed demonstrate that over-indebtedness can be addressed and 
mitigated through singlehanded or coordinated and cooperative 
undertakings of microfinance stakeholders. 
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21.2 Overall Contribution 
This study is of an explorative character and therefore generalizing and 
comparing its results is difficult. However, the less structured methods 
applied in this research project allowed for an in-depth and contextual 
understanding of the role of client protection in microfinance, the 
phenomenon of over-indebtedness, the concept of responsible microfinance, 
and the practical strategies a multi-stakeholder framework of responsible 
microfinance could offer in order to mitigate over-indebtedness. 
There are four main contributions of this study. First, although there 
were several researchers and practitioners advocating enhanced client 
protection in microfinance there was no claim to integrate client protection 
into the definition of microfinance. I presented reasons why the current 
definition of microfinance should be extended and incorporate a quality-
dimension requiring MFIs to abide by client protection standards. Second, 
responsible microfinance being an exclusively practice oriented concept 
lacked a common definition. I concretized the concept and shed light on the 
possible meaning and functions ‘responsibility’ could have in responsible 
microfinance. Third, extending the definition of microfinance by adding a 
quality-dimension and connecting this understanding of microfinance to an 
encompassing multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance is a 
novel approach and contributes to and concretizes a conception of how to 
conduct microfinance responsibly in the light of the threats over-
indebtedness poses to clients, MFIs, and microfinance markets. Fourth, I 
elaborated on a selection of strategies of how to enable and enforce the 
multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance in practice. I 
analyzed not only well-known, but also rarely discussed strategies to 
mitigate over-indebtedness and present the central implications that 
thereby surfaced below. 
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21.3 Implications for Practice and Direction for 
Future Research 
There are mainly three implications for practice that go beyond what has 
been addressed in this research project, and these implications are linked to 
directions future research could take in order to further contribute to 
concretizing a multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance. The 
three implications are: 
I. building a supervisory board for the third pillar of the framework of 
responsible microfinance, 
II. capitalizing the role of investors and their leverage to enable and 
enforce responsible microfinance, and 
III. enhancing the coordination between the efforts of microfinance 
stakeholders to mitigate over-indebtedness. 
 
Building a Supervisory Board for Pillar III 
The definition of responsibility introduced in Chapter 14 states that we 
either commit ourselves to a responsibility, in the sense of a promise, or 
that we are appointed to a responsibility from an authority, in the sense of 
an exogenous assignment (Raz 1988, 82; Simmons 1979, 76). However, 
this research project does not address what the character of this ‘authority’ 
is. Who is entitled to assign MFIs with a duty? And, who is legitimate to 
detect that a certain MFI has failed to fulfill its duty and to impose a 
sanction? As argued in Chapter 14.4 holding a person or corporation 
responsible includes actually blaming or approving this person or 
corporation. In the case of wrongdoing, eschewing the blame denies that 
there is a creditor: That there is „someone to whom at least an apology is 
owed” (Pettit 2007b, 174). The lack of a legitimate authority that has not 
only the mandate to assign responsibility to MFIs but also to declare 
breaches of MFIs often results in no one actually blaming contravening 
MFIs. 
In Chapter 19.4 and 19.5 it has been shown that the two standards 
most applicable in the realm of microfinance – Smart Campaign’s Client 
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Protection Principles and Certification Program and SPTF’s Universal 
Standards for Social Performance – both showed lack of enforceability. 
There are two possibilities of how to approach this issue and enhance 
enforceability in the future. In Chapter 19.5 and 19.7, it was discussed that 
SPTF, Smart Campaign and CERISE already work closely together. They, for 
example, synchronize the revision processes of their tools and principles. 
These main players all representing institutions that further the goals of 
responsible microfinance, could form an overarching control organ, for 
example, an elected supervisory board within the framework of responsible 
microfinance, which is authorized by the endorsers of SPTF, Smart 
Campaign and CERISE to criticize but also praise business practices of 
endorsers. On the one hand, MFIs that cannot afford a certification but 
nonetheless strive to implement client protection and social performance 
management into their day to day business, are given the opportunity to 
prove their abidance despite the lack of certification. On the other hand, 
MFIs that endorse Smart Campaign’s principles and SPTF’s universal 
standards but do not act accordingly could be criticized for their conduct. In 
order to detect harmful practices more easily there is the option to have 
National Contact Points (NCPs) in place. The OECD, for example, requires all 
countries adhering to the ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ to 
have NCPs in place. NCPs’ roles are to „further the effectiveness of the 
Guidelines by undertaking promotional activities, handling enquiries, and 
contributing to the resolution of issues that arise from the alleged non-
observance of the guidelines in specific instances” (OECD 2016). Such a 
system could work well in the context of responsible microfinance. The size 
and complexity of such a system though would have to be adapted to the 
size and complexity of the worldwide microfinance market. The most 
demanding task remains, and that holds true for any regulatory framework 
that claims enforceability, the actual implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement is key to ensure that standards are not „empty promises that 
undermine trust” (Brix and McKee 2010, 19). 
 
  
  227 
Capitalizing the Role of Investors 
I marginally addressed the role of investors in regard to using their leverage 
in order to enforce responsible microfinance. Investors putting their money 
into microfinance (e.g. private equity, lending money) could condition their 
investments on certain standards that have to be met103. If the MFI does 
not abide by the terms agreed upon, the investor might increase the cost of 
the loan. In fact, a survey conducted by SPTF shows that investors already 
incentivize MFI’s to abide by soft law standards by giving the MFIs 
preferential terms if they do so (Social Performance Task Force 2014c, 9). 
Also Brix and McKee (2010, 21) more generally state that investors can 
improve the double bottom line of the MFI, so that especially the social 
performance is enhanced. They further argue that the leverage of the 
investor should not be misjudged and actually is often considered a better 
incentive for adequate business conduct of MFIs than the threat of 
regulatory intervention. Additionally, Argüello et al. (2013, 190) cite 
Guillermo Salcedo, current Deputy Director Credit at Oikocredit 
International, that they „would never fund an organization that is purely 
commercial. If there is no social value, we wouldn’t fund it”. This statement 
resonates with all interviewees Argüello et al. consulted. Hence, there 
already seem to be several investors conditioning their investments on the 
social performance of MFIs. 
  
                                       
103 Funders range from institutional investors putting their money mainly into formal 
MFIs to NGOs funding smaller and semi-formal MFIs. All investor types could use their 
leverage to incentivize responsible microfinance practices. 
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Enhancing Coordination 
As shown in Part IV, cooperation between various microfinance stakeholders 
is established within all of the pillars of responsible microfinance. However, 
the coordination between the three pillars is widely non-existent. This fact is 
partly owed to the framework of responsible microfinance still being in its 
infancy but microfinance summits bringing public and private actors 
together, and collaboration, such as the one between Smart Campaign, 
SPTF and CERISE in regard to synchronizing revision processes, can address 
and minimize coordination problems and render the framework of 
responsible microfinance more effective. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Savings Products 
Savings products are vital for MFIs. They help them to reach self-
sustainability and, in the case of compulsory savings, they insure the MFI 
against defaults. Furthermore, savings are also beneficial for clients. After 
reaching a certain amount, savings serve as collateral for larger loans. Also 
it enables microfinance clients to insure themselves against sudden shocks, 
such as natural disasters, death, illness or payment for events, such as 
tuition or self-finance investments (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 174–
175). Robinson (2001, 21) even claims that savings are more valuable to 
the client than credit. 
Savings can be roughly categorized into compulsory and voluntary savings. 
In many countries the regulatory status of the MFI determines whether it is 
allowed to take deposits. It is often the case that solely MFIs with a banking 
license may offer voluntary savings products. 
The main voluntary savings products are: current accounts without 
restrictions and contractual savings products with a savings plan and 
interest on the deposited amount (La Torre and Vento 2006, 28–29). MFIs 
that do not operate under banking law can merely offer compulsory 
savings. Compulsory savings are forced savings and technically do not 
count as deposits. They serve as an alternative form of collateral for a loan 
and are retained as long as the client is in arrear with his or her payments 
(Morduch 2000, 626; Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 173). 
 
Insurance Products 
The BoP is at the mercy of all kinds of risks, such as natural disasters, 
illnesses or droughts. Mostly they lack insurance and suffer great losses due 
to the lack of reserves (Cohen and Sebstad 2005, 397). 
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Microinsurance products aim to reduce the vulnerability to outer shocks 
(Arun et al. 2005, 308). The product variety ranges from life-, property-, 
weather- to health insurance (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 195–201). 
 
In literature, the provision of insurances in microfinance is widely criticized 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 195; Cohen and Sebstad 2005, 402; La 
Torre and Vento 2006, 31), especially due to the common combination of 
insurance products with credit and savings, which may lead to concentrated 
risks (La Torre and Vento 2006, 31). Also, microinsurance products face the 
same imperfect information problems there are with microcredits. TCs are 
very high and enforcing insurance contracts is difficult (Armendáriz and 
Morduch 2010, 195, see also discussion about information asymmetries in 
5.3.2.1). 
 
Money Transfer 
Money transfer – also named payment services, or fund transfer – allows 
people to send money from one destination to another via a secure channel. 
Clients that use this form of transfer, favor sending money in an alternative 
form to cash (Isern, Donges, and Smith 2008, 96). Money transfer is simple 
and safe; the prices of these products can however greatly differ. The 
money is quickly transferred to the desired destination and may be paper-
based (e.g. checks), card-based (e.g. debit card), or transferred 
electronically (e.g. e-banking) (Isern, Donges, and Smith 2008, 61, 100–
109). Either MFIs have their own payment services products or they 
cooperate with common global providers such as Western Union and 
MoneyGram or commercial banks. 
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Funders of Microfinance 
From the 1980s on, MFIs were still dependent on subsidies in order to keep 
up their operations. This changed a decade later when the financial self-
sufficiency of MFIs came into focus and institutions strived to avoid soft 
loans and interest free grants given by donors (e.g. foundations, 
development agencies) (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 323). Soft loans 
characteristically have subsidized interest rates 104  and are commonly 
provided by aid agencies (e.g. UK Department for international 
Development), apex institutions (e.g. Women’s World Banking, ACCION) or 
multilateral banks (e.g. The World Bank). With the enhanced focus on 
growth and financial sustainability in the 1990s, also institutional investors 
channeled their funds into microfinance markets (Armendáriz and Morduch 
2010, 254–256). This is achieved through microfinance investment vehicles 
(MIVs) that „invest all or part of their assets in microfinance institutions” 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 254). Furthermore, MFIs try to operate 
financially sustainably with their own means. Except from the provision of 
training - which is normally free - interest rates, savings and fees are 
fundamental sources of income for the MFI (La Torre/ Vento 2006: 35). 
Despite efforts to reach financial sustainability, subsidies do not lose their 
importance in microfinance. Grants and soft loans play their part and 
although they should not subsidize „ongoing operations”, they may be 
valuable for MFIs to foster their start-up phase, to support non-profit 
services that MFIs provide (e.g. impact data collection that might benefit 
also others) for institution building (e.g. introducing a new management 
information system) or for educational training (e.g. business development, 
health, finance), the MFI might offer (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010, 333–
334). 
  
                                       
104 Armendáriz and Morduch (2010, 322–323) take the Grameen Bank as an example 
showing that from 1985 to 1996 the nominal interest rate per year it had to pay was around 
3.8 percent. After adjustments for inflation are subtracted, -1.8 percent per year were left to 
pay. In comparison, when lending from commercial banks it would have to pay more than 10 
percent per year. 
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The following figure illustrates the financial in- and outflows of an MFI and 
summarizes how MFIs are funded. 
 
Figure 9: Financial In- and Outflows of MFIs (Landolt 2009, 8) 
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